Daily Report

East Europe

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Pact Foreign Ministers Confer at UN Headquarters

Jeszenszky Meets With Nastase

LD0110094390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Excerpts] Warsaw Pact foreign ministers have conferred at the UN headquarters in New York, where Geza Jeszenszky also held a discussion with his Romanian counterpart. Gyorgy Bolgar reports:

[Bolgar] [passage omitted] As Geza Jeszenszky said after the meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, Hungary and the Pact member states welcome with satisfaction the fact that Baker and Shevardnadze agreed last week on the main disputed issues of the reduction of European conventional weapons.

[Begin Jeszenszky recording] I (?highlighted) and expressed my recognition, my pleasure, because we felt that this was an enormous obstacle to agreement, and the fact that there was success in going beyond this makes the rest possible as well, that the other states belonging to the Warsaw Pact should also agree among themselves on the level of the various kinds of weapons. [end recording]

[Bolgar] At the dinner hosted by the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Geza Jeszenszky also had the opportunity to hold separate discussions with his counterparts. Earlier, however, at the Hungarian UN mission he conducted a 45-minute discussion with Romanian Foreign Minister Nastase.

[Begin Jeszenszky recording] It is in itself important. I have always believed this, that we should also confer with one another here at a high level. On the other hand, as we indicated earlier as well, a high-level discussion can never take the place of substantive work, the work of experts, and, well, it cannot take the place of agreement. I am of the view, and I even said this, that we have to strive for a frontal breakthrough. He, on the contrary, seeks a solution in tiny steps. There are basic issues here which we have been keeping on the agenda for a very long time, to which, as a matter of fact, Romania has already committed itself, either on the basis of an agreement, or on the basis of earlier promises. [end recording]

Ministers Discuss CSCE, Arms Levels

LD0110153490 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1100 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] In the United States, an informal meeting of foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact states was held in the residence of our permanent UN representative in New York. It was a part of the preparations for a ministerial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is starting in New York this evening. Ministers examined the structural changes of the organization and the Vienna talks on conventional arms. They agreed in principle on their intention to dissolve the Warsaw Pact military structures and to turn them into political structures.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, speaking about the development of talks on conventional arms, briefed them on the latest talks with his U.S. counterpart, James Baker, at which the Soviet Union accepted a ceiling of 33 percent as the maximum share of one country in the total number of weapons in a particular sphere. All participants called this agreement acceptable.

Chebeleu on Balkan Foreign Ministries' Meeting

AU2009191090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1803 GMT 20 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/9/1990—Mr. Traian Chebeleu, spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specified, at his weekly press conference, that, at the recent Bucharest meeting of high officials from Balkan countries' Foreign Ministries, Romania made five concrete cooperation proposals, which were included in the final act. "I cannot possibly understand how the 'IZVESTYA' correspondent in Bucharest could state in his commentary titled 'Dialogue on the Balkans' that none of the five Romanian proposals could be reflected in the final document, a misrepresentation which was further relayed by Radio Moscow".

With reference to one of the targets of the said meeting, which was to prepare the Balkan foreign ministers' conference scheduled for 24-25 October at Tirana, Mr. Chebeleu reminded that the Romanian foreign minister outlined in his opening address to the Bucharest meeting the general principles of the Romanian initiative advanced by President Iliescu himself during his visit in Yugoslavia. This initiative proposes the setting up of a forum for security and cooperation in the Balkans and is at the moment the object of diplomatic consultations among the countries in the area.

Mr. Chebeleu also expressed the opinion that the 4th conference on how the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty was carried out, was important, useful, and underlined the significant place the Non-Proliferation Treaty holds within the international peace and security system, as well as the wide support that juridical instrument enjoyed. "We believe that the ban on nuclear weapons could best meet success if thought out in terms of equal partnership in a joint target". He pointed out that Romania strictly observed her obligations deriving from the treaty.

The spokesman also mentioned that on 10 September the Finnish ambassador in Bucharest called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue an invitation to visit Finland to Mr. Romulus Neagu, state secretary, on behalf of the Finnish Government which is willing to be informed, most accurately, from official source, about the situation in Romania.

Ministry Denies Rumors of Troops in Saudi Arabia

AU0110211590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] In connection with rumors spreading around Sofia and other cities that a Bulgarian military aircraft with soldiers on board has allegedly taken off for Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of National Defense announces that this is not true. It adds that similar rumors are only creating unnecessary tension among the public.

Semerdzhiev Meets Relatives of Citizens in Iraq

AU0110212190 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Vice President Atanas Semerdzhiev received representatives from the initiative committee of the relatives of Bulgarians in Iraq who submitted their petitions and proposals to him. The representatives of the initiative committee were informed that the Committee on Sanctions which is under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council has been been approached in connection with authorizing the delivery of foodstuffs by air for the needs of our compatriots in Iraq.

The petition submitted by the initiative committee on guaranteeing the evacuation of all Bulgarian citizens who wish to return to their home country will be handed over to the government. The country's leadership is aware of its responsibility for the fate of our citizens.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the president's office, of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and from the Agrokompleks and Transkompleks economic enterprises.

Chinese Economic Delegation Visits; Meets Lukanov

AU0110203690 Sofia BTA in English 2007 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—The state of Bulgaro-Chinese economic relations was discussed at a meeting here today between Mr. Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mr Zheng Tuobin, minister of foreign economic relations and trade of China.

An emphasis was laid on the availability of favorable opportunities for a further expansion of business contacts in the spirit of the existing traditionally good relations between the two countries. Particular attention was paid to cooperation in mechanical engineering, the chemical and the light industry.

Long-Term Trade Agreement Signed

AU0210090290 Sofia BTA in English 2203 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA) —A new long-term trade agreement between the governments of Bulgaria and China was signed here today. It covers the period until 1995 and envisages a transition to settlements in freely convertible currency. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of barter or compensation deals.

This agreement places trade and economic relations between Bulgaria and China on a new basis. It only defines the legal framework in which trade will be conducted, while the companies, free from state tutelage, will decide the rest.

A clearing payment protocol, which was also signed, envisages that end-of-the-year accounts be balanced by a delivery of goods. For the time being bilateral trade is almost balanced.

U.S. Businessmen Draft Economic Management Plan

AU0210090090 Sofia BTA in English 2157 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—Dr. Richard W. Rahn, vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who heads a team of U.S. experts drafting an economic crisis management program for Bulgaria, today handed his draft to the Prime Minister Mr. Andrey Lukanov. The more than 600-page long draft contains suggestions and recommendations to the government and to the Grand National Assembly.

For his part the prime minister presented to the guest the blueprint of an economic reform which is being drafted by the government. He told the U.S. official about the key areas of the reform and more specifically about the plans for privatization, a reform of the monetary and credit, banking and currency system, insurance, labor remuneration, as well as the provision of social protection for the people. A new pricing policy was also mentioned as part of the reform.

According to the Americans, the sooner the reform is carried out, the better. In their view, the coming three to six months will be hard for the country, no matter what the government will do. However, if it takes resolute action now, there will be fewer difficulties. If resolute action is delayed, the period of difficulties will be longer. They stressed particularly the need to act fast and resolutely to call the attention of the world financial community and of the business circles.

It was recommended to speed up the drafting of the new constitution or that in the coming months the Grand National Assembly adopt a declaration on constitutional principles as a groundwork for further work on the draft Constitution. The U.S. experts believe that such a step would help build the business community's confidence in Bulgaria.

The U.S. program recommends that the following branches of the Bulgarian economy be prioritized: agriculture, the food and the light industry, the tourist

industry, trade and services, high technology sectors of mechanical engineering, electronics and the chemical industry.

The U.S. experts' recommendations will be used by the Bulgarian Government in the finalization of the economic reform program which will be submitted to the Grand National Assembly on October 9.

Zhelev Meets Sweden's Carlsson, NATO's Woerner

AU0110203790 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Aleksandur Vladkov report "from the United States" on 1 October—live or recorded]

[Text] Today's activities of the visit paid by President Zhelyu Zhelev to the United States was devoted to his participation in the 45th Session of the UN General Assembly, after which he departed for Boston.

The Bulgarian president already met with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, with whom he conducted talks on the future of bilateral relations between the two countries. Ingvar Carlsson expressed the support of the Swedish Government for the democratic changes under way in our country. He pointed out the necessity of prompt actions aimed at adjusting Bulgarian legislation to international norms, especially in the economic sphere, which is absolutely necessary for rendering assistance to Bulgaria during this difficult period.

Zhelyu Zhelev, in turn, assured the Swedish prime minister that the changes in Bulgaria are irreversible and that our country needs the support of the Western countries for consolidating this process.

Lyuben Gotsev, Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs, attended the meeting.

Dr. Zhelev also held a talk with Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general. During the meeting which was attended by Foreign Minister Lyuben Gotsev and Dimitur Ludzhev, presidential adviser, the Bulgarian side explained the new Bulgarian foreign policy concept stemming from the changes under way in Bulgaria and in worldwide international relations. The view was expressed that the Warsaw Pact organization has exhausted its present functions and should exist in the future as a political consultative council.

Bulgaria is not looking for one-way methods of guaranteeing its security, but intends to do so on the basis of treaties with all its partners and within the framework of the new European and world structures of security and cooperation.

In Boston the president of the Republic is expected to give two lectures at the Boston Medical Institute and at Harvard University. The subjects of the lectures will be the transition from a totalitarian system to liberal democracy in Bulgaria and to the development of Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries.

The president will also have meetings at the Boston Chamber of Commerce with representatives of local business circles.

Late at night, or in the early hours of next morning, according to Bulgarian time, the president of the Republic is expected to return to New York.

At tomorrow's morning session he will address the 45th Session of the UN General Assembly.

FRG Embassy Outlines New Visa Requirements

AU2809185890 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] The FRG Embassy in Sofia has submitted instructions to the Consular Department of the Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Ministry concerning instructions for Bulgarian citizens visiting the GDR and West Berlin.

On this occasion, the Consular Department announces that, following the coming formal unification of the GDR and the FRG, the entry and stay of Bulgarian citizens on the territory of the former GDR and of West Berlin will be subject to the following regulations:

The validity of the agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the GDR on the mutual abolition of the visa regime for citizens from the two countries is annulled as of 3 October 1990 on the basis of the requirement for new regulations concerning visits to the territory of united Germany. Following this date, Bulgarian citizens will not be allowed to enter the territory of the former GDR without visas.

The validity of special permits for visits to West Berlin is annulled. Following 20 September 1990 Bulgarian citizens will not be allowed on the territory of West Berlin without visas.

Following 3 October 1990, visas for visits to the territory of the former GDR will be granted on the basis of the FRG laws on aliens adopted on 28 April 1965. This law will be enforced on the territory of the former GDR until 1 January 1991.

Following this date, the new German law on aliens adopted on 9 July 1990 will come into force. Hence, until 1 January 1991, Bulgarian citizens will be granted visitor's visas to the present GDR territory on the basis of the conditions settled by the GDR internal legislation and formerly applied to citizens of other countries with which the GDR did not have agreements on a visa-free regime.

Following 1 January 1991, visas for Bulgarian citizens' visits to the former GDR will be issued according to the currently valid procedures for entrance and residence on the FRG territory.

Bulgarian citizens have the opportunity to obtain further information on these regulations from the FRG Embassy in Sofia, or from the Consular Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

International Seminar on Lev Convertibility Held

AU0210085690 Sofia BTA in English 2154 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Varna, 1 Oct (BTA)—A discussion of the problems concerning the convertibility of Central and East European currencies opened here today with an analysis of the Bulgarian conditions and prerequisites for convertibility of the Bulgarian lev. The meeting of experts and businessmen in this field from 16 European countries, the U.S. and Japan has been organized by the Vienna-based International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis together with the Institute of State Administration and Economic Management with the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria.

The idea to discuss these problems emerged at the first Varna Seminar (1989) on East-West Economic Interaction. The subject of the current seminar is relevant to the urgent problems which these countries confront in their economic and socio-political reform. Representatives of Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania shared with their colleagues their respective experience in this field. A report on the prospects, achievements and difficulties in the currency, economic and social union between the FRG and the GDR was submitted to the seminar.

SDS's Popov Wins By-Election in Velingrad

AU0110105090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Our correspondent Radka Mileva reports the results of the by-election for the Grand National Assembly representative from Velinograd's 92d single-mandate constituency.

[Mileva] The results were already published last night, thanks to the rapid and competent work of the regional election commission, and confirmed by the members of the Central Election Commission, who together with the commission's chairman, Professor Zhivkov Stalev, and Dimitur Popov, secretary, were in Velingrad throughout the day. The members of the Central Election Commission accepted the protocol of the regional election commission and confirmed its validity on the spot.

In his assessment of the election, Dimitur Popov stated that the Election Law had been fully observed and this was confirmed by the protocols of the section commissions. Dimitur Popov pointed out in particular that the difference between the Velingrad by-election and the elections for the Grand National Assembly, which took place on 10 and 17 June, appears to be the sharp deterioration of the citizens' interest in the elections. Out of 44,010 voters only 27,622, or 62.76 percent voted.

The results: Some 58.84 percent voted for Dr. Aleksandur Popov of the Union of Democratic Forces; Ilko Iliev, Bulgarian Socialist Party, 39.09 percent; Nevena Zareva, Alternative Socialist Association, 266 votes; Kiril Georgiev, Liberal Party, 227 votes; and Vera Bednikova, Radical Party, 78 votes.

The reports about violations in some election sections have been passed on to the Central Election Commission. They do not, however, cast any doubt on the legitimacy and legality of the elections and their democratic character.

BZNS Begins Municipal Elections Campaign

AU0110112890 Sofia BTA in English 1025 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—The Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS) will run in the forthcoming municipal elections with a list of its own, but as an ally of the Union of Democratic Forces and the other opposition parties, the leader of the agrarians, Mr. Viktor Vulkov, said at the session of the BZNS Supreme Council which was held here. He accused the Nikola Petkov BZNS of trying to assert itself as a monopoly force with the Agrarians and expressed his conviction that the unification of the two agrarian parties can and must be implemenete only on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

In the decision adopted by the council support is expressed for the activity of the BZNS leadership aimed at a merger with the Nikola Petkov BZNS. The Agrarians will suggest to the Presidency to change the name of the town of Georgi Traykov (BZNS leader of many years who died in 1975) and of all streets and sites called after the name of this BZNS activist. The former agrarian leader, Mr. Angel Dimitrov, and other top ranking BZNS figures of the time of the totalitarian regime were removed from the BZNS ruling council. Ms. Elena Kircheva, spokeswoman for the BZNS parliamentary group, and other representatives of the "new generation" of politicians in the Agrarian Party were elected members of the council.

The BZNS Supreme Council determined the dismantling of the totalitarian system and the implementation of a peaceful transition to democracy as the most important tasks which the United Agrarians should carry out.

Beron Calls For Democratic Overthrow of BSP

AU0210091090 Sofia BTA in English 0818 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 2 Oct (BTA)—"I consider my present post to be a temporary one. I do not intent to hold it for three decades, as Todor Zhivkov did." The interview the ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME paper held with Dr. Petur Beron, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) a biologist by occupation, begins with these words.

Dr. Beron severely criticizes the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and blames it for the grave situation in the country. He says that the BSP should be overthrown in a parliamentary way and by complying with the Constitution and that the culprits for the country's painful problems should be taken to task.

The Union of Democratic Forces declares itself to be for a peaceful transition to democracy, Dr. Beron points out. He mentions the proposals made by the opposition for guaranteeing the transition to democracy and market economy, for the complete depolitization of the state institutions and for the protection of the environment.

The SDS leader warns about the existence of extremist forces which are trying to create chaos and provoke unrests. These forces must be isolated, Dr. Petur Beron states.

The leader of the Bulgarian opposition expresses his hope that the reforms in Bulgaria would receive international support. He notes there are good prospects for cooperation between the SDS and the Bulgarian Agrarian Party which is to the interest of the reform.

Opposition Intends To Publish Terrorism Documents

AU0110203490 Sofia BTA in English 1836 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—The opposition Union of Democratic Forces-affiliated Podkrepa Labor Confederation will soon make public materials on the connections of the ousted regime with international terrorism: on the operation of terrorist training centers in Bulgaria, and documentary evidence of the stay in this country of notorious terrorists Ali Agca and Carlos, Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of Podkrepa, told the press today.

He went on to say that many foreign organizations show interest and would like to conduct inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the arson of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council. Dr. Trenchev, who faces charges of instigation in the arson, specified that the Podkrepa Labor Confederation is holding negotiations and a group of U.S. experts will probably arrive here.

Vice President Semerdzhiev on Position, Future

AU3009183190 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 26 Sep 90

[Interview with Vice President Atanas Semerdzhiev by Lyubomir Denov and Valeri Vasev; place and date not given: "Security for Everyone and All"; first two paragraphs are NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] Amidst the rapidly changing circumstances which our society is undergoing, the problems of its security are the most topical and most crucial today. This applies to general national security guaranteeing our peaceful transition to a democratic and rule-of-law state, and also to our state security and to the preservation of our country's territorial integrity.

Security for everyone and for all—this was the subject of interview with Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, who was so kind to answer our questions.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Can you describe the reasons for establishing the National Security Council, its most important tasks, and the chief trends of activities?

[Semerdzhiev] Guaranteeing national security has always been and will be a priority task for every society and every government, at least today and in the near future. It is absolutely natural that our state leadership should have the same attitude toward this question. Therefore, establishing the National Security Council, appointing its staff, and establishing regulations for its activities was one of the first acts accomplished by Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev after his election to the post of president of the Republic.

The problems and tasks of protecting public order were the prerogative of the State Defense Committee in the past. According to the amendments and addenda to the country's Constitution this organ was abolished. Its functions were transferred to the National Security Council which was based on Volume 11, Article 92 of the Constitution.

The council is a consultative organ under the president's office. This is the statute of such institutions in all countries based on well-established democratic traditions. The basic trends of the council's activities apply to both domestic and foreign policy in connection with national security, to the organization, training, and use of the Armed Forces and security organs, to the country's defense preparations. We should point out that during crisis situations the Council is expected to discuss and propose measures likely to guarantee civil peace, public order, and the citizens' rights and interests.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Would you provide some details on the council's staff? Are you in a position to disclose the qualifications of the staff members both as experts and as exponents of political parties to the readers of NARODNA ARMIYA?

[Semerdzhiev] The answer to this question is provided by Article 2 of the document entitled: "Structure and Regulations of the Security Council's Work." It operates under the leadership of the president of the Republic. The vice president is its deputy chairman. The chairman of the Council of Ministers, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of national defense, the minister of internal affairs, the minister of economics, the chief of the General Staff, and other leaders are the members of the council.

As regards the staff's intellectual qualities, education, and professional qualifications, they are chiefly determined by the appointment of cabinet members. The higher the criteria in selecting ministers are, the greater will be the opportunities of the National Security Council, as a whole, for efficiently coping with its tasks.

Your question about the council's political image is inappropriate in my view, considering that none of the staff members is participating as an exponent of a political party, or movement. The protection of national security is a special function irrelevant of all political preferences. This principle applies to all National Security Council members.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Can you map out the guidelines of cooperation between the National Security Council and the Grand National Assembly?

[Semerdzhiev] There can be no doubt about the urgent requirement for such cooperation. Nevertheless, the forms and mechanisms through which it is supposed to function are still in the process of being clarified. In dealing with this problem we should observe the principle of the separation of power. The Grand National Assembly is the country's supreme legislative organ, while the National Security Council is a consultative organ under the Presidency. The first steps in organizing the cooperation between the two institutions, and with the Permanent Parliamentary Commission on National Security, in particular, have already been accomplished. The leadership of this commission is familiar with the council's structure, regulations, and working schedule for the 1990 period.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What do you, as vice president of the Republic, think about the influence of the draft law on amendments and addenda to the Law on Political Parties, which is aimed at the depolitization of certain basic institutions, and how national security may be effected?

[Semerdzhiev] The term "depolitization" has become very popular, but it far from accurately reflects the real situation. There is no army in the world, there are no security organs whatsoever, which are totally relieved of political functions. Such institutions are part of the state structure and they cannot be apolitical. What matters is that they should be independent from the political parties existing in the country and that they should be guided solely by the ideas and principles of the Constitution, that they should exclusively serve national unity and national interests. The security organs should be the guarantors of the country's sovereignty, of the inviolability of national borders and of the country's territorial integrity, they should protect the citizens' rights and freedoms, and decisively contribute to our country's transformation into a democratic and rule-of-law state.

I support the idea contained in the draft law on this issue which was submitted by the president of the Republic to the Grand National Assembly. It is, however, required to find the correct form of expression in this respect. I am not an expert on the subject. This is the task of legal experts and of the respective parliamentary permanent commissions.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What is the stand of the National Security Council on the alarming confrontation which characterizes our domestic political situation?

[Semerdzhiev] This stand was expressed during the president of the Republic's meeting recent meeting with leaders of the major political forces and members of the National Security Council to discuss the country's situation. The participants in the meeting pointed out that the increasing political and psychological intolerance and the exacerbated social tension are extremely dangerous. Such tendencies are likely to provoke general disorder and unrestrained violence. This would be disasterous. In this connection, the participants in the meeting submitted some recommendations which were approved by the president of the Republic and publicly announced on television, radio, and in the newspapers.

Unless the development of the country's situation takes a decisive turn for the better, the National Security Council will be forced to deal with these problems again and again.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Last, but not least, let us ask you a personal question: Would you compare your work as vice president of the Republic with that of the Bulgarian People's Army chief of staff? Do you not miss the Army?

[Semerdzhiev] I never expected to be chosen for such a high office and I feel very honored by the great confidence in my abilities. I still have the feeling that the recent events which changed my existence concerned another person, and not myself. I was prepared simply to remain a deputy in the Grand National Assembly, but the efforts of solving the presidential crisis involved me in a solution of compromise and promoted me to a post which is linked to the hopes and expectations of numerous people. Naturally, their hopes and expectations are not so much addressed to me in person, as they are to the president of the Republic. I do not know what will happen, but I very much hope that we will justify the people's hopes and will not disappoint them. This applies to the problem of civil peace, in the first place, to the people's longing for a peaceful life and for security, without which there can be no way out of the crisis. Without civil peace, anxiety about the future, instead of joy and happiness, will reign in our homes.

Apart from the years of partisan struggle and my service on the front of World War II, I spent my entire conscious life in the Army. This career greatly influenced my personal life. Therefore, in my case retiring from the Army and embarking upon a new career was not a simple change of jobs, but a profound psychological and emotional experience. Hardly anyone would remain unaffected in my position. Actually, I will always remain a soldier at heart until the end of my days.

TU Accuses Government of Breaking Wage Promises

AU0210085890 Sofia BTA in English 2207 GMT 2 Oct 90

["Trade Unions Accuse Government"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—The Executive Committee of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions convenes the National Strike Committee and the Coordinating Council of the Confederation. This is necessary because there are no more opportunities for a constructive dialogue with the government on wage indexing, says a decision of the Executive Committee.

The decision recalls that none of the deadlines under the August 14 accords on wage indexing between the trade unions and the government has been met and that the indexing was supposed to offset at least partially the blows which the working people suffer daily from the growing prices. Under the accords, the indexing had to be introduced as from September 1. The government, however, again broke its promise, the decision says. The Bulgarian working people will not receive their due compensation for September. The failure to adopt the decree calls into question the October indexing, too. Meanwhile, prices keep rising steeply. The repeated delay of indexing shows clearly that the government practically seeks a unilateral revision of the accords, the confederation Executive Committee points out.

The Podkrepa Labor Confederation, the other major trade union amalgamation, issued a declaration to the same effect today.

An effective strike was declared today at the port of Varna. On August 1, 1990 the staff of the port asked the government to reduce the profit tax, to eliminate the tax on the wage level growth, to raise the rate of the port service charges and to index wages. Later on, after talks between the strike committee and the port administration in the presence of the first deputy minister of transport, an agreement was reached to end the strike. The prime minister Mr. Andrey Lukanov sent a letter assuring the port workers that all problems listed in the declaration two months ago will be considered without delay by the Grand National Assembly.

Local Interim Administrative Bodies Appointed

AU0110204390 Sofia BTA in English 1959 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—The chairman of the Council of Ministers today appointed the Interim Executive Committees of 139 municipalities in accordance with the signed protocols whereby all political forces in those municipalities give their consent. These administrations meet the requirements set by the People's Councils Act amendment act, adopted by the Grand National Assembly, and the additional directions for their formation that no political force should have a majority in an interim administration.

In a number of municipalities, however, work has not been completed on the coordination of the composition of the interim executive committees. In this connection the chairman of the Council of Ministers issued additional directions in keeping with the common understanding reached by the representatives of the political forces to the president of the Republic and insisted on an urgent holding of consultations on the nominations. The statutory deadline for the formation of interim administrations is October 7, 1990. The term of office of the previous local governments expired on August 28. Local elections are expected to be set for the end of the year.

New Islamic Institute Inaugurated in Sofia

AU0110204190 Sofia BTA in English 1839 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 Oct (BTA)—Forty-five Muslims from all over the country will attend the Islamic Institute which was inaugurated here today as the first junior college of its kind in this country. The last Muslim high school was closed in 1948.

The students, selected from 700 applicants, will study general education subjects like history, history of philosophy and foreign languages. Some of the lecturers teach at Sofia University and at other institutes of higher learning.

Speaking at the inauguration of the institute its rector, Khadzhi Nedim Khafuz Ibrakahim Gendzhev, chief mufti of Muslims in Bulgaria, said that there had been long a need of an institute for Islamic culture. He told the BTA that the institute has become possible thanks to the democratization in society and to the efforts of the renewed Supreme Muslim Theological Council, to its perseverance and initiative. The rector expressed the hope that in several years' time, the junior college could turn into a senior one.

A Muslim high school will open in Shumen soon.

Calfa, Other Officials Attend VPN Meeting

LD2909185390 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Report on interview with Fedor Gal, chairman of the Public Against Violence Slovak Council, and Federal Premier Marian Calfa by Pavel Sveton at the meeting of deputies of the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council; date not given]

[Text] [Announcer] A two-day meeting of deputies of the Federal Assembly, the Slovak National Council, and representatives of governmental and legislative bodies for the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement opened in Tatranska Lomnica today. The meeting is being attended by Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Federal Assembly; Marian Calfa, federal prime minister; Fedor Gal, chairman of VPN's Slovak Council; and other representatives. Pavel Sveton has sent us the following report from this High Tatra mountainous resort:

[Sveton] The meeting is being held behind closed doors and journalists have been referring to a news conference, which is to be held at 2000 tonight. Not a great deal of information has, therefore, filtered out from the meeting during the day.

Fedor Gal told journalists before the meeting started that the VPN's concern is to raise integrity, accurately define its political platform, map out areas of friction, and seek ways of resolving them. When I asked him precisely about these so much debated areas of friction he said:

[Begin Gal recording] Deputies are not independent people who present their own views in the parliament. They are representatives of a political movement which they have to respect, champion, and develop its ideas. The government must act as an executive team which knows precisely what kind of political rear it represents, what are the chief tasks facing this society, and what is the strategy of tackling them. Our movement is no longer a civic initiative born spontaneously and which has a sole enemy—the totalitarian regime. The situation has changed substantially. Our movement cannot afford to be inconsistent internally; it cannot afford disintegration or a disunity of views, and this is what we are going to discuss. [end recording]

[Sveton] During an interval at the meeting, journalists did, after all, meet Federal Premier Marian Calfa at an impromptu news conference. I asked him about the diversity of views so symptomatic for VPN when there has has been such a demand for a unity of views. This was his answer:

[Begin Calfa recording] VPN emerged as a spontaneous movement. It has, in its name, against violence, and the base on which it was founded was opposition. When elections were held and VPN became a political force, which in fact won the elections in Slovakia, along with Civic Forum in the Czech lands, it became a positive force, that is a force which is creating something and which must implement its program. It had to overcome certain differences of views in order to unify itself on a kind of common course of action and to be able in particular to implement its election program. It is in this sense that a certain unity of views, a certain united course of action, and a certain internal discipline are now being demanded, both from members who support VPN, and from its representatives active in political life and holding offices of state. [end recording]

Calfa Gives News Briefing

LD2909215890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Federal Premier Marian Calfa stressed that the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement had, at the present time, the obligation to share actively in the positive building of our new political and economical system.

At an improvized news conference, during an interval of the deliberations of the VPN deputies held behind closed doors in Tatranska Lomnica, he went on to state that our economic situation was extremely serious and demanded extraordinary measures. The crisis staff—whose members include among them all three premiers—has to set up the priorities of the course of action to be taken. Premier Calfa considers the preserving of the dynamism of our economy to be the overriding task.

Regarding the powers of the Slovak and Federal Government, the premier said that there had to be a joint search for the best model of the co-existence of the two nations and legal set-up of the state.

People's Party Opens Extraordinary Congress

LD2909143190 Prague CTK in English 1338 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Zdar Nad Sazavou, South Moravia, Sept 29 (CTK)—An extraordinary congress of the Czechoslovak People's Party began here today, a week after prominent figures of major streams traded accusations over party policy and leadership.

Richard Sacher, Czecoslovak interior minister up to June 1990, attacked Chairman Josef Bartoncik, who had been accused of collaboration with the Secret Police, StB, for being a "burden for the party dragging it to the bottom of political life, into political isolation".

Bartoncik and Party General Secretary Jiri Cerny retaliated by charging Sacher with serving "rival political forces", meaning the Civil Forum, and "attempting to gain positions".

Bartoncik is one of seven candidates for chairmanship proposed to the congress while Sacher is not but it is assumed that the list is not final. The candidates also include Czech Deputy Premier Antonin Baudys and Augustin Navratil, the author of a 31-point petition for

civil and religious freedoms which was signed by over 600,000 people in 1988. The election is scheduled for tomorrow.

The present leadership says that the party wants to be a modern Christian party. It has 15 chairs in the 300-member Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) and 19 in the 200-member Czech National Council (Czech parliament). It ran in last June's elections in coalition with another three Christian Democratic groupings.

The Czechoslovak People's Party was founded in 1918 and with the exception of the second world war has not interrupted its activity. During the years of the Communist rule in Czechoslovakia it was the largest of the four political parties allowed by the Communists in Czechoslovakia. Last November, the former leadership of the party failed to react to the start of democratic struggle and it took an intenal reshuffle before it joined the general stream. It had some 50,000 members in November.

CPCZ Tactics for Upcoming Local Elections

AU2909191890 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 1

["(ada nig)"-signed report: "On Electoral Tactics"]

[Excerpt] Prague (from our correspondents)—Federal Assembly Deputies for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] briefed journalists on their party's tactics in the upcoming elections.

First of all, the CPCZ will try to form coalitions with other parties and movements—thereby, the possibility of alliance with some groups of the Civic Forum cannot be excluded—and independent candidates. The consideration of the CPCZ's actual list of candidates and adding the independent candidates to their list comes second. Only in the event that none of these possibilities proves feasible in some localities, will the occasion arise to support lists of candidates of other parties and movements. [passage omitted]

Socialists Call For 'Dignified' Participation

LD2909223390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] At the end of today's consultation meeting, members and officials of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party adopted a statement which calls for the party's dignified participation in the November communal elections. Political relations and legal aspects concerning assests of the Melantrich publishing house should also be solved.

Free, Liberal Democrat Parties Form Union

LD3009224290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 2030 GMT 30 Sep 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Liberal Democratic Party [Liberalno-Demokraticka Strana] and the leadership of the Party of Free Democats [Strana Slobodnych Demokratov] agreed today to form a Liberal Union [Liberalna Unia], due to the similarity of their program orientation and policies. The two parties will be equally represented in the union.

New Women's Organization Established 29 Sep

LD2909215690 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1500 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] A Confederation of Women and Family Initiatives of Czechoslovakia was established today at a meeting attended by some representatives of women's organizations, movements, and associations from both national republics. The new confederation is to be open to all organizations championing and defending the rights and interests of women, families, and children; furthermore, it is to have the right to represent women with government and state authorities.

People's Militia Said To Be Preparing Putsch

AU2709094290 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 22 Sep 90 p 3

[Stanislav Cech commentary: "Was it All?"]

[Text] That the People's Militia were the "protective shield" of the gains of the workers class was a claim the ideological demagogues had been hammering for years into the consciousness of our society. Lest our society lose these "gains," its "leading force" took motherly care to make sure that People's Militia members are not short of anything, especially in the sphere of weaponry and equipment.

Until recently no one had any idea of what was hidden under the cloak of the armed component of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. And, to be frank, the "velvet revolution" made it possible for information of this type to remain buried for a long time. Even today it is hard to determine the number of former People's Militia members. There exist also other interesting facts, however.

At the beginning of this year the Czechoslovak Army took over from the People's Militia, among other articles, 20,067 pistols, 71,043 submachine guns, 130 light field machine guns, 358 mortars, and 149 recoilless cannons, which represents a quite decently equipped army of a small country. In addition, it took over from People's Militia units 4,414,652 rounds of pistol ammunition, 62,896,128 rounds of submachine gun ammunition, 16,445,766 rounds of ammunition for guns and 1,082,767 for light guns. I will be generous and will leave aside the 4,005 signal pistols, 2,031 hand grenades, and other "trivia." What I do not comprehend, however, is for what the defense force of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia needed 13,328.4 kg of plastic explosives, 7,589 kg of TNT charges, and 1,360 kg of other explosives.

We do not, however, avail ourselves of far more important figures. An attentive reader will have noticed that

the above figures refer to weapons taken over by the Czechoslovak Army. We have no information on whether these were all the weapons in the People's Militia's possession. Last week a scandal broke out in South Moravia when the daily ROVNOST published a piece of information from the Defense and Security Affairs Committees of the Federal Assembly. Deputy Stanislav Devaty asked CSFR Minister of Interior Jan Langos what he knows about "certain" forces forming and arming themselves in Znojmo District in order to prepare a "red" or "bloody" October. He was seconded by Deputy Mlynarik, who came up with similar signals from Lucenec District. I do not want and do not intend to create a psychosis of chaos, anxiety, and panic in our society, which now needs peace and poise more than ever before. Yet we should certainly know the answers to these questions, which may well be interrelated.

Top Secret Testimony on 17 Nov Events Divulged

AU2909163990 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 3

[Report on interview with journalism student Vaclav Bartuska, representative of university students in the parliamentary commission set up to investigate the events of 17 November 1989, by Radek John; place and date not given: "'It Is Very Delicate'; Shall We Ever Learn the Truth, Rather Than Legends, About 17 November?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [John] Do you think that the commission investigating the events of 17 November 1989 [which led to the collapse of the communist regime] failed?

[Bartuska] In the six months of our work, we examined, unfortunately, only those things which we were allowed to investigate, as was, in fact, determined beforehand.

[John] Determined by whom?

[Bartuska] By those who established the commission; by those who were in power at that time. It is quite clear to me that every system guards its secrets and its dirty tricks [svinstva]. I have no illusions that in the United States, for example, this is any different. There, under pressure from the press and public opinion, the U.S. Congress is simply forced to investigate more than our parliament ever will. [passage omitted] Our commission was appointed, but because it was not provided with any actual powers it could not [do any real] work from the very beginning.

[John] How do parliamentary deputies respond when you tell them such things to their faces?

[Bartuska] When I came to the parliament building today, I was glad when the cloakroom attendants and waiters greeted me. They knew what I was doing there. I could care less about what the politicians say because I do not believe even their "Hello." I do not like politicians and politics.

[John] Do you not believe any of them?

[Bartuska] I would like to believe some of them but, having spent half a year in the investigating commission, I am no longer able to. [passage omitted]

[John] Would you consider accepting membership in the new commission [set up by parliament on 20 September to investigate the events of 17 November 1989] if you thought that the new commission had any hope of finding out what really happened?

[Bartuska] If ifs and ands were pots and pans there would be no need for tinkers. I am convinced that the intention never was to find out the truth. There is no place for truth in this game.

[John] What then was the point of establishing the commission?

[Bartuska] To gain popularity, to gain influence and good starting positions in the struggle for power. [passage omitted]

[John] Do you not think that the new commission will find out anything new?

[Bartuska] New facts will definitely come to light as time goes by, but this will scarcely happen on the basis of investigations by the parliamentary commission. It is more likely that some witnesses and direct participants will "regain their memory." Some of them will try to sell their testimony to Western journalists for hard currency. I myself witnessed two such attempts in June. I suspect that this will happen around the first anniversary....

[John] How will this effect the value of your book "Partially Clouded" [Polojasno], the topic of which are the events of 17 November?

[Bartuska] The value of my book is, as I hope, in its being an honest account of everything surrounding the investigations. [passage omitted]

[John] What new things will readers learn from your book?

[Bartuska] For example, the testimony of StB [State Security] member Zifcak made in late March, early April, a testimony which those in power have managed to suppress before the nation. On 30 March Zifcak gave up and said how it really happened. The testimony is top secret. Its protocol reads like a thriller. The first 16 pages are filled with platitudes and useless rubbish. He says nothing except that he "does not remember." What follows are a fascinating 20 pages about how, on 16 November, Zifcak was summoned to the Federal Ministry of Interior where StB bosses were planning the whole operation under the command of [the then deputy minister of interior] General Lorenc; about the specific assignments given to individual chiefs of StB administrations; about how they ordered Zifcak [who participated in the student demonstration on 17 November as an agent provocateur] to pretend to be dead. When the protocol got into my hands, it was the most beautiful day of my work in the commission. Finally, things started to

move. Then helicopters started to fly to fetch the ministers and take them to the [seat of the president at Prague] Castle. Presently those in power started to say that "It is all very delicate. It fundamentally changes the whole investigation. But we cannot believe a single StB member. We must approach this prudently, in the interest of political stability." Furthermore, they swept the whole testimony off the table. It was futile to ask: "What more do you want? There exists no evidence any longer. They had all the time they needed to destroy it. You will not get more than this. Do you think that the big StB bosses will confess?"

They suppressed the testimony. At the same time—even though only a very narrow circle of the highest representatives of this state had a copy of Zifcak's testimony—one of them mimeographed it and sent it to a circle of initiated StB officers in order to warn them that Zifcak spilled the beans and to tell them what is known. Incidentally, this testimony at least had the effect of bringing Lorenc and Bytcanek into custody for a while. Even today, however, I would not bet even one koruna on Zifcak's life. [passage omitted]

[John] Publishing the contents of a top secret testimony in a book could get you into big trouble.

[Bartuska] I do not care. I do not have the feeling of doing something wrong by writing the truth. [passage omitted]

[John] What was it, in fact, that has shaken your confidence in any politician?

[Bartuska] Perhaps, it was that incident of 2 January when a Civic Forum representative was explaining to me that the legends about 17 November are constructive. Why should we make people nervous by telling them the truth when myths can serve them much better. [passage omitted] When StB General Lorenc, the commission's chairman Stank, and Supreme Court Chairman Motejl used the very same words to express the very same ideas I realized that there are certain laws of power which outlive every revolution. They were explaining to me that I am too rash. That what I want to publish can wait a few years. They were saying this in the hope that these things will be of no interest to anyone in a few years. Politicians can say things using lofty words. When the commission's chairman Stank told me that he wants to censor my book, he said that he wants to read it in order to bring my subjective views into harmony with the objective reality. Later he claimed that I would need the consent of both Federal Assembly chambers to publish the book.

[John] What did you reply?

[Bartuska] That they have no right to prevent its publication.

[John] What did he reply?

[Bartuska] Stank is a clever man, a real politician. He realized that there is nothing he can do about me. I did not, and did not want to, join politics. I appeared in them only because of the investigations. [passage omitted] I did not have to pay heed to any future political ambitions. I was not interested in any official trips abroad either. They simply could not buy me. This independence is the greatest asset which I could possibly acquire in the course of the investigations.

Triska Previews Sale of State Property

LD2809132990 Prague CTK in English 1056 GMT 28 Sep 89

[Text] Prague Sept 28 (CTK)—The sale of state property within "small" privatisation in Czechoslovakia is expected to yield 30,000-40,000 million crowns and most of the money should go to the budgets of the communities, Deputy Finance Minister Dusan Triska told a press conference today.

He reported on yesterday's talks of representatives of the Federal and the Czech and Slovak Governments at which they agreed on a draft law under which shops, workshops and small businesses are to be offered for sale to the population this autumn. The law is to go to parliament next week.

Tomas Jezek, Czech minister for the administration of national property and its privatisation, said that the volume of property concerned by this privatisation will be large and he expects that supply will exceed demand and that as a result the average prices will be low and the property offered for sale will thus be accessible to the broad strata.

The property will be sold at auctions. The sale will be organized by district commissions formed by representatives of local authorities, enterpreneurs and trade unions and controlled by the Czech and Slovak ministries for privatisation. If current employees gain the particular business at an auction, they will receive a 50 per cent loan which will be repayable over five years.

In order to prevent a disintegration of the basic retail network the government agreed that present food shops will have to be preserved for another two years.

Triska said that small privatisation is the start of a major scheme to build a strong private sector. Privatisation of larger enterprises is to follow.

Businesses forcibly taken over by the state under a 1959 law and now claimed by their former owners or their heirs will not be offered for sale but returned under another bill which is also to be submitted to parliament next week.

Triska also dispelled doubts that small privatisation would lead to unemployment because the sphere of services is understaffed and it will inevitably expand.

Timetable for Tax Reform, Removal of Subsidies

AU2809102290 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 24 Sep 90 pp 1, 8

["(do)"-signed report: "Introduction of Uniform Sales Tax Rates Delayed; Fuel Prices Without Subsidies as of December"]

[Text] The prices of industrial consumer goods were expected to undergo considerable movement as of 1 October—some merchandise was to become cheaper and some more expensive. According to an announcement of the Federal Ministry of Finance, 1 October was to be the day of adjustment for sales tax rates—i.e., those taxes which citizens surrender to the state indirectly, through the payment of pertinent prices.

A similar adjustment has already been carried out with respect to food products, on which the negative sales tax—i.e., subsidy by means of which the state maintained food prices below the level paid to producers—was removed in July. Those who were looking forward to buying a cheaper television set, for instance, in October will be disappointed, however. According to Engineer Jan Klak, director of the department for indirect taxes at the Federal Ministry of Finance, the adjustment of the sales tax rates has been postponed until 1 January 1991.

The streamlining of the system of indirect taxes is an integral part of the overall restructuring of our economy. A completely new system of indirect taxes (such as the one which satisfactorily operates in the EC countries, for example) cannot be introduced before 1 January 1993, however. Because the currently valid sales tax rates continues to contribute to price deformations, lack of transparency, and, literally, to enciphering price ratios (just for illustration: there exist more than 1,000 various sales tax rates), the Federal Ministry of Finance worked out a proposal this summer for unifying the tax rates into only four bands. The first category, with a zero sales tax, would include staple foods, fuels, clothing for children, and school utensils; the second (with a sales tax of 12 percent) mainly construction material and timber; the third (22 percent) the most common types of industrial merchandise; and the fourth (32 percent) textiles, garments, drugstore goods, and some engineering products.

The amount of work connected with recalculating the prices of industrial goods is unusually extensive, however. One can, therefore, understand a certain restraint on the part of retailing organizations, all the more so as prices will be liberalized as of 1 January 1991, which can be expected to result in another movement of prices. According to information from the Federal Ministry of Finance, the objections of the retailing organizations have been joined by those of the governments of the two republics or, rather, their ministries of finance. They, too, were of the opinion that both price adjustments—the one resulting from the introduction of uniform tax rates and the one resulting from price liberalization—ought to be carried out with effect from the same day, i.e. 1 January 1991. The governments of the two republics and the retailing organizations argued, moreover, that price increases in October could negatively affect supplies to, and the atmosphere of, the Christmas market. Director Klak does not deny that political considerations, particularly the prospect of communal elections [in November], too, may have had a certain influence on the decision to change the timing of the price movement.

The Federal Ministry of Finance sees the greatest drawback of the simultaneous introduction of new tax rates and of price liberalization in that the influence of the unification of tax rates will be mixed up with the influence of price liberalization. At the same time it needs to be remembered that, according to the statistical sheets of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the introduction of uniform sales tax rates should result in a drop of more than one percent in the overall level of prices of industrial merchandise. Yet this "last and for the population evidently positive price intervention by the visible hand of the center" (a statement by Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus) will apparently blend with the impact of the liberalization of prices.

Fuels represent a completely separate chapter as far as the upcoming price movements are concerned. The Federal Ministry of Finance has prepared for the government material concerning the central rectification of the retail prices of fuels. It foresees, briefly speaking, an increase in the prices of coal, gas, and heating as of 1 December through the removal of state subsidies on fuel prices. Coal, gas, and heating prices have been maintained at a low level so far because the state has been subsidizing them with around 9 billion korunas from its budget every year. Only the socially weakest groups, i.e. pensioners and families with children, would probably be compensated for this quite perceptible increase in coal, gas, and heating prices.

It would evidently be naive to expect the public to break into euphoria over the increase in the prices of coal, gas, and heating and over the general upward movement of prices that can be expected from January on. It needs to be realized, however, that this movement of prices is an essential part of the reform and that it only removes past price deformations. A reaction to it in the form of wage demands would therefore not only send the inflation spiral spinning but would jeopardize the very prospect of the economic reform.

Size of Losses From Uranium Exports Estimated

AU2909195590 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Engineer F. Sedivy, employee of the Czechoslovak uranium industry in the 1950's, by Martin Fuk; place and date not given: "I Was There; How Much Did Uranium Exports to the East Cost Us?"; first paragraph is SVOBODNE SLOVO introduction]

[Excerpts] Engineer F. Sedivy, economic director of the Melantrich Publishing House, reacted to our article of 10

August entitled "Oil Shock—and What About Uranium?" in which we interviewed officials of the Federal Ministry of Economy on ways to secure fuel for our nuclear power stations, and told us about his experience with the handling of uranium in Czechoslovakia. [passage omitted] "From 1954 to 1955, I worked in the so-called technical inspection department in Jachymov, where uranium ore from the whole republic used to be processed—from Jachymov, Pribram, Ceska Lipa, and Jihlava," Engineer Sedivy recalls. "I worked in the squad of loaders that was taking cargo off trucks coming from individual mines. [passage omitted] Besides weak ore (containing large amounts of gangue), they were bringing strong ore with a small amount of gangue. This strong ore was stored in wooden boxes for up to 130 kg. While I was in Jachymov, some 30 trucks with boxes used to arrive every day, not counting those with weak ore. A Tatra 111 used to carry some 12 tonnes but, for the sake of simplicity, let me assume that each truck was carrying some 10 tonnes of strong ore. The world market price of ore at that time was about $8,000 per kg. Let us assume that throwing such large quantities on the market would cut the price by one-half. When we multiply the daily output by the price of ore and by 300 working days a year, we arrive at a value of annual production of $360 billion." [figure as published]

[Fuk] This is an unbelievable sum. Is it not a bit exaggerated?

[Sedivy] "Absolutely not. I am assuming a price and an output that are both below the actual figures, and I am counting only the strong ore. Not included is pure uranite (whose world market price was then between $50,000 and $70,000 per kg), which used to be brought by the same trucks as strong ore. Sometimes there were two boxes of uranite on a truck, sometimes four, sometimes even as many as 16. Sometimes there were none at all.... The above figures are for 1954 and 1955 only. In the subsequent years, output was probably even higher." [passage omitted]

Vavrousek on Safety of Bohunice Power Station

AU2709070690 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 24 Sep 90 p 1

["kz"-signed article: "How Long Will it Last?"]

[Excerpts] A few days ago the Federal Government discussed a preliminary report of the commission of experts set up to consider the safety of our oldest light-water nuclear power station—the V1 at Jaslovske Bohunice. The conclusions drawn by the experts thus far demonstrate that, although its operation is connected with greater risks than is customary elsewhere in the world, the danger of an accident definitely does not exceed tolerable limits. [passage omitted]

We learned from Environment Minister J. Vavrousek by what sort of shortcomings our oldest nuclear power station—which has been working in a highly reliable way, with a minimum of malfunctions, all of them common, since the late seventies—is beset. He said that the concept of this power-generating source is based on a philosophy which does not foresee the eventuality of the greatest possible accident, which we understand to mean, in line with current world practices, the complete interruption of the primary circuit. Another fault of the power station lies in the fact that, from the viewpoint of seismicity, it is built in the second least suitable location in Czechoslovakia. An even greater danger [of an earthquake] could be expected only in the Komarno area. On the other hand we know, however, that an earthquake in this locality can reach a maximum of the seventh degree on the international scale, which would still be sustainable for this building project. There are also complications with the two reactor vessels. They were made from improper material, material which contains some additives that make it more susceptible to being overstrained. The crystalline lattice of the atoms of iron greatly disrupts the flow of neutrons. It is obvious from this that the service life of the reactors will definitely be shorter than the projected 25 to 30 years. But how much longer will the reactors be able to work without any serious risks?

It is evident that, in view of the limited availability of domestic fuel and power resources and of an environment disrupted by coal-burning power stations, Czechoslovakia will not be able to do without nuclear power in the foreseeable future. The cutbacks in supplies of Soviet crude oil and the present situation in the Persian Gulf are bound to even intensify our present energy problems. This is why putting the V1 nuclear power station at Jaslovske Bohunice out of operation would be unacceptable. Let us therefore hope that this source of energy will last for some more time. Yet this should definitely not be at the expense of the safety of our population and that of the neighboring countries.

Severe Potato Shortage, Solutions Reported

AU3009173390

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers have recently published a number of items dealing with the shortage of potatoes, which—according to a RUDE PRAVO report of 26 September, for example—have virtually disappeared from shops.

Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 25 September on page 1 carries a 600-word "ha"-signed report on the potato supply situation, entitled "A Too Hot (and Expensive) Potato." The report quotes Engineer Hanus Fantl, department head at the Czech Ministry of Agriculture, as saying that this year's potato harvest is expected to be "about one-third lower" than required, mainly as a result of the dry weather. The situation is aggravated by the high proportion of small potatoes, which retail organizations refuse to accept because they do not meet the set quality norm. Fantl says that the retailers' refusal to agree to an exemption from this norm deprives the market of 15-20 percent of the harvested potatoes.

Asked about possible solutions to the potato shortage, Fantl says that the shortage would be alleviated by an

immediate liberalization of prices (instead of on 1 January 1991, as planned) because many potato growers are hoarding their potatoes in the warehouses, waiting for 1 January in expectation of higher prices. "We talk about a market economy, so let us create scope for it," Fantl says. As he observes, while there are no potatoes in state shops, they are to be had from some private growers for between 5 and 7 korunas per kilogram (the official price is 2.60 korunas).

Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 22 September on pages 1 and 6 carries a 1,200-word "zn"-signed article on the potato supply situation, entitled "Supply Falls Short of Demand." This report mentions yet another factor which contributed to this year's potato shortage. Whereas last year potatoes were grown on 104,566 hectares in the Czech Republic, this year it was only 98,590 hectares.

Shop Assistants Strike Against Privatization Bill

AU2809120190 Prague CTK in English 1722 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sep 26 (CTK)— Shop assistants went on strike today in protest against a bill on privatization of shops and services.

Although their trade union had shortened the planned one-hour strike in Bohemia and Moravia to a five-minute token one, most shops on Wenceslas Square in Prague were closed for an hour and even more.

Chairman of the Czech Chamber of the Shop Assistants Trade Union Josef Albrecht, who participated in today's session of the Czech Government, told CTK that many government members support the trade union demands.

Shop assistants demand their preference at auctions of shops, the granting of interest-free credits to the full value of a shop, and representation of trade union functionaries in privatization commissions.

Czech Premier on Land Setup, Cadre Policy

AU2809130490 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 22 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Milena Geussova report: "Petr Pithart on the Land Setup and Against Evaluations of Cadres"]

[Text] The internal arrangement of the Czech Republic—i.e., the possibility of a land setup [zemske zrizeni] being created—will be subject to public debate. Speaking to journalists yesterday, Czech Premier Petre Pithart explained the line the Czech Government has decided to follow.

He said that, in case the land setup is not restored, it will have to be replaced by something else, because an intermediary link between the center, districts, and individual communities would be missing. The idea that—in the event of disagreement with the district authorities, for example—mayors would have to travel to Prague really does not make sense.

Petre Pithart did not want to say which type of arrangement he would prefer because, as chairman of the Czech Government Committee for Questions of the Land Setup, it is his assignment to work out alternative scenarios which will be assessed by others—the citizens and the deputies. Nevertheless, his news conference made it clear that the "zero option" will not be the final outcome. Between "zero"—that is, no land setup at all—and the maximum—that is, the formation of three lands, each with their own assembly, government, and president—there exist several possibilities depending on the degree of autonomy. Within the next few weeks the government committee will formulate, name, and characterize all these scenarios and will determine the positive as well as negative consequences of each of them. As the premier observed, hardly anyone is willing or able to say today exactly what he understands the land setup to mean. Some people may be ready to set themselves on fire in the name of some abstract notion about the independence of their land, yet "it is hardly conceivable that someone will set himself on fire for variant 'D,' for example" he added.

The 30-member government committee should present its alternative scenarios before the communal elections and, following a public debate, the Czech National Council could then make a decision in mid-1991. Adherence to solidness and thoroughness, which are among the attributes of the present Czech Government, however, will not allow any acceleration. The premier is also of the opinion that the issue of the land setup does not lend itself to a referendum because a referendum presumes an unequivocal question and an unequivocal answer—yes or no.

On Wednesday [19 September] the Czech government issued a significant political statement on the implementation of the Federal Assembly's legal measure which extends the range of offices filled by appointment. The measure will have a positive effect only if its letter and spirit are strictly adhered to. Practical life, however, does not show that this is always and fully the case. Mechanical approaches and the formation of various commissions are reminiscent of past cadre evaluation methods. In the opinion of the premier, personnel questions must not be decided by signature-gathering campaigns, strikes, etc. Full responsibility rests with those with jurisdiction over the appointment and dismissal of employees. Anything else is superfluous and politically improper. Senior officials must have the certainty that this is the last measure of this type. Anyhow, the true test [of managers' and executives' competence] will be next year's harsh economic reality.

Answering a LIDOVE NOVINY inquiry about where specifically an improper line had been taken, the premier said that inappropriate methods had been chosen, for example, by the Ministry of Engineering and Electrotechnical Industry and, in part, also by the Ministry of Industry. However, these measures have meanwhile been nullified.

Unemployment Statistics for Czech Republic

AU1809103990

[Editorial report] Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 12 September on page 2, under the headline "Labor Market Situation," publishes a 400-word report on unemployment in the Czech Republic as of 31 August 1990. On that date, according to the report signed by Renata Hrbkova of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, there were 89,957 jobs available, and, at the same time, there were 14,680 unemployed. This translates to approximately 0.3 percent of the labor force. The report emphasizes the uniqueness of these figures, namely that, as opposed to the West, a high percentage of the unemployed in the Czech Republic are highly qualified people. The report also stresses the fact that 6,465 persons, among the almost 15,000 unemployed, collect unemployment benefits and are people who could not be placed within 15 days. It mentions that some individuals abuse the system.

Unplaced citizens and available jobs in the Czech Republic

Region	Unplaced citizens 31 Aug 90				Jobs available 31 Aug 90			Sum of the benefits paid in 1990 given in korunas
	citizens	total		collective benefits	citizens	total		
		labor	other			labor	other	
Prague	1,673	262	1,411	819	17,723	15,124	2,599	4,762,235
Central Bohemia	1,188	589	599	522	8,607	7,862	745	2,074,047
South Bohemia	998	360	638	547	6,049	5,403	646	2,264,582
West Bohemia	844	432	412	163	8,827	8,074	753	*1,200,000
North Bohemia	1,032	709	323	407	12,812	11,543	1,269	1,285,900
East Bohemia	1,375	543	832	585	10,096	9,168	928	*2,021,107
South Moravia	2,806	1,434	1,372	1,275	13,746	11,585	2,161	6,331,803
North Moravia	4,764	2,978	1,786	2,147	11,397	10,779	618	*8,000,000
Total Czech R.	14,680	7,307	7,373	6,465	89,257	79,538	9,719	27,339,674

* estimate

Democratic Party Congress Held in Zilina

LD2909214790 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Correspondent Hudec report]

[Text] [Announcer] One could dare to give this Saturday a congressional attribute. This is because delegates of several political parties and movements are deliberating at a number of venues in Czechoslovakia today. The deliberation of the Democratic Party in Zilina has unquestionably generated the greatest attention in Slovakia. As is known, the party has been split into two opposing streams. The outcome of the congress can, therefore, bring surprise in many respects. It is only natural that we should have a correspondent there.

[Hudec] This is Marian Hudec reporting from Zilina. In the afternoon, delegates to the congress deliberated without the presence of journalists. I have been able to gather some information so far. In the first place, it has still not been decided whether there will be a change in the person holding the post of the chairman of the Democratic Party in Slovakia. Delegates have already heard a report delivered by Dr. Martin Kvetko, the existing chairman, on the development within the Democratic Party. He stressed that the party will remain in the government coalition and will support the Slovak Government in the case of privatization, as well as in its social policy.

The congress discussed in the afternoon the party's new structure to enable it to assert itself through its program in the coming local government elections. The congress wants furthermore to adopt a resolute standpoint on the former officials of the Slovak Revival Party and its policy during the past 20 years.

The congress proceedings is expected to last until late tonight. The newly elected party leadership will brief journalists about the outcome of the congress tomorrow.

Freedom Party Central Committee Elects Chairman

LD2909215490 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] The newly elected Central Committee [CC] of the Freedom Party held its first session in Bratislava today at which it elected 43-year-old doctor Gustav Kovac as the new party chairman. The Central Committee also concerned itself with preparations for local government elections, the possibilities of establishing closer links with the National Prosperity Party, and confirmed the political aim of the Freedom Party, which is the confederation of Czechoslovakia as the first step toward establishing Slovak statehood.

Latest Data Concerning Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU2909162390 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 19 Sep 90 p 1

["(fr)"-signed report: "Not a Single Rocket Any Longer?"]

[Text] Yesterday we succeeded in securing from the Federal Ministry of Defense the latest data regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from our territory— this question was unsuccessfully asked by many journalists from prominent Western papers at a news conference not so long ago. We can do a service to them: As of 0600 yesterday, 39,596 Soviet soldiers, representing 53.8 percent of their total number "temporarily" deployed in our country, left Czechoslovakia. A total of 765 tanks are on their home territory (that is, 62.7 percent), 1244 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers (48 percent), 234 anti-aircraft defense systems and 62 aircraft of all types. To this we can add 92 helicopters and 30 rocket-launching devices—they are gone altogether.

OF Cancellation of Trip to Moscow Explained

AU2909192590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 2

[Report on telephone interview with Civic Forum representative M. Palous, by RUDE PRAVO correspondent Dalibor Macha; place and date not given: "The Reason for Not Going to Moscow"]

[Excerpt] [Macha] The explanation by the Civic Forum [OF] Coordinating Center Council says that the visit had to be postponed "upon considering all circumstances—particularly the domestic political impact." What should one interpret from this broad phrase?

[Palous] A lack of interest in continuing contact and communication with the USSR certainly is not the reason. It is simple: The local elections are approaching. OF is again in the stage of searching for its own identity. We are involved in a certain debate on how to provide our movement with a "more definite shape" and give it a comprehensible face. In this respect, the planned visit could cause more complications than it would be worth. This decision does not testify to our foreign political orientation. The domestic political reasoning really takes priority here. It is connected with our efforts to bring the movement closer together. [passage omitted]

Direct-Dial Phone Service to Albania, Gibraltar

AU2909193590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 2

["(ZA)"-signed report in the "By Telex, Mail, Telephone" column]

[Text] An automatic international telephone communication was introduced from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to Albania and to Gibraltar. The calls to Albania can be made by dialing the area code 00 355 and to Gibraltar by dialing 00 350.

CSA Suspends Flights to Cuba, Mexico

AU2909193290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 25 Sep 90 p 2

["(ZA)"-signed report in the "By Telex, Mail, Telephone" column]

[Text] Ration limits on aviation fuel were announced in the Republic of Cuba. The alloted limit does not allow for CSA [Czechoslovak Airlines] direct flights back. The option of an in-between landing in Canada would markedly influence the economy of the CSA enterprise. The CSA, therefore, is forced to interrupt the scheduled flights to Cuba and Mexico. The last scheduled Prague-Havana-Mexico-Havana-Prague flight will take place 5-6 November.

Notice to Readers: *Beginning 4 Oct, the German Unification Attachment to the West Europe DAILY REPORT as well as the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC sections of the East Europe DAILY REPORT and the East Europe JPRS Report will cease publication. Also on that date, the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT will be renamed GERMANY. The GERMANY section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT will include the kind of material previously published under the FRG, GDR, and German Unification titles, as well as material previously found in the GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC sections of the East Europe JPRS Report.*

Obstacles To Revealing Deputies' Stasi Ties Gone

LD2809165390 Hamburg DPA in German 1417 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (DPA)—The constitutional doubts about naming deputies who worked for the former State Security Service [Stasi] were thrown out by the GDR's People's Chamber this afternoon.

Free Democratic Party Deputy Jochen Steinecke proposed a relevant motion. Thus, nothing more stood in the way of publishing the names, above all demanded by the Alliance 90/Greens opposition group. [passage omitted]

15 Politicians Named

AU0110131490 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 29-30 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Names of the 15 Incriminated Politicians"]

[Text] According to information available to DER MORGEN, it was recommended by the special committee investigating People's Chamber deputies that the following 15 ministers and deputies resign from their seats:

Christian Democratic Union [CDU]: Rudolf Essler, Dieter Froenicke, Armin Kleinau, Harald-Dietrich Kuehne, Eberhard Schiffner;

Free Democratic Party [FDP]: Dietmar Schicke, Jochen Steinecke;

Social Democratic Party: Manfred Naumann, Hans Watzek (formerly Democratic Peasant's Party);

Party of Democratic Socialism: Horst Kober, Peter Stadermann, Gisela Voigt;

Ministers: Karl-Hermann Steinberg (CDU), Manfred Preiss (FDP), Axel Viehweger (FDP).

Krause on Stasi Problems, Vote Against Diestel

AU3009155590 Hamburg BILD in German 25 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with State Secretary Guenther Krause by Peter Brinkmann; place and date not given: "Krause Shoots at Diestel"]

[Text] [Brinkmann] Stasi [State Security Service] and no end. Every day there are new problems. What has been done wrong?

[Krause] Recently I have dealt very intensively with these Stasi problems. In this process, I had to realize that the accusations of the Stasi committees against the interior minister were to some extent justified.

[Brinkmann] In which respect?

[Krause] The committees complained that Diestel hindered them in their work. There is some truth in this. And one can hardly defend oneself against such accusations if one permits former high-ranking Stasi officers to work in one's close proximity.

[Brinkmann] You were not in the People's Chamber when the vote of no-confidence was taken against Interior Ministry Diestel....

[Krause] It was my birthday and I was with my family.

[Brinkmann] What would your decision have been?

[Krause] I would have joined the 107 votes against Diestel and would have voted for his dismissal.

[Brinkmann] Should Diestel resign voluntarily?

[Krause] I would suggest to him to think about how he has to assess the issue in political terms. Whether he has to resign then is another question.

[Brinkmann] Should taxes be raised for German unification or not?

[Krause] I am against tax increases. This would only increase the entrepreneurial risk involved in investing in the new laender. We rather have to try to improve the tax incentives once again, including investment subsidies—from the present 33 percent to a rate of 50 to 60 percent. In this connection, tax increases would be rather counterproductive.

[Brinkmann] But from where should the money for unity come?

[Krause] I am for raising the net loans raised by the federal government.

[Brinkmann] Thus, debts. In what amount?

[Krause] About 100 billion Deutsche mark by 1994. This can be justified, because as of 1994 at the latest, we expect a clearly rising tax revenue in the new laender.

[Brinkmann] The people are greatly dismayed about Mrs. Bergmann-Pohl's letter, trying still to get some more money for the deputies.

[Krause] I can understand this. I would have advised her against writing this letter.

Further Reportage on Local Election Results

Budapest Results Updated

LD0110172190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] A total of 37.4 percent of the citizens of Budapest entitled to vote cast their votes yesterday. Eva Sos now summarizes the results for Budapest:

[Sos] The votes cast for the party lists are as follows:

Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] 31.41 percent
Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] 24.85 percent
Young Democrats [FIDESZ] 17.47 percent
Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] 9.1 percent
Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] 6.33 percent.

In only five of the 22 districts of Budapest did the party list voting produce results.

Of 414 individual mandates, only 155 candidates received a sufficient number of votes to be elected. There will be new elections for the others.

In every electoral district of Budapest, therefore, a second round of elections must be held. In most districts there will again be voting for party lists and individual candidates.

More on Latest Results

LD0110182190 Budapest MTI in English 1706 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 1 (MTI)—The home office's electoral office and information working group have given their first update of the local elections in individual constituencies, in small towns with fewer than than 10,000 inhabitants, in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants, and in the capital.

A summary based on 84.5 per cent of the vote in small towns shows that the election of mayors was successful in 2,325 of the 2,476 small towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. The elected mayors included 2,037 independent candidates, 88 representatives of the Independent Smallholders' Party, 58 of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 44 of the Alliance of Free Democrats, 44 of the Christian Democratic People's Party, 21 of the Agrarian Association, 20 of the Hungarian Socialist Party and 8 of the Federation of Young Democrats.

Taking into account the results of 88.5 per cent of those votes cast in small towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, the turn-out ensured a valid election in [figure indistinct] of the 2,593 towns, resulting in 11,615 mandates for independent candidates, 975 for the Independent Smallholders' Party, 719 for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 554 for the Alliance of Free Democrats, 472 for the Christian Democratic People's Party, 219 for the Agrarian Association, 172 for the Hungarian Socialist Party and 84 for the Federation of Young Democrats.

According to a summary of 96.5 per cent of the election data for individual constituencies, the turn-out was adequate in only 383 of the 2,038 districts. Heading the list of local representatives is the coalition of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats (66), followed by the Alliance of Free Democrats (57), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (56), independent candidates (49), the Christian Democratic People's Party (36), the Federation of Young Democrats (33), the Independent Smallholders' Party (18), and the Hungarian Socialist Party (9).

According to figures received from 155 towns (95.7 per cent), the election by party lists was only successful in 11 towns. The order of parties so far: Alliance of Free Democrats (38), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (30), the Federation of Young Democrats (26), the government coalition parties (16), the Christian Democratic People's Party (15) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (10).

According to the Budapest election results available on Monday morning, 37.4 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls.

Ballots cast to elect members of the metropolitan assembly had been counted in 1,470 constituencies, with the electoral rolls of the remaining 16 being checked for compliance with the legal regulations. The distribution of votes: Alliance of Free Democrats 31.41 per cent, Hungarian Democratic Forum 24.85 per cent, Federation of Young Democrats 17.67 per cent, Hungarian Socialist Party 9.01 per cent, Christian Democratic People's Party 6.33 per cent, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 4.31 per cent, Independent Smallholders' Party 3.84 per cent, Federation of Town Protection and Civil Organizations, and Social Democratic Party of Hungary 0.88 per cent, and the National Organization of Artisans 0.58 per cent. The voting, however, was invalid as the turn-out fell short of the required 40 per cent.

The break-down of the total number of election results in individual constituencies is as follows: Alliance of Free Democrats 32 seats, Federation of Young Democrats 26, Coalition of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats 47, Hungarian Democratic Forum 23, HDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF] -Christian Democrats-Smallholders Coalition 17, Christian Democratic People's Party eight and independent candidates two. (Interestingly, only two of the 331 independent candidates were elected.) In other words, a mere 155 of the 414 individual posts have been filled, with a second round of voting to be held to elect the remaining representatives.

Election by party lists was successful in five of the 22 Budapest districts - in districts 1, 2, 5, 11 and 12. Of the 90 offices awarded, 22 went to the Alliance of Free Democrats, 20 to the Federation of Young Democrats,

18 to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 16 to the Hungarian Democratic Forum-Smallholders-Christian Democratic Coalition, six to the Hungarian Socialist Party, five to the Christian Democratic People's Party, two to the Hungarian Socialist Party-Leftist Youth Association Coalition, and one to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The future of the remaining 302 positions will be decided during the second round of voting.

The elections will have to be repeated in most small towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants for lack of a sufficient turn-out. All candidates who ran for the first round of elections can enter the second round, and the post will be given to the candidate who received the most valid votes, irrespective of the turn-out figure.

There must be a second round of voting in all Budapest constituencies because the ratio of electors casting ballots for metropolitan assembly candidates on party lists fell short of the minimum 40 per cent. Most districts will also see a new round of elections by party lists and in individual constituencies.

In a few small towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, where candidates for mayor failed to receive 25 per cent of the vote or the turn-out did not reach 40 per cent, the voting must be done again.

The second round of elections will probably take place on October 14, with the date subject to a decision by the National Electoral Committee.

Council of Europe Observers Comment

LD0110204290 Budapest MTI in English 1732 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 1 (MTI)—The local government elections in Hungary were honest. Due to excellent organization, the voting was successful everywhere, says the report of the Council of Europe's delegation which monitored the elections in several towns.

The delegation, including representatives of the Council's Permanent Conference of Villages and Regions, faced the press with their experiences at the Budapest election centre on Monday.

John Morgan, vice-president of the Permanent Conference of Villages and Regions, Moreno Bucci, Karl-Christian Zahn and Halvald Skard, all members of the organization, as well as Erich Prambock, general secretary of the Austrian Municipal Federation, equally believed that the electoral law and the voting conformed to European standards.

John Morgan said, "It is also encouraging to the Council of Europe to see the favourable course of events in Eastern Europe. [no closing quotes as received]

The delegation did not share the worries of Hungarian journalists over the relatively low turn-out. First of all, they said, citizens of a democratic state can freely decide whether to go to the polls or to stay at home. Moreover, a turn-out which reached 40 per cent at many places is not be considered low by Western standards. The only difference is perhaps than most Western countries do not have a minimum turn-out requirement, or set lower limits. The Council's delegation is totally satisfied with the election result considering that the Hungarian electorate could freely express their will.

On the other hand, the Western observers were critical that there were so few women candidates standing compared with the West. They found it interesting that the former Council leaders won the confidence of people in a large proportion of small towns and villages. Although the underlying causes still have to be analysed, it seems probable tnat the councils employed many people of ability under the former regims too, they said.

Second Round To Be Held 14 Oct

LD0210074890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0700 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] The National Elections Committee announced the date for the second round of the local elections for Sunday, 14 October.

The first round in many places did not produce valid results [40 percent mandatory turn-out was not achieved]. The majority of settlements smaller than 10,000 inhabitants did succeed in electing a mayor, but in most of the larger towns the elections must be repeated.

Imre Pozsgay on Political Struggle, Coalition

AU0210085190 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 26 Sep 90 p 4

[Interview with Imre Pozsgay, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party faction in parliament, by Arpad Gyorffy in Veszprem; date not given: "Calm Power in the Minority?!"; first paragraph is NEPSZAVA introduction]

[Text] "More than 150 members of Hungarian intellectual life gathered for a friendly exchange of views in Lakitelek on 27 September 1987. Imre Pozsgay, general secretary of the Patriotic People's Front, was also invited to this meeting," says the opening of the Lakitelek Statement that we could read in the newspapers only 60 days after the event, on the occasion of a Pozsgay interview. How did the values adopted at that meeting materialize?

[Pozsgay] I think that the basic ideas of Lakitelek still live and assert themselves. We committed ourselves to a multiparty system and an anti-catastrophe policy. With a common will, we are trying to drive back the political trends which are crushing our nation's forces, so that those who carry real values are able to openly take a stand. Those 150 intellectuals in Lakitelek formulated their own identity with a particular national commitment. Perhaps this also belongs to the prologue of a new world.

It hurts me, however, that ever since Lakitelek, the political palette has become not only more colorful, but also less imaginative. I do not feel today the power of initiatives that characterized the meeting in Lakitelek. Perhaps this is connected with the peacefulness of the revolution in Hungary, because, under such circumstances, human manifestations are far from being so clear in their intent as during the time of an upheaval. The advantage of Lakitelek, however, or Monor, or of the study called "Change and Reform," was that they prepared this peaceful and constitutional process.

[Gyorffy] I know that it is not advisable to ask you to describe another party, but, in view of the self-presentations of recent weeks, I will nevertheless ask you to compare the current Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] with the ideas of Lakitelek.

[Pozsgay] As I see it, as a movement, the MDF continues to carry the values adopted in Lakitelek, but, as a governing party under serious burdens, it does not always see the connections and consequences of its actions. The people and the type of thinking expressed by Lakitelek are still present, but becoming a political institution has paralyzed these forces. The way I see it, this party sometimes fails to separate the movement from the governing responsibility. Thus, as a governing party, the MDF is in an extremely sensitive situation, and it can also become a loser as a movement. I hope this will not take place, because Hungary needs a stable government and a state administration which can promise a future. At present, however, I am uncertain.

[Gyorffy] Evaluating the past 100 days, you said that a minority government might even be more successful than a bad coalition compromise. How would the opposition react if, instead of fighting to hold the coalition together by all means, the MDF formed a minority government, even at the price of a momentary loss in prestige?

[Pozsgay] I do not think that the MDF would lose prestige in the wake of such a decision. It will much more sacrifice its prestige in a coalition burdened by compromises that cannot be fulfilled.

I, of course, cannot speak on behalf of the entire opposition. I think that, following such an event, the Hungarian Socialist Party would be able to support even a strong minority government. Do not misunderstand me; this does not mean that the Socialists want to participate in the coalition, and there are no party policy considerations in this issue. We accepted the role of opposition and we want to rebuild the party and the movement on the basis of experience drawn from this status.

[Gyorffy] How could the situation of your party change after the election campaign, a party that has been almost excluded?

[Pozsgay] I count on a rational attitude from the others, at least the recognition of the fact that we are also a legitimate party.

Antall Addresses Journalists on Free Press Role

AU0110150490 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Jozsef Antall Visits the National Federation of Hungarian Journalists"]

[Text] On 26 September, Premier Jozsef Antall was invited by the leadership of the National Federation of Hungarian Journalists to attend the press club's meeting. Antall stressed that he had not come to the meeting "as a rival, and certainly not as an enemy."

Antall announced that "the government does not intend to undertake anything against the freedom of the press." He mentioned that the press' legal situation was disorderly, that there was no up-to-date press law, and that the existing tensions partly arose from this situation. Antall also saw the privatization problems of the press—and particularly the problem of foreign ownership—as a source of conflict. According to the prime minister, journalists, the government, and parliament should make a concerted effort to solve these problems.

The prime minister said that "nobody should take offense if the press criticizes, because, in a way, the free press is always in the opposition, given that its task is also to deal with negative factors."

At the end of his speech, Jozsef Antall pointed out that the atmosphere in the country was bad. People had not been prepared for the changes that had taken place. According to Antall, this was because a rather small group of people—rather than a mass movement—had carried out the changes of the last three years.

Minister Fur Queried on Army Reduction, Budget

LD3009211190 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1800 GMT 30 Sep 90

[Interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] There is no area of our lives where more money is not needed. This station has spoken to Defense Minister Lajos Fur, but not just because yesterday was Armed Forces' Day. By the way, this was the last Armed Forces Day.

[Begin recording] [Reporter] More and more attention is being paid to defense. Ferenc Koeszeg, Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] deputy, alleged in MAGYAR NEMZET that Army reductions are being implemented to such an extent that Hungary's security interests are not taken into consideration. At the same time, in connection with the recently published government program, Attila Karoly Soos, an SZDSZ economic expert, made a condemnatory statement in MAI NAP that the defense sector is increasing its expenditure at the expense of other important areas.

[Fur] These two opinions do not seem to be in harmony with each other; rather, they are in stark contradiction,

even if both were made by members of the same party. What matters is current reality, such as whether the government could be attacked or come under fire in some way or another.

I propose that neither allegation corresponds to reality. The former does not because, although reductions have begun, and the process of decreasing numbers in the Hungarian Armed Forces is under way, as is the phasing out of certain types of weapons, this reduction is not to such an extent that the defense of the country is at risk. Let me tell you that at the end of the reduction in 1992, the Hungarian Army will number 90,000, which corresponds to the general European norm. The size of the Army in today's Western and Central, but not Eastern, Europe, consitutes around 0.6-0.8 percent of the country's population. It will not be less than elsewhere in Europe, including our neighbors.

[Reporter] You have not replied....

[Fur, interrupting] I must answer the second half of the question, which does not correspond to reality either. There was a news conference a few weeks ago at the Defense Ministry where one of our economic expert soldiers, a colonel, expounded that they are carrying out calculations to figure out that, if we want to maintain the Army at its present level next year—then taking into account inflation, the increase in expenditure, and many other factors—the annual expenditure of the Army should perhaps be increased to 77 milliards.

[Reporter] Is this your opinion?

[Fur] For the moment, no it is not. This does not mean that maintaining the Army at its present level will not require much greater sums from the budget than the Hungarian Army received this year.

[Reporter] Yes, but given the economic state of the country and the latest student demonstrations—plus those requirements which will be necessary to remedy social ills—would it be permissible to increase the expenditure of the Army?

[Fur] The student demonstrations are stating that this or that will be the defense budget next year, or that this is the extent to which they will raise or have raised it. This is not true at all. Neither the individual ministries nor the government have debated next year's budget yet.

[Reporter] DIE WELT wrote recently that Hungary is to purchase 400 T72 tanks from the GDR.

[Fur] This is merely a question. The answer is very, very far off—if it will ever have an answer. It is not a question of purchasing, but perhaps of taking over certain types of weapons.

[Reporter] A few months have passed, and I suppose you have been able to gain some sort of insight into the life of the Army. In your opinion, how is the staff of officers living through this change of system?

[Fur] The staff of officers and junior officers that form the professional corps of the Army has lived through this change of system in much uncertainty. What I see now, however, is that the steps taken in recent weeks—one or two months—are convincing them that no one wants to carry out a witch-hunt within the Army, that nobody wants to clear away the former party members, but that everybody—including the new defense leadership, including myself—would like the professional corps to truly understand the new historical situation which has been created today, or which will be created in this country a few months' time. With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and with our departure from the Warsaw Pact, an independent Hungary will truly be created here in the Carpathian basin. Its independence and defense can be guaranteed only and exclusively by this Army. I have confidence that the normal harmony between the Army and society, between the officers' corps and the enlisted troops of the Army will be restored once again. I am confident that the honor of an officer, which is very important, will be restored within the Hungarian Army. [end recording]

New World Federation of Hungarians Head on Tasks

AU0210085790 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Sep 90 pp 1, 7

[Report on interview with Attila Komlos, newly elected general secretary of the World Federation of Hungarians, by Gyula Fejer; place and date not given: "No to Nationalism"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] Attila Komlos is the new general secretary of the World Federation of Hungarians. The successor of Jeno Rande is a journalist and priest. [passage omitted]

[Fejer] Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's often-criticized statement that he wants to be the spiritual leader of 15 million Hungarians makes me ask you the following question: Whose organization is the World Federation of Hungarians today? Does it represent the Hungarians living in Western countries? Or the hundreds of thousands and millions of Hungarians living as national minorities in the neighboring countries? Or perhaps all Hungarians?

[Komlos] The World Federation of Hungarians cannot accept such practical tasks like uniting all the Hungarians in the world. At most, this can be our long-term goal. For the time being, we must be content with our task in the Hungarian Forum—namely, to help organize the world conference of Hungarians of various professions. To give a very practical answer to the aforementioned question, the World Federation of Hungarians wants to be an organization of everyone who accepts our basic goals and helps us in achieving them. Anyone can be a member in our organization, both in Hungary or beyond Hungary's borders, private persons or corporations which—aware of our concepts—express their intention to join us.

[Fejer] What are these concepts today?

[Komlos] Ever since it separated from the state, the World Federation of Hungarians has been an independent body which does not intend to function as a political organization. Our task is to maintain contacts with the Hungarians abroad, primarily to promote our culture, traditions, mother tongue, and common past. At the same time, we also want to fulfill certain functions connected with representation of interests, and thus support those who want to repatriate. [passage omitted]

[Fejer] Many people in the world are concerned about our exaggerated show of being Hungarians. This also threatens the World Federation of Hungarians. On the one hand, the organization should oppose certain phenomena in Hungary, and, on the other hand, it must continue to work for the prestige of Hungarians and Hungary abroad. Are you able to fulfill this double task?

[Komlos] Obviously, there are a lot of temptations. We must, however, resist the nationalist effects, even if our organization is temporarily blamed for this. We must look ahead. Something new is emerging in the West and we Hungarians, here and abroad, should not disregard this development. Maintaining one's national awareness is not a crime at all in the foyer of European unification, but this should not confront people, nations, and national minorities, just as in many parts of the world where national minorities are enriching their homeland. At the same time, the World Federation of Hungarians is an international organization that is required to consider the international trends. Our organization, therefore, must not be introverted, but a pulling force in the right direction. [passage omitted]

'Lack of Progress' Reported in Romania Talks

LD0110202390 Budapest MTI in English 1729 GMT 1 Oct 90

[All punctuation as received]

[Text] New York, October 1 (MTI)—The ever-closing gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions seems to herald the early conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of European armed forces, Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky told MTI's correspondent and other Hungarian journalists after the New York meeting of Warsaw treaty ministers. Jeszenszky also reported lack of progress during his talks with Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase.

"We are happy to see a compromise emerging in keeping with the Hungarian proposal, on what is such an important matter," Jeszenszky said. "This summer, we proposed that reductions leave every country with armed forces of less than a third of the alliance system's total army strength.

Jeszenszky also pointed out that as the Vienna agreement would involve 22 signatory states rather than two alliances, possible changes in the alliance status of countries should not affect its validity. This means that the reductions will apply to Hungary even after its Warsaw treaty membership has ceased. At the same time, it is also desirable for all participants in the Helsinki process to endorse the agreement," he said.

"The talks I held with Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase at the Hungarian UN mission for nearly 45 minutes, were not very constructive, unfortunately," Jeszenszky stated. "We were in agreement insofar as the tensions between the two governments have to be relaxed, but our opinion on how to achieve this differed considerably: Romania was in favour of a slow, step-by-step policy, while we would like to proceed in leaps and bounds, rather as past German-French or German-Soviet relations have done."

As to old questions, such as the re-opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Cluj or minority education in the Hungarian language, the attitude of the Romanian Government, though not absolutely dismissive, seems to suggest that "the public mood in the country does not allow for solving these problems at the moment". Plans are for a Hungarian politician to reciprocate the Budapest visit of the Romanian deputy foreign minister within a reasonable time, Geza Jeszenszky said.

Antall Leaves for Unification Congress in Hamburg

LD0110110290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Jozsef Antall has left for Hamburg to take part in the unification congress of the West German and East German Christian Democratic Parties.

The head of government will travel on tomorrow to Strasbourg, where he is to speak at the session of the parliamentary general assembly of the Council of Europe, at which Hungary's request for admission will also be debated.

Reportage on Antall's Visit to Austria

WA0110185490

For reportage on Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's visit to Austria, including reports on his talks with President of the Austrian People's Party Josef Riegler, please see the Austria section of the 1 October West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Chemical Ship To Return Cargo to Antwerp

LD0210090890 Warsaw PAP in English 0838 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 2—Polish ships M/S "Wloclawek" detained by customs officers in the Turkish port of Mersin last Friday [28 September], had seven containers on board with 90 tonnes of sodium cyanide among dozens of containers with other chemicals. The substance may be used for the production of military gas known as yperite or mustard gas, writes GAZETA WYBORCZA today.

The containers were loaded in Antwerp on the order of an agent, the Belgian firm "Unitrans." The cargo was destined for Iran via the Turkish port and a Turkish transport company.

Owner of the ship, the Polish ocean lines, and the Ministry of Transport ordered the shipmaster to keep the load on board and go back to Antwerp (where it was supposed to go anyway). "Wloclawek" is expected in Antwerp on October 10 where it will give back the load to the agent.

Unofficial sources in the Polish ocean lines say that Turkish customs officers were warned about the cargo by U.S. special services which are checking bills of lading of ships leaving West European ports and heading for the Persian Gulf area, the paper wrote.

Skubiszewski Recounts UN Ministerial Meetings

LD2809191390 Warsaw PAP in English 1543 GMT 28 Sep 90

[By PAP correspondent Adolf Reut]

[Text] New York, Sept. 28—Head of the Polish delegation to the 45th session of the UN General Assembly Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski spoke with the PAP correspondent on some of the most important issues of talks he held here with his counterparts from other countries.

Skubiszewski said: My stay in New York is also an occasion to meet foreign ministers from Latin American countries. I met with the foreign minister of Costa Rica Quesada Bernd Nichaus and we decided to establish diplomatic representations. Next, I met with foreign minister of Venezuela Reinaldo Figueredo. I told him about Polish interest in Venezuelan crude oil because of difficulties resulting from purchases in the Soviet Union and Iraq.

During the meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Jose Francisco Rezek we talked about development of political dialogue between our countries and the need to expand economic relations.

I also met with Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez. It was devoted to the situation in the Mediterranean, conflict in the Middle East, and relations with Arab and Islamic countries. The issue is to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restore independence to that country.

A solution must be found to the Palestinian issue and removal of all doubts concerning the peaceful, calm and good existence of Israel.

I had three different meetings here with the Jewish community. I received many questions about the Jewish community in Poland. Questions concerning most of all signs of anti-Semitism perceived lately in Poland, which are closely observed in the United States.

I explained to my Jewish interlocutors that those were marginal phenomena in Poland and not typical.

Returning to my meetings with foreign ministers I would like to report that with my counterparts from Costa Rica, Brazil and Venezuela we decided to lift visas in personnel traffic—I apologize for this term—between our countries. This still requires an agreement, but was decided in talks. It will be an argument of certain pressure, a certain model for European countries, which fear mass inflow of Poles when visas are lifted.

The issue of visas was also discussed with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis. He told me something which was similar to what the Belgian minister said to me: We will lift visas but sure guarantees must exist so there will be no illegal Polish emigration because they do not want that.

With the Italian minister I also discussed reduction of the Polish debt and met with positive reaction.

A special meeting I held with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. We talked about enlivening of our political dialogue which recently diminished because of various developments in China.

I held a long meeting with Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans. It was really, and I do not hesitate to say that, a historical meeting. For the first time Poland undertakes dialogue directly with Latvia, a country with which it always had good relations during the interwar period.

Mazowiecki on Talks With Spain's Gonzalez

LD2809203290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1730 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki has ended his visit to Spain. He flew from Barcelona straight to New York for a UN session. Here is what the head of the Polish Government told us just before flying out to New York:

[Begin Mazowiecki recording] The most profound dimension is probably the talks concerning Spanish and Polish experiences, in the sense that Prime Minister Gonzalez and I too very highly value personal contacts in politics. A considerable part of my talks with Prime Minister Gonzalez consisted of more profound discussion of the situation in both Poland and Spain—of the

situation in Europe—in order to find some common foundation of values, ways of understanding, ways of assessment, and so forth, I would say.

The second area was a rapprochement of the European role of Poland and of Spain—their place in the new Europe. I believe we can count on Spain's support here, firm support, as regards our participation in the Council of Europe; and concurrent, identical views regarding the role of the CSCE. Spain understands our argument that we should come away from the Paris meeting of the CSCE with some kind of pan-European institution, which we presented in the form of a council of economic cooperation, which would fulfill the role of a pan-European institution continuing the matters which are the subject of the CSCE, i.e. issues of European security, between CSCE sessions.

Finally, the third area is economic [word indistinct]. As far as the government is concerned, the granting of preferential credits to Spanish entrepreneurs is a very important matter, because then they will partially [words indistinct] the preferential credits and trade credits, and that is an incentive for them. The credit pool is not yet completely exhausted, and there is the hope that, after being speedily exhausted, as I think it will be, it will be renewed. [sentence as received] [end recording]

PAP Cites Mazowiecki's Spanish Press Interview

LD2809173590 Warsaw PAP in English 1530 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Madrid, Sept. 28—Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki's visit to Spain received wide coverage in the Spanish press. The prime minister granted a number of interviews to the Spanish press, including the "ABC" daily in which he said in part:

"My government is not forgetting about workers, for it remembers its roots. We are constantly holding talks with trade unions. But we came to power when the monthly rate of inflation reached 30 per cent, now it's between one to two per cent, and this also changed the situation of workers. There was no other way than the one we chose, to control inflation and to prepare a certain economic expansion."

Asked whether participants in the recent meeting hosted by Primate Glemp discussed the problem of a "cease-fire" between him and Lech Walesa, Mazowiecki replied: "No, this has not taken place. I would prefer to give you a positive answer, but I cannot."

Speaking on the role of the church the prime minister said: "The role of the church was and will continue to be important. During the struggle against totalitarianism, the church was the most vital advocate of human rights and at the same time the principle voice calling for a peaceful solution of all problems. In the changed conditions, the church, as a stabilizing factor and acting in the direction to avert the dismantling of what has been born, is and will continue to be important," said the Polish prime minister.

Ukrainians Delay Exhumation of Polish Officers

AU3009163390 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Sep 90 p 2

['D.Fr' report: "Back Where We Started"]

[Text] "The [Polish] Prosecutor's Office has done everything it could. We will undertake all possible legal measures and efforts, via diplomatic channels, to bring to a conclusion the investigations on the murder of Polish officers from the Starobelsk camp and their exhumation from collective graves near Kharkov," said Deputy Prosecutor General Stefan Sniezko at a meeting with journalists on 24 September. "Our ambassador in the USSR, Stanislaw Ciosek, raised this issue recently in a conversation with the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The Ministry of Justice will convey its report to the government. For we believe that this issue should be determined at government level, in talks between the Polish and Soviet sides."

As we know, the exhumation of bodies from mass graves outside Kharkov, where the Polish officers from the Starobelsk camp who were murdered by the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] are most probably buried, was supposed to start in September, following an agreement with the Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office. This office commenced investigations at the beginning of 1990. At the beginning of September the Polish side presented a list of 10 experts meant to attend the exhumation: historians, archivists, forensic experts, criminologists, and others.

But then we were told that the exhumation would take place in just two days, 26 and 27 September. So this would not have been a complete exhumation. Therefore, Deputy Prosecutor General Sniezko went to Kiev on 18 September.

"Vladimir Sinyukov, first deputy prosecutor general of the Ukraine, told me that the question of exhuming the remains of Polish officers buried near Kharkov was not valid for the time being," said Sniezko. "After reading the documents, the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office concluded that this was a matter for the relevant military authorities to decide. The documents have been conveyed to the USSR Chief Prosecutor's Office, and from now on this office will make all the decisions."

Asked by RZECZPOSPOLITA what Poland now intends to do concerning the exhumation of the bodies, Sniezko replied: "We will write another letter to the USSR prosecutor general. This should be a complete exhumation, attended by the Polish team agreed upon previously."

Relations With Germany, Russia Viewed

AU2809072890 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 21 Sep 90 pp 4, 5

[Jan Rygulowski commentary: "Between Germany and Russia"]

[Text] **Relations With Germany**

I believe that a policy of a consistent Polish-German rapprochement is consonant with the future imperatives of the Polish raison d'etat. As far as the German side is concerned, there are two basic issues that are closely connected with one another and determine Germany's attitude toward Poland. They concern our border and the German minority.

It would appear that we have already dealt with the first problem. Shortly after the new sovereign German state is constituted, the Republic of Poland will conclude a treaty with Germany, which will finally settle the issue of the border. I think that this issue should not be viewed in terms of a possible threat, but as part of essential settlements within the framework of a new European order. "Poland's border with Germany is final in the form that it possesses today. We, the Germans, will not call this border into question by making territorial claims, neither today nor in the future," is how H. Kohl expressed it before the Bundestag and to the leaders of the Union of Expelees; that is also what the resolutions adopted by the two German parliaments state.

So, what remains is the German minority issue, which is to be settled in a separate treaty that will be concluded at some later date. It is to be hoped that the epilogue to that question will be similar to the one concerning the border. If it is not, there is a possibility of losing everything that has been accomplished in the field of reconciliation and of creating an infrastructure of understanding and cooperation between our peoples and states. Polish society is particularly sensitive to all moves by our western neighbor with respect to this subject, and we would like this sensitivity to be understood and respected appropriately and as being well intentioned.

So, what should the hallmark of Polish policy toward Germany be? The road that our diplomacy has travelled from the Ottawa declaration on the "two-plus-four" conference to Paris, where the conference took place, provides several interesting observations and makes it possible to formulate certain definite conclusions.

If we compare the initial position of the two sides regarding the interpretation and resolution of contentious issues, then it transpires that the final result obtained by the Polish side is more or less convergent with the maximum that the Germans were prepared to accept at the outset. This prompts the following question: Were Poland's intensive diplomatic efforts necessary if the same results could have been achieved through reaching agreement with the Germans directly? Did we not, perhaps, make a mistake in that we appear to have overestimated the extent to which support could be obtained from the great powers while, at the same time, displaying a lack of trust in our German partners? It seems that in future we should place more emphasis on direct negotiations with the Germans and give up using intermediaries who, in the final analysis, prove to lack credibility and effectiveness.

Instead of trying to revive prewar models and patterns, we should take the widely held view that the unification of Germany signifies the end of the concept of a balance of forces in Europe as the starting point for the conclusions that we are to arrive at. Viewed from this angle, it seems rather inappropriate for the Polish politician who, having expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the "two-plus-four" conference in Paris, proceeded to consider the possibility of returning to the idea of a Franco-Polish pact, and we know what function the pact performed in the past. I am not casting doubt on whether Paris really does take a favorable view of our arguments and proposals, but we should not succumb to illusions about what genuine likelihood there is of France becoming engaged, politically as well as economically, in Central and Eastern Europe.

If Poland wants to realize the tasks that it is faced with in wanting to achieve progress—and this can only be accomplished through integration with Western Europe—it must be prepared to pursue extensive cooperation and collaboration with Germany. We must accept the fact that we are in our weakest position vis-a-vis Germany in centuries and, at the same time, we should be conscious of the opportunities that the possibility of creating a Polish- German community of economic interests provide.

In the West, Germany has assumed a leading, predominant role in policy toward Central and Eastern Europe and, whether one likes it or not, it is the only country that has real economic interests in Poland. The negotiations that have taken place with England and France thus far have clearly shown that Poland cannot count on any more substantial capital engagement from these countries. The truth is that in macroeconomic terms, over the next few years, we will see German capital in Poland or we will have to rely on some kind of autarkic development option.

The fostering of model cooperation relations with Germany would impart a new impetus to Poland's establishment of more extensive contacts in our region. Until that happens, all efforts to create regional alliances will receive a lukewarm response from states such as Czechoslovakia or Hungary, which are not interested in functioning within structures that could be interpreted as an alternative to cooperating with Germany.

Poland is not the only country in which there is discussion of the possible consequences of German domination of Europe, nor is it the only country that is carefully following the birth of the new giant in the middle of our continent. It appears that the concern with which Europe

is approaching the problem of the formation of a united Germany will gradually find an outlet not in waging a struggle against Germany, but in an effort to Europeanize Germany and create a new democratic Europe along with Germany.

Poland faces the task of having to transfer the impetus derived from the political rapprochement with Germany to cooperation between societies. This means that there is a need for cultural elites and opinion-makers to involve themselves in dismantling the psychological barriers to cooperation and coexistence with the Germans that still exist within Polish society, especially within the older generation. If there is no fundamental change of attitude on the part of people, then all treaties and accords will remain a dead letter, and we will always be faced with the danger of having to "resist history." We also expect the Germans to make moves of this kind and such moves, rather than declarations about friendship, will constitute a true determinant of intentions on both sides of a border that should unite Poland with Europe rather than separate her from it.

Relations With the USSR

Because we lack a precise concept, our Eastern policy is one of adapting with more or less skill to the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The fact that Polish-Soviet relations are becoming increasingly partner-like has more to do with changes taking place in the USSR itself and the decisions made by the Soviet leadership than with the consistent implementation of Polish postulates. As a result, Poland is still a member of the Warsaw Pact, and the by now anachronistic treaty on friendship and cooperation remains unchanged, and the issue of our enormous liabilities arising from investment in the USSR and the cost of stationing Soviet troops in Poland over the past years is yet to be resolved.

I do not mean to say that nothing has changed in our relations over the past year; that would be absurd. However, I do maintain that these changes have not been as resolute and consistent as our raison d'etat would require. What should this inaction be attributed to?

First, the thrust of Polish diplomatic efforts was directed at the process of German unification. In addition, we adopted what later proved to be a mistaken assumption, namely, that Polish interests would receive the vital support of the Soviet Union. To be honest, it has to be acknowledged that as various procedural issues arose during the course of preparations for the "two-plus-four" conference, the Polish position met with understanding from the Soviet delegation. This was something that the USSR could permit itself, because for it the conference was not a key forum. The Soviet Union obtained guarantees for its strategic interests after the unification of Germany through bilateral negotiations with Bonn. This no doubt explains the nervous and negative Soviet reactions over the past year to the statements and actions of Polish politicians who were more resolute in supporting the German's right to union and self-determination while respecting existing borders. It was more convenient for the Russians to negotiate with the Germans in an atmosphere that saw a certain degree of tension in Polish-German relations.

During the Gorbachev-Kohl talks (14-16 July) the USSR agreed to a united Germany's membership of NATO, to the lapse of the four powers' rights when unification occurred, and Germany's assumption of full and unlimited sovereignty in exchange for a promise of far-reaching economic and financial aid and concessions on the question of the military status of what is currently the territory of the GDR for a transition period. It would seem logical to conclude that a decision of such strategic importance did not occur in an ad hoc fashion during the Kohl visit, but that the basic points were agreed on earlier, during the meetings between Shevardnadze and Genscher, including the meeting at Brest, and that it was decided to postpone announcing the agreement until the decisions that were to be yielded by the 28th CPSU Congress were known. The triumph of the Gorbachev line at the congress made it possible for the Soviet leadership to play the German card, which it had had at its disposal for a long time.

In light of this and from the perspective of Polish national interests it is justified to ask whether the Soviet authorities informed our leaders of their plans. After all, Poland is still a member of the Warsaw Pact and an ally of the Soviet Union and a decision concerning a united Germany's membership of NATO cannot be a matter of indifference to any Warsaw Pact member state, especially in view of the geopolitical location of our country. The answer to this question could provide a yardstick for gauging the nature of Soviet intentions toward our country as well as indicate at what stage of partnership Polish-Soviet relations currently find themselves.

The basic problem that Polish foreign policy currently faces with regard to the USSR is that the process of recovering full sovereignty and equality in relations with the USSR should be free from all manner of anti-Soviet rhetoric and actions that will antagonize our eastern neighbor.

Despite being in the midst of an ever-deepening process of disintegration and decline, the Soviet Union remains a global military power and a key factor in world politics. The Iraqi act of aggression against Kuwait and the importance of Soviet-American cooperation in isolating Saddam Husayn shows how complex international security, which encompasses military, legal, and political elements, is. The Soviet Union is assuming a new role as one of the pillars supporting the world order in this post-bloc age. The restraint that the West has displayed with regard to the Lithuanian crisis shows the Gorbachev team will be the West's favored partner for some time.

This has implications for Poland. The reorganization of our relations with our eastern neighbor posits the continued existence of a Russian state in some form as a key

element in European politics. Thus, Poland should endeavor to exploit the USSR's natural desire to maintain strong economic and political ties with Western Europe and to offer a maximum degree of extensive cooperation in this field.

Poland in the role of a bridge, a transmission belt between a USSR that is becoming democratic and Europe, is a task to be accomplished by those political forces in our country that favor a new European order in which there is a place for both Poland and our eastern neighbor. A Poland that does not divide but unites is a Poland that does not have to be destabilized or weakened.

The Strategic Goal and the Methods

What consequences do these reflections entail for Polish foreign policy? In so far as the strategic goal—Poland's integration with Western Europe—is undeniably right, the methods that we intend to employ to attain it arouse doubts and misgivings. What other possible conclusions can be drawn from our policy of delay vis-a-vis NATO, the lack of firm moves to accord our relations with Germany a new status, and the procrastination in formulating a comprehensive concept for establishing relations based on partnership with our eastern neighbor?

Poland appears to be gradually becoming a country that has been pushed onto the sidelines of the main current of European change. Because of a lack of resolve and an inability to exploit opportunities in the international situation, from being the country that initiated the process of change in all of Central and Eastern Europe, we are becoming Europe's backwater.

Apart from external factors, this can also be attributed to the domestic situation in Poland, that is, to the fact that the evolution of our political system has been blocked. Constitutional amendments that were a product of the "roundtable" decisions accord the president a key role in formulating the strategic directions of our foreign policy and place the responsibility for implementing such decisions on the government. However, as a result of the rapid changes that have occurred in the Polish political landscape and the emergence of a new arrangement of forces, the presidency is unable to perform the functions with which it has been entrusted. The practical paralysis of this central state institution has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of our foreign policy. This sphere of state activity has now been taken over by the government and, to some extent, parliament. This carries great dangers with it in the form of disrupting the continuity of state policy and hindering the realization of national interests when cabinet crises occur or when the government is embroiled in domestic issues. These dangers are further compounded by the prolonged reorganization and vetting process within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which means that the department's policy staff is very modest in size.

All these things mean that Polish foreign policy is not in a position to effectively discharge the tasks that lie ahead of it. Only ending the period of transition in our political life could radically alter the situation. In light of this, the calls to bring forward presidential and parliamentary elections and to accelerate the formulation and adoption of a new constitution become a political imperative. Only a new political setup, one that is the product of completely democratic elections and enjoys public support, will be in a position to impart the necessary dynamism and resolve to our foreign policy.

Walesa Campaigns Among Steelworkers 24 Sep

AU2909193990 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Sep 90 p 2

["A.B" report: "Large Plants Support Walesa"]

[Text] On Monday, 24 September, Lech Walesa met with representatives of the National Federation of "Solidarity" Factory Committees, a body which held its first meeting at the Sendzimir Steelworks near Krakow on 24 August. The guests supported Walesa's candidacy for Polish president. The National Federation also wants the presidential election to be held at the same time as the parliamentary one.

The meeting repeated the postulate expressed in Krakow on 24 August whereby membership of political parties must be separated from membership of "Solidarity" by 30 September. Lech Walesa said this date is unrealistic, saying that until free elections have been held, "Solidarity" is committed to proceeding with its present activity because until the elections, the union remains the chief force responsible for the reforms in Poland. The time for a clarification of the union's situation and a settlement of the issue about who may use the "Solidarity" emblem will not come until after the elections.

Walesa will attend the National Federation meeting scheduled for 9 October at the Warsaw steelworks. He pledged his support for the movement now arising inside major plants as a result of the situation there. Nevertheless, he did share a few of his doubts: "Seventy-five percent of Poland's heavy industry was founded for political reasons, not economic ones. When you save one [?industry], take care that you do not lose the whole of Poland."

Walesa Explains His Reasons for Candidacy

PM2809160190 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 21 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa by DZIENNIK BALTYCKI chief editor Tadeusz Bolduan; place and date not given]

[Text] [Bolduan] What are you, first and foremost: a trade unionist or a politician?

[Walesa] Since 1980 my destiny has entrusted me with the task of seeing to the implementation of the 21 demands. Within the document listing these demands you will find all that Lech Walesa represents. Walesa was supposed to stand at the head of the movement in order

to overthrow the old system, and now he must still stand at its head so that a new system can be built. This applies until such time as the authorities elected in a free election either thank him for his leadership or oblige him to continue as a leader. Until such time, I will continue to implement the 21 demands.

[Bolduan] You are more of a politician than a trade unionist.

[Walesa] I am a Pole first of all; after that, I am a trade unionist.

[Bolduan] And where does the politician come in?

[Walesa] Along the way.

[Bolduan] But your actions show that you are predominantly a politician.

[Walesa] What is politics? I have already been said to eat like a politician, laugh like a politician, and do many other things in the manner of a politician, though I myself do not see any of these things in a political context. In my practical interpretation the art of politics begins as soon as you start calculating your moves: What is more important, what you can concede or what move you should make sooner and what later? Such considerations constitute political thinking and acting. I do indeed act in this way, for I am a politician by now, but every single man looks at politics in a different way and acts differently.

[Bolduan] With you, political actions are mixed up with trade union activity.

[Walesa] Yes—and this is because trade union activity involves politics too: Wages are also the concern of politics.

[Bolduan] Solidarity is credited with 1.7 million members, while the National Trade Union Alliance [OPZZ] admits to 7 million. These numbers are certainly significant.

[Walesa] No. To say this is to approach the question in a theoretical manner. If we were fighting the battle of Grunwald [against the Teutonic Knights in 1410] today and if I only had one tank at my disposal, I would still defeat both the opposing armies. The numbers at your disposal are only significant at the significant time. In 1980 we needed 10 million members to be able to set certain processes in motion. But at that time we were forced to acknowledge officially in our statute the leading role of the party. Today, when we are numerically weaker, we have managed to put enough pressure on the party to bring about its disbandment. We have our own premier; we also control the most important ministers, the Army, and the police. Our strength is computed in a different way today. Our fire power is actually greater now.

[Bolduan] What counts now is your ability to exert pressure and the popular support offered to Solidarity.

[Walesa] What counts is the ability to provoke certain phenomena and resolve the problems they pose. Today we have accomplished much more without having tanks at our disposal than the previous authorities had been able to do with the tanks and with the martial law. So how do you compute our power?

[Bolduan] Your power lies in your specific abilities and talents.

[Walesa] It lies in our ability to bring about certain processes and to resolve the resultant problems. If and when we find ourselves in a clear-cut situation, then we will have a variety of trade unions and Solidarity may become unpopular and lose favor with some; it may espouse the populist tendency, just as other trade unions have.

[Bolduan] You are being accused of populist tendencies already....

[Walesa] No, no, the fact that Walesa is being called a populist results from something altogether different. My dear colleagues, whom I used to trust so, now fail to adjust their moves and maneuvers to the entirely new situation which has developed after the dissolution of the party. I wanted to introduce reforms in the previous system where the party was very much in evidence; I attacked the party, restrained it in some of its designs, acted as a mediator, and created international alignments of forces. But today, when the party has been disbanded, who is there for me to attack? The setup is no longer there, but there are those 35 percent. My colleagues are not capable of bringing about an acceleration, despite the fact that I had told them all, that time back in March or in April, that we must accelerate [the rate of the reform processes] because I had felt at that time already that the whole configuration of factors was perfectly disastrous and could only result in calamity. They interpreted my calls for an acceleration as an attack against the government and an attempt to destabilize the situation and accused me of populist leanings. I am not a populist, but I need to see that the government is actually implementing the changes stipulated in the 21 demands. The situation I find myself in is quite intolerable.

[Bolduan] Your demand for acceleration implies changes in the sociopolitical system.

[Walesa] No. I wanted to keep the word I gave during the roundtable conference, but I have no partner now, so there is no one to take me up on my word. A new situation has developed and we must keep up with it. The parliament and the president must be elected and appointed by the entire society, not by myself alone. I only set them up at the time because there were no other competent forces then and the party would not allow them to act. I must open the way now for the forces which existed at that time....

[Bolduan] Are those forces sufficiently organized?

[Walesa] Yes, though if they only had kept up with the developments and helped them along, I would not have interfered with them: I would have felt morally absolved

from the responsibility of taking any further action. As things are, however, I find myself looking like a fool. After all, there is the parliament; there is my premier; and what is my own position? It is insufferable. Now I am being ticked off, and have to suffer demagogic addresses against myself and other criticism just because I try to pull our Polish cart along until we arrive at the free election.

[Bolduan] The political climate and the public mood are by now ready for some decisive moves.

[Walesa] They are not really ready and never will be if our situation continues to require constant updating. It all depends on the majority, which should decide what needs to be done. Today the majority keeps itself apart and will not vote, so something needs to be done to win the majority to our side.

[Bolduan] But a forced election is not an answer....

[Walesa] Of course it is not. My contention is that in this scandalous situation we must invoke the patriotic duty.

[Bolduan] In other words, no coercion.

[Walesa] Coercion which follows from patriotism.

[Bolduan] But this kind of duty must come from our inner conviction....

[Walesa] Yes, we must say to people: "Come on, you Poles, this is your own country! Do you want your president and your ministers to be plucked from the moon? Taking part in the election is your patriotic duty. I am talking about patriotism, not about a dictate from above. But people of no imagination have yet again distorted my idea and discouraged the public from following it.

[Bolduan] You want to command 80 percent of votes in a compulsory election.

[Walesa] I called on the intelligentsia, on the intellectuals, to instill patriotism in people, and instead they pick on me, even though I am right, for having provoked the problem. This is a blow below the belt.

[Bolduan] So you go around explaining your intentions....

[Walesa] I forever have to explain something or other, for example my decrees. The decrees have been, are now, and will long continue to be necessary, but not as an act of dictatorship against democracy. Whenever a system is changed, loopholes appear, and the law cannot keep up with them. If we want to avoid excessive damage, we must issue decrees, which in due time will reach parliament. My concept, which I put forward during public meetings and rallies, was just fantastic. Just consider this. People have been saying to me: "What are things coming to? There is rampant larceny and lawlessness all around; you cannot contain it; you will not be able to sort it all out in good time." So I tell them this: "If things are getting too much out of hand, we need decrees!" Now others say that that was just a presidential point-scoring idea of Walesa's....

[Bolduan] You stand outside the Center Alliance, but they have been using your name and conducting a hostile campaign....

[Walesa] I permitted the Center Alliance to take advantage of the situation because I could see that many things were going wrong and that we were facing the threat of a rise of a Solidarity-based nomenklatura system, and even a monopoly situation. I took advantage of the commotion caused by the Center Alliance in order to force others to attend to the burning issues of the moment. As a result, the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action [ROAD] group was established, and I am very pleased about it, because now I have some pluralism here. The present situation is not yet quite what I am after, but there is a guarantee that there will be no monopoly. I will not allow myself to be exploited by just one group, I just want to set up and highlight the new problem. Well, I have certainly set it up.

[Bolduan] It looks as if certain leaders of the Center Alliance wanted to climb high by standing on your shoulders and then kick you down.

[Walesa] Many have tried this before. I do not care about this. I care about Poland, and Poland will not be kicked down. What do I lose by this? Nothing. When I decide to play for real stakes, I will stand up to face the public and say: "I know that they will try to exploit me; I have allowed myself to be exploited in order to provoke people to think, and thinking is to Poland's advantage. And this is fine: This is my role."

[Bolduan] So you will not really allow yourself to be exploited by the Center Alliance?

[Walesa] I will not. And not only by the Center Alliance: by no one else.

[Bolduan] But the Center Alliance is using your name as a banner under which to ride in the race, and the ROAD group is speeding up alongside....

[Walesa] No, it is not like that. The Center Alliance is not playing the game, since people know that I do not identify with them. It is now ROAD that tries to win the stakes by claiming that I allegedly identify with the Center Alliance. They want to push me forcibly over to the Center camp, so as to weaken my position.

[Bolduan] Things are getting from bad to worse: People are getting increasingly demoralized, despondent, even completely apathetic.

[Walesa] Theoreticians are right when they state the problem as you just have. As for myself, when I come to the conclusion that the room I am in does not look good, I then throw all the furniture out, set up the ladders, and bring in the paints and paintbrushes. At this point you would say that the place looks awful, but if I were to take

the ladders, paints, and paintbrushes out, it would be an improvement. Things are in an awful state in Poland now, but they are not going to improve unless they get worse first. You cannot ride forward and backward at the same time in an automobile. You have to stop between the two.

[Bolduan] You have to cross through hell to get to heaven.

[Walesa] In Christian terms you could put it like this, but it is better to tell people to repair and redecorate their home first. It will then look better....

[Bolduan] Does your ego not dominate your whole personality? You "set up" Poland, appoint the government, decide the presidential candidacy, dismiss public figures, engineer splits....

[Walesa] You are not getting this right. I have moved on from being a worker who hardly uttered a word for 25 years except for saying "good morning" to his foreman or floor manager. I used to collect my screwdriver and get on with my job. Then suddenly I jumped over that fence [during the August 1980 strike in in the Gdansk shipyard] and addressed thousands of people. I have certain of my character traits already formed permanently and nothing will change them at my age. My "ego" does not contribute to friends' understanding me better or giving me their support. But you should not interpret this in the spirit of malice. That same "ego" makes me the driver of our democratic vehicle and should be replaced with the word "we."

[Bolduan] In spite of everything, you have the courage....

[Walesa] No, this is just a faulty trait of a worker who has moved on to a different position. It was not my "ego" that suffered: It was the collective "we" who suffered and who finally lived to see a different Poland.

[Bolduan] You show your hand rather too often and the cards you disclose are different each time. What you say is either entirely credible, or unrealistic.

[Walesa] The cards that I put down are taken up and placed in a different configuration. I am forced to play the game on my own and sometimes I cannot cope with it. But we lose so many trump cards because of our own stupidity. Some say that Walesa is against democracy. Why deceive the general public? When certain elements wanted to have just one union, I split it up into ROAD and the Center Alliance. So who is more truly a democrat? Who is better as a traveling companion? Perhaps those who threw the parliamentarians out of the ministry premises? [reference to recent dispute—involving government, Sejm, and Solidarity—over agricultural procurement prices] So I should be feared but evidently they should not—is that right?

[Bolduan] All the same, you do combine political activity with union work.

[Walesa] No necessarily. I rather combine it with solving the problems that life itself brings, and I do not know in advance what these problems will be.

[Bolduan] Mr. Chairman, who are your new advisers? How much do you need them? To what an extent do you listen to them?

[Walesa] Accusations are being bandied about that Walesa has poor advisers. For instance, the Kaczynski brothers are mentioned, though they have never been my advisers. I responded to the demand that I appoint a group of advisers and did appoint a team of specialists. I will give them problems to solve and listen to what they have to say about them. I will study the papers prepared under the supervision of individual advisers. I will take advantage of their wisdom in solving concrete tasks, and we will all argue about our preferred tactics. I hope I will have the best arguments. But no one will stand in for me in my place.

[Bolduan] You come up with those brilliant comments based on clever combination of words and ideas, and these often speak volumes more than whole treatises prepared by advisers....

[Walesa] This is because they are rooted in real life.

[Bolduan] You are surrounded by your supporters and your adversaries. This happens not only in politics.

[Walesa] If I am to galvanize people to act, I must have adversaries: I must get on certain people's nerves sufficiently badly to get them to fight. They say: "Walesa is pushing for president. Has he gone mad? We must do all we can to stop him getting there!" When it is all over, I will play to persuade people with my arguments and win them over. For the time being, I encourage them to try their strength against one another and see which force wins.

[Bolduan] You mentioned the matter of the presidential candidacy. I would like to know your definitive answer.

[Walesa] Right. I do not want to be a president. It will be a dangerous, unhealthy, and extremely burdensome task for me. I am well aware of it. Nevertheless, I have already set certain things going and I am able to complete them. People have invested their trust in me, a simple worker, and also in my position in Poland and in the West. So I cannot just grab my toys now and leave the playground. I am a believer, and so I cannot do such a thing. Unless I am released from that obligation in a democratic vote. I have much work to do outside Poland, on the international scene. But I do not want to go around with an uneasy conscience for the rest of my life. I want to have a clear conscience. So, if Poland releases me, I will be glad to step down.

[Bolduan] What do you mean by "Poland"?

[Walesa] I mean all of us together and this whole chaotic mess in which we find ourselves here and now.

[Bolduan] So Walesa does not want to be a president, but he will be one.

[Walesa] He will have to accept it. Today I am capable of winning this contest with anyone who stands in my way. I can even tell how the votes will be cast, in terms of percentages. Mazowiecki will take away the biggest proportion of votes from me, but not more than 35 percent. It is unfortunate that the votes of the electorate will be split up, but we cannot have just a single presidential candidate. Whoever wins the contest will have to show enough strength to be equal to sorting out the difficult problems that Poland faces today. A weak president will not sort them out.

[Bolduan] Will you succeed in persuading people to go and cast their votes in the election?

[Walesa] We will feed the fire a bit. If I am elected president—and I am convinced this will happen—I will work 30 hours a day and I will really wake people up. I will travel the width and breadth of Poland even more than today; I will arrange press conferences once a week, or even twice, and sort out all local problems there and then, on the spot. I will say to the people: "Poland belongs to us. Sheriff, this is your town; you just organize the people, and we will get something good going."

[Bolduan] What if the sheriff refuses to do it?...

[Walesa] No, you cannot have that. Walesa will give the say-so, the bishop—or the priest—will sprinkle holy water on it, and things will run as they should.

[Bolduan] You are full of faith....

[Walesa] Yes. The Poles are a capable people; it is only that their leaders are no good.

[Bolduan] There are some who say that Walesa's career is over.

[Walesa] He would very much like his career to be over, but he intends to go on winning: to win definitive victories, together with Poland.

[Bolduan] Will you be able to lead Solidarity safely through all these splits?

[Walesa] In 1980 our objective was to defeat the system; in 1990 we are setting up a system of market economy not only in the economic sector, but also in the trade unions. And when we come to the trade unions, then it is not only Walesa who is involved in them, but also Jurczyk. When it comes to politics, it is not only Solidarity. There are unfortunate tendencies to claim monopoly in these matters. Before long, we could have Solidarity men in the posts of president as well as premier, and also in the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP]. This would be exactly the same as before. We should be ashamed of such configurations, because they would amount to another monopoly. I am capable of leading Poland into a market economy system where it will be possible to choose between Walesa and Jurczyk, between Geremek and Miller, and between Mazowiecki and still other personalities. We must all stand a chance, because Poland needs us all.

[Bolduan] For the time being we have a kind of new nomenklatura system emerging....

[Walesa] Not entirely. I am the only person there who is trying to split things up and actually get something done. There are two forces in existence now; I am looking for a third one....

[Bolduan] The two being ROAD and the Center Alliance?

[Walesa] There is also a Christian-agricultural faction which will probably organize itself into a formal movement. Two forces mean a head-on confrontation, whereas three will guarantee a regular political contest.

[Bolduan] Your own position is above these forces.

[Walesa] Yes. Until the time of a democratic election, I am the referee. After the election I will take on the task of clarifying all issues—or I will move on to be president, to see to it that all new acts and laws are implemented and to build.

[Bolduan] You will stir the mixture in the pot until, finally, we get a clear, limpid broth.

[Walesa] That is correct. If we run a genuinely free election, I will move on to the post of president, but no political group, no friends or colleagues will have any influence with me. We will have pluralism. Everybody will be given access to an appropriate position, according to his or her capability. There will be no room for sharp practice.

[Bolduan] You have a heightened sense of responsibility.

[Walesa] First and foremost I have a conscience. I took an oath over the 21 demands, and I am obliged to put them into practice.

[Bolduan] If you are to put them into practice, free elections must first take place and you must assume the supreme authority.

[Walesa] Society can invest me with that authority or deprive me of it.

[Bolduan] I rather think it will invest you with it.

[Walesa] I also rather think that it will invest me with it.

[Bolduan] Mr. Chairman, thank you for talking to us.

Political Figures on Walesa's Presidential Bid

AU2809094490 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 18 Sep 90 p 3

[Marek Rudnicki report: "TRYBUNA Asks: Should Walesa Be the Only Candidate?"]

[Text] Deputy Anna Dynowska, Democratic Party says: No, he should not be the only candidate. If he were, it would not

be an election, just an appointment. Of course we have had situations in recent times where there was only one candidate, but this time there should be more. As a citizen, I of course do have my choice for candidate. However, I am not a private citizen, so I cannot say who it is.

Deputy Henryk Wujec, member of the Founding Committee of the Citizens Movement Democratic Action [ROAD] says: Of course not! That would be a contradiction of democracy. That is not what we have had a revolution for. Lech Walesa should run against an equal candidate, and I think there will be many of them. We, too, have our candidate. His name is Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland says: First, it is no surprise to me that Lech Walesa has agreed to take this post. I am pleased that he is talking about a general election. We, too, approve of that idea. The point is to have real democracy. We too are considering our own candidate. I hope the presidential election will strengthen this democracy and political culture, and not be a contradiction of it.

Senator Jan Jozef Lipski, leader of the Polish Socialist Party says: It would be a national catastrophe! There cannot be just one candidate in such an important election. The Polish Socialist Party is not going to nominate its own candidate. Personally, I will take a good look at the people nominated by others.

Aleksander Mackiewicz, chairman of the Democratic Party says: We in the Democratic party extol the principle that democracy means variety. There should be various candidates in the election, but only the best one should win. We will discuss who to nominate as our candidate at the plenum. Today I cannot answer your question.

The secretary for Deputy Tadeusz Fiszbach, chairman of the Polish Social Democratic Union says that: Fiszbach was in Gdansk attending a meeting with voters when Walesa made his declaration. He spoke out in a similar vein on the radio yesterday, and does not want to repeat himself.

Senator Jaroslaw Kaczynski, head of the Center Accord, could not be reached. His office told us he was on vacation and would come to Warsaw on Tuesday to attend the meeting with Primate Glemp.

Seweryn Jaworski, "Solidarity 80" deputy chairman says: In any case, Walesa should not be the sole candidate. That is a violation of democracy that could cause grievous consequences. That would look like opting for autocracy. We in "Solidarity 80" think Kornel Morawiecki is the best candidate for president. He has high political ethics, a suitable education, and is a very appropriate age.

Alfred Miodowicz, chairman of the Polish Trade Union Confederation says: Lech Walesa admitted that he has become mature enough to make such a decision. I think several other people have also reached this maturity. Who? They will make themselves known. In any case, he should not be the only candidate. It is difficult to say whether we will nominate our own candidate. Our trade unions have so much trouble with working people's problems that it would take two presidential terms of office to sort them out.

Leszek Miller, secretary general of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland says: He should not be the only candidate. It would not be satisfactory for him, nor would it be a good idea from the point of view of the nascent democracy and pluralism. I think the Social Democratic Party will nominate its own candidate.

Stanislaw Stomma, participant in the meeting of the Forum of the Democratic Right says: Why should I say what I think? On Saturday we said who we want for president—Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Whether the candidate agrees to our suggestion is his own business.

Andrzej Drzycinski, Walesa's press spokesman (information supplied by PAP): The chairman's proposal is a political one. We believe the "roundtable" era is over. The solution reached there was ideal at the time, but we now have new challenges. A failure to tackle them would mean we are standing in one place all the time. The chairman said that by means of his decision he might accelerate change, revealing people the possibility of joining in the process that is due to occur.

President's 'Modest Powers' Reviewed

AU2809195590 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Bozena Wawrzewska article: "The Division of Power"]

[Text] A great deal is known already. What the political scene will look like in two or three months time can already be predicted with a considerable degree of accuracy. A new president will enter Polish political life, but the Sejm—the one elected last year—will remain the highest seat of authority under the provisions of the present Constitution. Before considering how these two key state institutions are to cooperate, it is worth recalling how they stand in relation to each other.

So, what can the president do under the present Constitution?

He represents Poland abroad; he proposes the appointment and dismissal of the chairman of the Council of Ministers; he is chairman of the National Defense Committee; and is head of the Armed Forces. He calls parliamentary elections. He may dissolve parliament if any one of the following three situations arise: The Sejm fails to approve a budget within a period of three months; the Sejm fails to appoint a government within three months; the Sejm passes a resolution or item of legislation that violates the powers of the president with respect to safeguarding the Constitution, the security of the state, and the observance of political and military alliances. The president may dissolve parliament if any

of those situations should arise, but he is under no obligation to do so. However, if he does to intend to dissolve it, then he must seek the advice of the Sejm and Senate marshals. The dissolution of the Sejm automatically entails the dissolution of the Senate. The Senate cannot, however, dissolve itself.

The president may declare a state of emergency for a period of three months. However, it can only be extended beyond that period with the consent of the Sejm and the Senate. During the state of emergency the president may not: dissolve parliament, alter the Constitution, or alter the electoral code.

The president also has the right to question legislation by directing legislation to the Constitutional Court or by returning legislation to the Sejm where it is to be reconsidered. If the Sejm proceeds to pass an item of legislation a second time (and it must do so with a two-thirds majority vote and with half the total number of deputies present) the president must sign the act.

He has no right to issue decrees, but he has the right to issue orders and directives that have a basis in legislation and are intended to facilitate the implementation of that legislation. However, it would be difficult to assert that the president only exercises executive authority: He has in sense powers relating to another sphere. His right of supervision vis-a-vis parliament is extensive, but it is supervision of a negative kind. He also has the right to initiate legislation.

What the president can do with the Sejm is known: He can dissolve it, but under a very strictly defined set of circumstances. But how can parliament hurt the president? It can put him before the State Tribunal. Last year's constitutional amendment states that the president can be impeached before the State Tribunal for infractions of the Constitution and legislation as well as for the commission of crimes. A decision to this effect can be made by the National Assembly after a vote that yields a majority of two-thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly.

There is one more interesting issue that arises in relations between the Sejm and the president and has not been completely clarified: The president may dissolve the Sejm if the Sejm prevents him from exercising his constitutional powers. However, what would happen if the Sejm were to wish to abolish the office of president altogether and would pass an appropriate constitutional amendment? If the president can dissolve parliament when parliament seeks to curtail his authority, which is not all that much, then can he also dissolve it if, for example, the parliament goes further than that and wishes to replace the presidency with a monarchy or some kind of collegiate body that would perform the role of head state?

The president, with the powers that he currently has, is certainly someone who matters in view of his position in the state, but his powers could hardly be termed dictatorial, and with those present powers, he can influence the course of politics, but in a fairly limited way.

The relationship between parliament, government, and president suffers from a clear defect. The president has not been given too much; he does not, for example, possess the right to issue decrees. The government cannot do all that much, and the Sejm can do the most. In one sense, this is a remnant of a system under which the Sejm possessed extensive power in theory, but in practice passed everything that it was asked to pass, and, in another sense, the arrangement is the product of a contract that sought to give the president as little as possible.

Of course, it is difficult to introduce amendments to a constitution on the basis of who appears to be the most likely candidate for the office of president. The scope of presidential power and the powers that the president have should, above all, depend on how great the president's social power base is, and this also depends on how the president is elected. The principle should be: The broader the electoral base, the greater the social mandate, and the stronger the president.

Polish presidents were elected by the National Assembly (apart from Boleslaw Bierut, who was elected by the Sejm, because there was no Senate at the time). In France, the president was elected indirectly, but has been elected directly by universal suffrage since 1962. In the United States, the president holds a strong position, so the election of the president can be described as direct. So according to the principle in its pure form, elections by universal suffrage are held when the president has extensive powers and strong authority.

The constitutional amendment on the election of a president that has been put before the Sejm talks about universal suffrage, but says nothing about the powers of the future occupant of the Belweder Palace. So, we might find ourselves with a rather peculiar system of government in December. We will have a president with a strong base of public support, because he was elected by means of universal suffrage, but equipped with what are rather modest powers (he will, to put it figuratively, be wearing a suit that was not tailored for him), and a Sejm, which can do practically anything under our Constitution, but whose mandate is not as much the product of elections, as of a political contract.

How these institutions will cooperate and coexist with one another and impact on the political climate is something that cannot be easily predicted today, although the issue is one that can hardly be overlooked.

Reform of Television, Radio Criticized

AU2809091590 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 24 Sep 90 p 2

[Anna Bikont article: "TV: A Populist Giant"]

[Text] Following the dissolution or fundamental reorganization of the security service and the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" Workers' Cooperative Publishing House, Polish Radio and Television is the only institution whose form has remained unchanged, says a statement by the Polish Radio and Television "Solidarity" organization. "It is a centralized giant that relies on one government sponsor. We call for an immediate end to the influence on the work of this institution that is exercised by people who were part of the old system."

Andrzej Drawicz told us: "I consider this to be a tactical move prompted by the meeting with Lech Walesa. It sums up matters that we are well aware of and which we are seeking to resolve together with the trade unions." During the meeting with Walesa, Andrzej Drawicz said that the situation in television is the same as that in other institutions, that "there are no brakemen," and that 80 percent of directors have been replaced.

The populist tone of the "Solidarity" organization's statement and the atmosphere of a witch hunt that pervaded the meeting with the union chairman are distasteful. Nevertheless....

It is true that conditions of employment for people working in television are very bad and that there are those vast offices of a vast number of directors. There are those who were subjected to the certification process in 1982 and still have to work under the very people who conducted that process. It is a closed institution that those from outside have great difficulty in entering. Frequently, posts that formerly belonged to the nomenklatura are now occupied by people who are honest, but do not know much about television, which provides fertile ground for comments about a new nomenklatura.

The government has not exploited the opportunities that it has had and neither has Drawicz. There was no desire to institute radical changes in television, neither personnel change nor more important structural changes. Television—that communist Frankenstein—has to be rebuilt from scratch, not cautiously reformed. This is an area where the Mazowiecki government's philosophy, especially in its Drawicz ultra-Christian form, could not yield results. What does replacing 80 percent of directors mean? It is not, after all, a question of replacing people, but of eliminating dozens of posts.

On the other hand, the charge of deliberately providing false information is unjustified. Often, programs providing information are bad, because they are produced by bad journalists with bad ideas, bad assistants, and bad technicians, and, in addition, work is poorly organized. However, as far as the reliability of information is concerned, it should be noted that television really is making an effort.

Walesa is presenting himself as the man who will put everything right. During the meeting with radio and televisions employees, when he was asked about the form that information policy and journalism should take, he was unable to say a single word on the subject. Who will he use to put things right? It is clear that should he become president, Walesa would rely on his people: Gdansk Television, whose programs are not better than those of Warsaw, and TYGODINK SOLIDARNOSC (no comment needed).

Senate Discusses Criminal Code Amendments, Issues

AU0110195190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1938 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 1/10/1990—The Senate resumed its work in plenum Monday afternoon. On its agenda are normative acts and bills on which discussions began last week along with debates on the bill on commercial societies that has been passed by the lower chamber.

Heated debates in the Senate were aroused by the bill on amending the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Speaking on that item, Octavian Fieroiu, chairman of the Legal, Nominations, Discipline and Immunities Commission, said:

As if to support my statement last week, an incident occurred that you learnt about through radio-and-television and written press coverages. Wednesday 27 September while we were discussing here whether to allow or not a defendant in custody to see unwatched during the inquiry the counsel for defence, a lawyer took the liberty to slip a note to his client, who was under escort, before scores of persons and before the court in Bucharest's Sector One court room. Therefore, if under those circumstances, a counsel took the liberty to do that, one may realise what he could do if he is allowed to see unwatched his client during the inquiry.

It was a decisive argument and the bill was enacted with certain amendments that make provision for the right of the person under arrest to see his defender; in exceptional cases, the prosecutor can ex officio or at the request of the criminal investigative body rule by motivated ordinance to forbid the person in custody to see his defender for up to five days.

With three votes against and eight abstentions, the Senate also passed the bill on the conclusion and ratification of treaties. The commission that writes Romania's draft constitution was given standing status.

Several senators asked the government on the state of the implementation of the reform programme. Tuesday the Senate will resume its work in plenum.

Weekly Activity of Deputies' Assembly Noted

AU2809205290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1738 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—The agenda of the Assembly of Deputies and the results obtained this week can be considered as very rich, appreciated Mr. Dan Martian, speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, at the end of the last meeting in plenum of that chamber.

Almost all the Assembly's Standing Commissions have received and approved over that interval a large number of bills some of which are very complex and of great significance for the building of a new legal framework to ensure the rigorous functioning of a democratic state of law. On the other hand, the Assembly of Deputies' agenda included numerous drafts of normative acts which have aroused thorough debates.

Of special importance among the bills validated this week is the one regarding the passing of the prisons' general department from the Ministry of the Interior under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. This normative act represents a return to our country's tradition (until 1948 that compartment functioned either as autonomous public service or as part of the Ministry of Justice) and it will increase Romania's prestige, eliminating the excesses and abuses characteristic of the former dictatorship in applying the coercive measures stipulate in the penal procedure code. They should contribute through legal means to recovering the convicts for society and to preventing new breaches of law. The bill on the passing of the Prisons' General Department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice will be followed by other bills meant to radically change and modernize the activity in prisons.

Also this week the Assembly of Deputies has validated the bill on modifying and completing the penal code and the penal procedure code as well as the bill on Romania's adherence to the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These two normative acts are closely linked: the changes in the penal code and the penal procedure code represent the integration therein of the principles in the convention Romania has adhered to. It is thus incriminated torture as defined in Article 1 of the convention and the punishment is function of the cruelty of the treatment. The bill on modifying and completing the penal code and the penal procedure code includes other stipulation as well meant to integrate the convention texts into the Romanian codes.

Worth mentioning is the good working climate in this week's session of the Assembly of Deputies.

National Christian Democratic Party Meets

AU2909142290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1948 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] New York, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—The proceedings of the all-country conference of the National Christian Democratic Party (the Maniu-Mihalache Political Line) have started in Bucharest. On its first day, the conference debated matters concerning the party's branches in the country, its programme-platform, the possible alliances with other democratic parties in order to create a viable opposition, the preparation of the forthcoming congress of the party.

The conference adopted a motion to request that all the youths now in jail for having fought for democracy in Romania be freed.

The conference proceedings continue.

Social Democrats' Proposal for Ensuring Democracy

AU0110151990 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 20 Sep 90 p 2

["Proposal of the Romanian Social Democratic Party National Convention" submitted by Sergiu Cunescu, president of the Central Council of the Romanian Social Democratic Party]

[Text] The meeting of the Central Council of the Romanian Social Democratic Party [PSDR] was held on 15 September 1990. During the meeting, the country's current political issues and other party activities were discussed.

The discussions concluded with the following idea:

Currently, the major preoccupation of Romanian society is to establish a state of law, observe democratic principles, and ensure a highly moral climate in our society. By achieving all these desiderata, we will be able to implement socioeconomic reforms which are vital for the country's progress. In this respect, the coordination of the activity of all the country's democratic forces is required in order to obtain the desired results rapidly and without any social tension. The PDSR is working according to its own beliefs to defend and not to limit freedoms, to achieve social justice and not to maintain privileges, and to achieve social solidarity and not to separate various sections of society. Likewise, the PDSR follows with interest the increasingly stronger progress of people toward democracy.

Currently, political parties and groups are being set up throughout the country. They have the same ideal for democracy in various areas. From a programmatic point of view, however, they expect different solutions and ways to solve issues. Nevertheless, what is uniting them is much more important than what is separating them. Therefore, the PDSR believes that it is necessary to start talks with all democratic forces in order to achieve a "National Convention for Democracy" which should coordinate all actions by these forces throughout the country. The coordination of these actions will eliminate all tendencies toward extremism and dictatorship, no matter from where they emerge. This action is needed even more now when attempts to return, under various forms, to certain communist practices can be noticed.

We believe that cooperation among all democratic forces to select the most competent and honest citizens as candidates for the elections of local bodies is an objective of the greatest importance in order to ensure the basic democratic management of the country.

The PDSR Central Council empowers the Managerial Committee to begin consultations and make decisions in the spirit of the ideas agreed upon on this occasion.

On behalf of the Central Council

President Sergiu Cunescu

FSN-PNL Commission To Supervise Ministry

AU0110170590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1606 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 1/10/1990—A five-member parliamentary commission representing the National Salvation Front (NSF) [FSN] and the National Liberal Party (NLP) [PNL] was formed on request from the minister of the interior, Doru Viorel Ursu, to overview and support the ministry's activities, a statement of the Ministry of the Interior's press office announced.

The main aim of the commission—the first of its kind since the December revolution—is to analyse the work for the democratisation of the organisational structures of the ministry and of its leadership, how its personnel fulfilled their tasks, especially in the maintenance of public order and peace, in safeguarding the life and integrity of the individual, of public and private property.

Another aim of the parliamentary commission is to see how the personnel discredited before or during the revolution was dropped from the ministry and how the screening process is carried on. Members of the commission will go to units, meet the personnel and consider the fulfilment of the tasks and missions of its police, gendarmes, firemen, passport processing and other forces.

Stress will be laid during this overview on the analysis of the legal framework for the Ministry of the Interior activities, on the state of the planned bill on the police and gendarme corps.

The commission will submit its conclusions to Parliament to make its contribution to the democratisation of Romanian society and the creation of the state of law.

Radical Civic Union Given Official Status

AU2809181190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1425 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—"The Radical Civic Union" has been given official status. It is a juristic person and has the right to participate in Romania's political life. According to its program, the ideological basis of this political formation is the freedom-responsibility relationship, and its aim is everybody's welfare within the natural boundaries of independent and sovereign Romania.

* Alliances of Opposition Parties Viewed

90BA0306A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7 Sep 90 p 2

[Andrei Alexandru article: "More or Less Monstrous Coalitions"]

[Text] Something that was to be expected has come to be. Antitotalitarian alliances or forums incorporating various parties, miniparties, and even trade unions—naturally apolitical—have appeared in Brasov, Cluj, and

Iasi, among them the PNL [National Liberal Party] and the PNT-cd [National Christian Democratic Peasant Party]. This preceded Mr. Radu Cimpeanu's attempt to unite the opposition behind a rather transparent veil and, if possible, to become its leader.

Shifts of partners and options, the apparition of some coalitions and the disappearance of others are normal phenomena in between elections. Nevertheless, this attempt to create a political alliance—even if it is only between the PNL and PNT-cd—conveys rather a note of uncertainty, weakness, and disorientation among the opposition. Especially since these two parties always claimed to be completely distinct entities. I will examine some of the reasons that have generated this new situation.

Any objective political observer can see that the PNL is visibly in regression regarding the number of supporters and sympathizers, and that for a number of reasons: The legalization of the young wing of the PNL and, simultaneously, the transfer of a number of members of sympathizers to the new party may be one of them. The support that the program of the PNL young wing appears to enjoy must necessarily worry the "old" PNL, which immediatedly after the revolution said on television, through its representative Mr. Radu Cimpeanu, that it was the genuine, one and only liberal party, in other words, the repository of the absolute liberal truth. These days, when an increasing number of people dissatisfied with either the opposition or the FSN [National Salvation Front] are turning to the young wing, it can be said that Mr. Cimpeanu was wrong in his initial affirmations.

The incorporation of the Democratic Party of Cluj in the PNL young wing is significant along this line. This is what Mr. Patriciu, executive secretary of the PNL young wing told us exclusively: "Since July we have been working on a liberal economic alternative to the governmental program, and on a political program designed to deepen the process of democratization and liberalization in the country. There is no question of uniting the opposition except on the basis of a well defined ideological backbone. We have produced such a backbone and we have begun negotiations with various political groups for the purpose of unification or association. The merger that occurred yesterday constitutes a first step along this line. Another blow to the credibility of the PNL were Mr. Patriciu's statements at the press conference given on the occasion of the legalization of the young wing concerning the existence of two PNL programs, one for public consumption, and another known as "the true PNL program." This "true" program envisaged, among other things, restoring plants and estates to their old owners and reinstating the monarchy.

Aware of losing its public support, the PNL leadership seems willing to make considerable concessions. How else can one explain this new desire to draw closer to the PNT-cd, in view of the fact that the pact concluded with that party on the eve of the May elections engendered great dissatisfaction among the party and was viewed as one of the major reasons for the few votes won by the liberals in the election. Is the liberal leadership aware of the fact that it is repeating the same mistake, or is it simply that it can think of no other solutions for the future?

Another noteworthy factor is the fact that the PNL continues to attach too much importance to foreign material and human resources, something that gives most people a sense of contempt for the indigenous man in the street. Unless, once again, it has no other recourse than foreign aid?

Coming back to the desire to unite the opposition, is such an attempt possible? I don't think so. It is astonishing that people with valuable political experience can imagine that, by calling the opposition to unity, they can bring so many program options to a common denominator. But perhaps they are no longer interested in programs, only in a strong opposition that can give them more power.

In this item I commented mostly on the PNL's position, because no one was surprised by the PNT's desire to find allies among the opposition, in view of the poor results obtained by this party in the elections. And if the small number of votes it won was not enough, two other PNT-cd splinters went their own way, while a third is now in the process of becoming an independent group.

As for the other parties represented in Parliament, it is not very probable that they will now accept the patronage of any of the historical parties. We shall see.

New Customs Regulations for 10 Oct to 30 Apr

AU2909141890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1101 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—Over 1 October 1990-30 April 1991 no Romanian or foreign tourist can take across the border anything except personal clothes and travel items, medicines for personal use, food for up to 24 hours, and gifts worth up to 500 lei, a government ordinance issued on 28 September announced.

The 500 lei limit can be exceeded in case the gifts are works of art by living professional or amateur artists that were bought from artists' union shops or that were allowed out of the country by the national cultural heritage offices.

No customs duty is levied on things that were allowed to be taken across the border.

As concerns the customs duties on imported motor vehicles, under the same government act a fixed tax is set that differs with the kind of vehicle (passenger car, caravan , motorcycle, boat, etc.) and the engine capacity.

Congress of Independent Radio, TV Stations Ends

AU2909200890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1723 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—The first national congress of the independent radio and television stations concluded in Bucharest Saturday afternoon.

The participants' questions were answered by representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Telecommunications, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, the Ministry of the Interior, the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade, the capital city's mayorship, the Romanian Radio and Television, the ROMPRES news agency and the Romanian Journalists' Association.

The congress adopted a resolution signed by 19 representatives of the independent radio and television stations which are already operating or are just organising which decided the creation of the National Federation of the Independent Radio and Television Stations and the government was requested to submit the bill on audio and visual means for public debate.

The participants appreciated as necessary the elaboration of a law of audio and visual means which should regulate the technical aspects regarding the distribution and use of frequencies.

The congress was sponsored by Rank Xerox company.

The proposal was made at the congress that the recently set up federation be affiliated to the International Federation of Independent Radio and Television Stations.

Colloquium for Independent Television Communique

AU0110104190 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 25 Sep 90 p 1

["Communique" of Predeal colloquium "For an Independent Television"]

[Text] Communique

The proceedings of the colloquium "For an Independent Television," which took place in Predeal, emphasized the need for several independent TV stations as a prerequisite for our society's evolution toward democracy.

Representatives of many associations, groups, leagues, etc. decided to set up a national television station under the control of the civic society, as the sole alternative to removing the monopoly of the powers that be over the circulation of audio-visual information.

The Association of Romanian Journalists, the Romanian Society for an Independent TV Station, the "Timisoara" Society, the "15 November" Movement of Brasov, the League of Students, the Uniclub Association, CADA [the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army], the "R" Society, the Independent Antenna, "Fratia" Trade Union Confederation, the Antitotalitarian Forum, the Group for Social Dialogue, the Reflection Group for the Renewal of the Church, the League for the Defense of Human Rights, and the Pre-University Trade Union

Dijmanescu on Change in Romanian Economy

AU2809165590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1401 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—In Romania, an economic system is simply discontinued and another one is about to be born, says Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of state for economic orientation, in the independent daily "ADEVARUL". However much as we'd like it to be a mere switch, the minister stressed, the transition is a long process: It takes time to build new economic structures and relations and overcome the inertia to change. The slump in industrial production, lower or delayed investment and the diminution of exports are the result of a combination of objective and subjective factors and reflect the response of economic agents to Romania's changed macro economical policy. An open contradiction has already appeared between the will to get rid of economic centralism and the request of economic units to have a central source of supplies. The attempt to solve, even partially, the problems arising from this evolution, through imports, brought trade and payments imbalances, to which the Gulf crisis also contributed.

On the other hand, the minister says, no reliable contract relationships have been established between private entrepreneurs and state enterprises, which explains the slow and somehow chaotic evolution of the private sector, including services where there are no technical-material obstacles.

Speaking about agriculture where 10.3 tonnes of cereals have been harvested and animal production has increased, the minister said output is expected to be poor because of the drought. The problem of raw materials and energy necessary for the present structure of the national economy has not been solved. Aggravating factors will add, such as the approaching payments in hard currency to central and East European countries, the Soviet Union in particular.

In addition, foreign investors, potential economic partners from industrial countries have taken a wait-and-see attitude.

That is why the industrial commodity output for the first eight months of this year was 19.9 percent lower than during the same period last year, and labor productivity dropped 22.4 percent lower among other things because of the work week which was shortened by 1/6 in the economy as a whole and by ⅓ percent in the hard-work sectors, the minister emphasized.

Minister Dijmanescu on Inflation, Unemployment

AU0110122590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1042 GMT 1 Oct 90

["Economy—Eugen Dijmanescu: The Shock of Change in the Romanian Economy"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 1/9/1990—Inflation has grown 18 per cent in Romania over 1989, tells Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of state for economic orientation, in daily ADEVARUL.

As for the unemployment rate it can be assessed at some 10 per cent of the total labor force. Unemployment will be a lasting phenomenon, the minister says, considering the existence of structural distortions that cannot be settled in a short while. In this context, the government has already advanced to the parliament a package of social security measures, he says, including reskilling programs and introduction of a system of unemployment security.

As compared with the positive commercial balances of these last few years—forced by the policy of export and drastic cuts on imports—in the first eight months of this year the commercial balance is adverse, with a deficit of 1100.4 million rubles and 908.6 million dollars, the minister says. This is explained by cuts on exports matched by failure to fulfill internal production while export contracts still have to be observed.

We need a wise monetary policy, Minister Dijmarescu said, pursuing an approximation of the official rate of exchange to a rate of equilibrium and promotion of exports. Likewise, the readjustment of the leu rate of exchange in relation with the currencies of the neighbor countries, deriving from the necessity to correlate it with the dollar, pursues deterrence of speculative operations and of diverting an important amount of products from the home market to foreign markets.

Newspaper Establishes Share-Holding Company

AU2909141590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0931 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—The editorial team of the "TINERETUL LIBER" newspaper unanimously decided, in its general assembly Wednesday 26 September, to set up the "TINERETUL LIBER" share-holding company.

The new company will, as a result of the government's favourable advice, print newspapers, books and other such materials, engage in business management, import-export and other socially useful economic activities, the draft statute discussed by the general assembly shows.

Employment of Securitate in Army Causing Concern

AU0110113890 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 20 Sep 90 p 1

[Viorel Stirbu article: "The Securitate, Militia, and the Army"]

[Text] When a person completes a prison term to which he has been sentenced for his wrongdoings, he can return among us with his head held high. When a person belongs to a particular institution that is condemned altogether, however, he is not guilty of breaking the law; he is guilty only of belonging to that institution, and his personal responsibilities cease at the same time the institution is dissolved. The initial measures to "incorporate" the Securitate into the Army seemed generous to me: The former secret political police is given a chance to be part of the honorable strata of society, where it has the opportunity to be rehabilitated, even if this only means partial rehabilitation. We do not know what happened; the only certainty is that the Securitate won in this clash of forces. I do not know whether it was for its benefit, but it certainly was to the detriment of the nation. As far as the militia is concerned, "gentlemen," as General Chitac would say in the sweet Moldavian language, it was weak. Here, we can also see Minister Doru Viorel Ursu, who tries to makes us understand that the Romanian police is poorly equipped and poorly instructed and, as far as its number is concerned, it is not sufficient. On the contrary, it does not even have a clear-cut legal status. Only one of two possibilities can be correct: Either the militia was not as strong as it seemed to be during the Ceausescu time or, since the revolution, it has been so thoroughly purged that the number of the "people in charge of public order" has decreased to an unexpected level. It is possible that the Securitate achieved its greatest success through a pretense of such proportions that it made us scared of the militia and its own omnipresence and omnipotence; we were scared then, we continue to be scared today, and we will be scared tomorrow as well. If this is the case, however, during the months since the revolution, there have been enough opportunities to fill the personnel vacancies—at least at the middle level, even if not at the level of generals. We saw the minister on television on the evening of 23 August and I had the impression that he is a worried man. I even had the impression that he is a person who is not understood by the people, who are far too preoccupied in order to be able critically to judge the bitter realities of their current life. However, the minister did not exactly succeed in convincing us—although he resorted to the cheap method of addressing the parents of the recruited soldiers (as a matter of fact, pupils)—because we have learned that part of the Securitate was incorporated into the gendarmerie and, as far as the creation of special order-keeping units are concerned, we learned about that as early as June. We, however, do not want to see the Army firing in the streets!

Commitee Protests 'Dictatorial System' in Army

AU0110110790 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 25 Sep 90 p 2

["New Acts of Intolerance in the Army"—statement by the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army and by the "For Military Justice" action group]

[Text] The curbing of the renewal process represented by the democratization of our military institution—primarily under the pretext of the tragic events of mid-June—caused widespread and profound concern among Army personnel. Events which followed this antidemocratic act confirmed the correctness of the growing concern of military cadres over the obvious attempt of some state or military decisionmakers to restore a spirit of intolerance to military life.

The slanders, threats, and intimidation practiced by certain leading cadres in the Ministry of National Defense against the promoters of this reform process in the Army have recently culminated in the arbitrary transfer to reserve duty of certain higher officers belonging to the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army (CADA), under the pretext that they participated in various actions undertaken by civilian and nonpolitical organizations. The decisive role in this abusive action was played by Chief of Staff Mr. Colonel General Vasile Ionel, who occupied some of the highest functions in the military hierarchy during the Ceausescu dictatorship, and whose recall to active duty last December proved to have served exclusively the maintenance of the dictatorial system in the Army.

The injustice of this kind of measure is all the more striking as it is directed against some of the very few military cadres who had the strength, in past years, officially and publicly to oppose the continuation of the Ceausescu dictatorship. As a matter of fact, this kind of opposition—particularly the steadfastness with which cadres such as Mr. Gheorghe Sinmartineanu, from the Timisoara garrison, Mr. Viorel Tocan, from the Brasov garrison, and so forth believed in and acted for the victory of the ideals of the December revolution—was the true reason that made them become undesirable in the eyes of those people whose personal interests are incompatible with the triumph of these legitimate aspirations.

Beyond the belief of the authors of the current initiative that these serious mistakes will be registered and condemned accordingly by the implacable judgment of history, we call on the country's Parliament to intervene firmly so that an immediate end is put to these gross violations of the most elementary human rights, violations that are in flagrant contradiction to the guarantees that the state power is trying to offer to the international community about the firmness and irreversibility of the democratic process in Romania.

The members of the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army and the "For Military Justice" Action group

Colonel George-Ioan Danescu Appointed Police Chief

AU2809201390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1833 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—On September 28, 1990 the Romanian Government appointed Colonel George-Ioan Danescu secretary of state, head of the police department.

Mr. George-Ioan Danescu, 52, graduated from the School of Police Officers and from the Law Faculty and took a post-university course in criminology. He is married and has three children.

Colonel Danescu was not a member of the nomenlatura and after the December 1989 revolution he was promoted head of Prahova County Police.

Miners' League Calls For Movement's Stability

AU2909141390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0923 GMT 29 Sep 90

["Social Life: Stabilising the Miners' Unions Movement"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—The past six months since the federation was formed have shown that its elected leaders have forgotten their main task, namely to fight for the rights of the people who elected them, to improve their living and working conditions which are particularly hard, says the Jiu Valley Free Miners' Unions League in a statement issued at the end of a joint meeting of the unions' executive councils. Those leaders got carried on by power, painfully clinging to their positions and busying themselves with petty problems that are not of general concern.

The Jiu Valley Free Miners' Unions League will fight for the observance of the rights and freedoms of its members, against the tendency to revive dictatorial practices, the statement says. Our miners who were the first citizens of this country to stand up to dictatorship in 1977, cannot tolerate such things in their own union. This position is shared by the miners in the Oltenia Free Miners' Unions League.

However, the two union organisations, taking the view that the destabilisation of the miners union movement must be avoided at all costs and that the movement's unity must be restored ask the current leaders of the federation and of the free unions to call within the shortest possible time another extraordinary conference with participants being democratically nominated to set the federation's coordination on a new basis.

Tourism Figures for 1990 Released

AU2909140990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0859 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—Nearly four million Romanians travelled abroad in the first eight months of this year, up from about 90,000 during the same period last year, Petre Baron, head of the Department for Tourism of the Romanian Ministry for Trade and Tourism, told a ROMPRES writer. The number of foreign tourists (who stayed in hotels or other public accommodation facilities) is put at 2.5 million until now which is more than during the whole of 1989 (1.8 million). Adding to that was the growing number of Romanian tourists—10 million or so—who checked in at various hotels or inns. Individual tourists make up two thirds of the total.

The aim in the next period is to make the Romanian offer more attractive, hence more competitive by using to advantage the potential for tourism, modernising tourist facilities, diversifying and upgrading tourist services, expanding cooperation with big foreign companies and international organisations. These are aims that can be attained through the government's reform programme. The thirty-nine county tourism offices and 18 tourism enterprises under the Department of Tourism are being reorganised. As a result, 136 share-holding companies are expected to be formed and operate on a fully economic and financial autonomous and profit-making basis. Adding to these companies are more than three hundred private agents and companies.

Ecological University Opens in Bucharest

AU0110193190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1853 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 1/10/1990—The Ecological University of Bucharest, the first private higher education establishment in post-revolutionary Romania, held its opening ceremony in the Great Palace Hall, in the presence of its 1,600 students, of as well as of scientists, men of letters, political leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, journalists. In his address, Professor Dolphi Drimer, the rector of this institution which will train specialists in medicine, law, engineering, agronomics, natural sciences and sports, showed that it was not incidental that an ecological university aroused so many negative passions in a country that has the lowest per capita number of students in Europe. This university, he said, is an alternative to higher learning schemes, based on different principles, free of tight control and planning. He further said that while the university has no premises of its own, an appropriate location, and not because Bucharest could not offer one, it has, instead, the bricks each of its students and professors stands for in their endeavour to relay the gains of science to the next generation. "This ardent wish to defeat communism where it had struck deepest, in education, will stimulate us to overcome the numerous difficulties of the beginning," stressed the rector.

Father Galeriu, an Orthodox priest, gave the blessing.

Church Board Elects New Bishop of Arges

AU2809180190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1505 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—The Church Board of Electors elected Calinic Argeseanul bishop of the restored Arges Bishopric. Calinic Argeseanul formerly was bishop-vicar of the same diocese.

Friday, September 27, the Holy Synod resumed its work at the Romanian Patriarchy, by analyzing a project that rescind the statutory provisions against church autonomy.

Report on Romanian-U.S. Ties, MFN Status

AU2809151390 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 18 Sep 90 p 4

[R. Caplescu article: "'Belated Regrets' as Leitmotiv?"]

[Text] Once U.S. Congress was notified of President Bush's decision to grant Czechoslovakia the most favored nation [MFN] status, all Eastern European countries—with the exception of Bulgaria and the USSR—now have this status, which has also been extended to China. There is no doubt that, in the new circumstances created after the great changes in the eastern part of our continent, this situation agrees with the requirements to intensify cooperation among states, because the extension of this clause in the framework of bilateral relations can act as an incentive for the world economic exchanges.

The natural question that arises is: What about Romania? As far as our country is concerned, the Romanian-U.S. trade accord signed in Bucharest in 1975 was automatically extended, in accordance with existing provisions, for another three years. The fact that neither side objected to its extension clearly shows that both Romania and the United States believe that this agreement is in accordance with the interests of both countries.

All the more paradoxical and incomprehensible is the fact that, in the framework of this overall agreement, the article according to which the two countries mutually grant each other the MFN status continues to be suspended. This means that, in the absence of the respective clause, much higher customs taxes must be paid on Romanian exports. It is obvious that the interests of the U.S. partners in the import-export transactions, as well as those of would-be U.S. investors, are also affected because the absence of this clause also acts as a kind of obstacle in the Romanian-U.S. business relations. It is an obstacle because it hampers the granting of guarantees and facilities for financial and trade credit, without which investments are deprived of an indispensable support.

It is known that at the end of February 1988, as a result of the aberrant policy of the dictatorship—which pretended that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (previously accepted without conditions) paved the way for an "inadmissible interference in Romania's domestic affairs"—the decision was made to unilaterally renounce the MFN status.

In June 1988 in Bucharest, the two sides signed an agreement on suspending the mutual application of the clause. It is known that one of the first foreign policy moves of the new Romanian authorities after 22 December was to declare the decision of the defunct dictatorship to renounce the clause as null and void. At that time, the declaration was welcomed by the U.S. State Department as "very good, very positive news."

Now, more than eight months later, the U.S. side has still not reestablished the clause. As is well known, the aforementioned Jackson-Vanik Amendment conditioned the granting of the MFN status in the trade relations with the Eastern European countries on ensuring the right to emigrate. The Ceausescu regime accepted this amendment, with very little enthusiasm and without the adoption of a proper law on emigration. Given the fact that, in Romania's case, the clause had to be renewed every year, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment acted as a kind of pressure instrument, which squeezed from the dictatorship a whole series of concessions in the area of emigration and human rights in general until the abusive decision to renounce the clause was made.

One would have thought that the cancellation of this pointless decision and the adoption of a previously nonexistent law which clearly provides for the right to free emigration would lead to the speedy reestablishment of the clause. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, however, is currently being interpreted in a much wider sense than before—at least as far as Romania is concerned. The U.S. officials say that from a "technical" viewpoint, Romania fully meets the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, due to the fact that there are no obstacles whatsoever to emigration from our country. They add, however, that other aspects connected with human rights are currently being linked to this amendment. It is emphasized that the United States must become convinced that there is no violation of these rights in Romania—something which could have been done more easily before the events at the beginning of June. Now, it is necessary to wait a little longer. The granting of the status is currently made conditional on "ascertaining that real progress is made toward democracy and the market economy."

The natural question is who and how is one entitled to pass such judgments, what "unit of measurement" should be used, and how long will the whole process last? President Bush's personal representative, Governor Gary Carruthers, said that the 20 May elections were "a huge step forward along the road of democracy," while the Romanian Government's economic reform program was hailed in the United States and other Western countries as extremely positive. Finally, the group of U.S. senators who recently visited Bucharest praised the firmness and promptness with which Romania joined in the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council against Iraq—in spite of the serious economic losses incurred as a result of this gesture. These positive assessments, however, are countered by other assessments regarding the controversial events at the beginning of this summer.

Is this tantamount to another delay? Some U.S. circles talk about a period of several months to one year before the adoption of an appropriate decision. Of course, one cannot "force the hand" of the authorized parties involved. No one can think in such terms. Anyhow, the time will finally come when the real or artificial objections to the granting of the clause will disappear. This is a general trend and process.

It would, however, be against the interests of both sides to delay the adoption of a decision too much. Some U.S. officials said that they regret the haste with which they granted the Ceausescu regime a "blank check," out of "real politik" reasons and political expediency (or was it opportunism?), considering this now as a mistake. Maybe they are now faced with the danger of making another mistake, in the opposite direction this time? It would be a pity if "belated regrets" were to become a leitmotiv of Romanian-U.S. relations....

Finance Minister Addresses IMF Meeting

AU2909142790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1920 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Washington, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—In his address to the plenum of the IMF and World Bank group yearly meeting, Mr. Teodor Stolojan, Romanian finance minister, expressed Romania's firm determination to create a real democracy based on the market economy.

The process of economic reform is hindered said the Romanian minister by the increase in oil prices and the effects of the embargo, but the Romanian Government is decided to continue and even accelerate the transition to a market economy. In that context he stressed again the major contribution the IMF and World Bank group can have to an accelerated transition process, to the restructuring and stabilization of the Romanian economy.

Mr. Teodor Stolojan and Mr. Mugur Isarescu, governor of the Romanian National Bank, met Mr. Michel Camdessus, IMF managing director, and discussed the necessary steps to revitalize Romania's relations with the IMF.

The IMF managing director was addressed an invitation to visit Romania in October, during his planned tour in a number of European countries. The invitation was accepted.

IAEA Team Inspects Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant

AU2909141790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1044 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—From 24 September to 12 October the nuclear power plant at Cernavoda will be inspected by a team of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Nuclear safety experts known as OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) check pre-operational safety of the nuclear plant at Cernavoda at the invitation of the Romanian Government. The inspection will have two stages: One in 1990 concentrates on construction, the second, in 1991, will be concerned with preparations for the start-up of operation. The IAEA experts are joined by government experts from Canada, France, Spain, Great Britain and the U.S. This is the first OSART mission to Romania.

Neagu Conveys Iliescu Message to Qatar Shaykh

AU3009193390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1708 GMT 30 Sep 90

[Text] Doha ROMPRES, 30/9/1990—Mr. Romulus Neagu, secretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the government, was received in Doha by the amir of Qatar, Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Hamad al Thani, to whom he handed over a message of friendship and cooperation from President Ion Iliescu of Romania. The message expresses Romania's solidarity with the State of Qatar in the complex conditions created by the crisis triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, emphasis is placed on Romania's determination to firmly and consistently apply all the measures on the Gulf agreed upon at the United Nations despite the considerable losses in its national economy because of the crisis in that area. The message expresses Romania's wish which was also highlighted during the talks conducted on the occasion to establish diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar.

Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Hamad al Thani congratulated the Romanian people on its courage and its determination in democratically developing the country after the December 1989 revolution, on Romania's principled stance on the Gulf crisis.

Underscoring the broad possibilities of cooperation in various areas between the two countries, he welcomed the initiative concerning the establishment of diplomatic links, which he said, could be considered to already exist.

Culture Minister Meets UK Council President

AU2909142690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1925 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 28/9/1990—Sir David Orr, chairman of the British Council, on a visit to Bucharest, met Mr. Andrei Plesu, Romanian minister of culture on Thursday [27 September] afternoon. The meeting was also attended Mr. Michael William Atkinson, ambassador of Great Britain to Bucharest.

The meeting, following shortly the Romanian minister's own visit to London at an invitation extended by the British Council, occasioned an exchange of views about bilateral cooperation at a cultural and artistic level—exhibitions, shows, concerts, participation in arts festivals, translations and co-editing, etc. Such activities will be included in the cultural-scientific exchanges programme of Romania and Great Britain to be signed in February next year.

The British guest said that his visit to Bucharest was an expression of Great Britain's wish to encourage the culture and artistic relations between the two countries. That wish would soon materialize by the opening of a British book shop and of a British contemporary art exhibition in Bucharest, and by a Romanian tour of London National Theater.

At this very moment, the Bucharest "L.S. Bulandra" Theater Company is touring London and Dublin, and Romania is going to participate in the Edinburgh Arts Festival early next year.

Roman Receives Italian Banker Cottone

AU0110173190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1604 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 1/10/1990—Romania's Prime Minister Petre Roman received on Monday afternoon Benedetto Cottone, deputy, president of the Italian-Romanian Bank. They discussed the activity of that bank and identified new possibilities of cooperation so that it should get more and more involved in financing the projects in Romania advanced by Italian companies.

Nastase To Visit China 12-16 October

AU2909141690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1043 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/9/1990—Romania's Foreign Affairs Minister, Adrian Nastase, will pay an official visit to China at the invitation of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, over 12-16 October.

Croatian Internal Ministry Denies Troop Movements

LD0110162890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1601 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—A competent representative of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs this afternoon denied a piece of news broadcast by the Serbian Knin Radio that "special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are moving in on Knin from several directions."

"The reports from Knin Radio are not true. It is blatant misinformation. There are no special units in that area," the competent representative of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated in Zagreb.

Denounces 'Misinformation'

LD0110212390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1837 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—In connection with the security situation in certain parts of the Republic of Croatia, an authorized representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia issued a special statement this evening:

In connection with a crude insinuation and provocation which was spread in Knin today and then in other parts of the republic, disturbing citizens, and according to which special police units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs moved in on Knin, the Ministry of Internal Affairs states that it is an unscrupulous untruth, which is detrimental primarily to the people of the Knin area. As a consequence of such misinformation, barricades were again set up on some roads in the Knin area, armed sentries stationed, and approximately 400 kilograms of explosive stolen from a mine in Modrino Selo near Knin.

All this shows, the Ministry of Internal Affairs statement says, that here an expression of the people's will is not the point; there are certain individuals and groups which, availing themselves of the current political situation in the Republic of Croatia, are committing criminal acts with most serious consequences.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs special units are still stationed in some areas of the Sisak region, and will remain there as long as the constitutional order, citizens, property, and public peace and order are to be protected. A part of the units has already been withdrawn, and the withdrawal will be continued depending on the security situation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs holds that efforts of all municipal bodies in the areas engulfed in the unrest have to be directed toward normalization of the situation and establishing responsibility, which will reduce the need to deploy the special police units, the statement concludes.

Internal Affairs Group To Hold Emergency Session

LD0110200790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The Internal Affairs Committee of the SFRY Assembly will meet on 3 October in an emergency session to discuss the current political-security situation in the country, with special emphasis on the events in Croatia.

A proposal is expected to be made to set up a special delegate group, which would be sent to acquaint itself with the situation directly.

A group of delegates from the SFRY Assembly Federal Chamber has announced an initative to convene an emergency session of the Federal Chamber to discuss the situation.

Presidency Urged To Safeguard Rights in Croatia

LD0110181490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1648 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Dvor-na-Uni, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The communal authorities of the town Dvor-na-Uni in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia called on the Yugoslav State Presidency today to urgently safeguard the full human and civil rights stemming from the Constitution and statute of all inhabitants of the commune.

Another call was sent to the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, to urgently invite a human rights commission of the European Parliament to visit Dvor-na-Uni and see on the spot Croatia's new democracy in which Serbian people in Croatia live, especially in the commune Dvor-na-Uni.

The calls came after the Croatian authorities and special police units took away the arms of police reservists from police stations in the Croatian communes populated by Serbs. The Serbian population in Croatia has opposed the special police actions. In the Bania region during the past three days there have been arrests and tear gas has been used against the discontented people who in fear of special police units sought shelter at local Yugoslav Army units.

After the Dvor-na-Uni authorities' special session today, an announcement was issued demanding that the special Croatian police units leave the commune by 1800. People were called to a protest meeting tomorrow at noon in case the police do not withdraw.

People protested sharply and bitterly after police searched the schoolchildren in Dvor-na-Uni at gunpoint as they were coming in and out of the local school.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia was urged to establish the responsibility of persons who helped to implement the decision to take away 60 percent of the weapons during the night without notifying the legal organs of the commune.

The situation in the Dvor-na-Uni commune remains extremely tense and uncertain today. The special units of the Ministry of Interior are still blocking all the approaches to the local police station and searching vehicles and people in the streets. Schools are closed in the commune, while many workers stayed home this morning.

To Meet Upon Jovic's Return

AU0210080890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] The SFRY Presidency will discuss the current political and security situation in the country at a session in Belgrade. The Presidency's session will be held immediately upon the return of Dr. Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, from New York where he took part in the work of the United Nations General Assembly.

Serbian, Bosnian Reaction to Events in Croatia

AU0110170190

[Editorial Report] Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian on 1 October at 1400 GMT devotes 20 minutes of an extended 45-minute cast to the events in the Knin region. Of these 20 minutes, 10 minutes are devoted to reaction by various bodies and parties in Serbia and Bosnia to these events.

According to the announcer, "the Executive Council of Serbia, discussing events in Croatia, concluded that aid consisting of food for children, foodstuffs, and medicines should be sent via the Serbian Red Cross to the population of the endangered communes of Knin, Obrovac, Petrinja, Glina, Dvor na Uni, and other places."

The announcer then cites the statement issued by the Socialist Party of Serbia: "We extend full support to the Serbian people in Croatia and their struggle for equality and civil rights, and for the protection of personal, home, and family dignity and integrity. The Socialist Party of Serbia most energetically condemns the state terror of the Croatian authority over innocent and unprotected Serbian people in some communes in Croatia. This is endangering human rights, peace, and freedom, and is directly awakening tragic historic memories and heralding a new genocide by Ustashas."

Reading a report on the session of the Serbian Trade Union Council, the announcer says: "Regarding the persecution of Serbs in Croatia, the Council of the Trade Unions of Serbia has appealed to all state organs of Yugoslavia and demanded that they undertake all necessary measures to protect the Serbian population within 24 hours. If this is not done, the trade union will demand resignations. If no action is taken with regard to these demands, the trade union council is of the opinion that the Yugoslav People's Army must ensure the security of Serbs in Croatia. If the army does not act according to its constitutional obligations either, the council will support the self-organization of Serbs in Croatia."

Citing the statement issued by the Executive Council of the Yugoslav Democratic Party of Banja Luka regarding the Serbs' proclamation of autonomy in Croatia, the announcer says: "Further capitulation to the state terrorism in Croatia which has been carried out by an undoubtedly nationalistic party, a party which expresses the will of only a third of the electorate of that republic, will at the same time be capitulation to the destroyers of Yugoslavia which is still one country."

Quoting the statement of the Serbian Democratic Party of Belgrade, the announcer says: "The Serbian Democratic Party of Belgrade appeals to all Serbian political parties, the Republic of Serbia, the Serbian people, wherever they may live, to extend all appropriate help and support to Serbs in Croatia. The Serbian Democratic Party demands from the federal state organs to perform their constitutional duties and effectively protect the Serbian people in Croatia from the terror of the Croatian state."

The announcer then cites the statement of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina: "We demand from the SFRY Presidency to, according to its constitutional powers, remove all possibilities for a civil war, to protect Serbian people in Croatia, and to guarantee a peaceful course of events. The criminal behavior of the Croatian militia toward Serbian people has demonstrated that the finale of the separatist disintegration of Yugoslavia has begun."

Citing the statement issued by the Initiative Council for Carrying Out Election Activities of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Vojvodina, the announcer says: "By unreasonable and irresponsible use of repression, the new Croatian authorities continue to cause hatred and clashes which could have tragic consequences. The council extends support to Serbs in Croatia and all democratic forces which favor peace, respect freedom and rights of citizens, and favor the realization of the full national equality. The council demands from all appropriate organs and above all the SFRY Presidency and the Federal Executive Council to undertake urgent measures to protect Serbs in Croatia and prevent an outbreak of civil war."

The announcer also says that six Serbian opposition parties held a new conference at which they said, according to the announcer: "We demanded a more resolute response by the Presidencies of Yugoslavia and Serbia in protecting Serbian people in Croatia. Otherwise the opposition will organize and send volunteer units to Croatia."

SDS Calls For United Support

LD0110152890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1003 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The Serbian Democratic party [Srpska Demokratska Stranka—SDS] of Belgrade calls on all Serbian political parties, the Republic of Serbia, and all Serbian people, regardless of

where they live, to provide the Serbs in Croatia with all adequate help and support and demands of federal organs to carry out their constitutional duties and to protect the Serbian people in Croatia effectively from the Croatian state's terror—today's statement by the republican committee of the SDS in Belgrade on the events in Croatia stresses. [passage omitted]

Other Parties' Reactions Noted

LD0110152990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1338 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—A number of Yugoslav parties reacted on Monday [1 October] to unrests in Croatia and clashes between Serbs and Croatian authorities. The parties demand from the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the federal government to protect the Serbian population in Croatia and remove the possibility of a civil war.

The Yugoslav Democratic Party of Banja Luka, Republic of Bosnia- Hercegovina, explicitly demands that "federal police units and Yugoslav Army units be sent immediately" to the troubled region in Croatia so as to protect the frightened Serbs from terror of Croatia's ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its "ethnically pure formations, special units of the Croatian Guard."

The Yugoslav Democratic Party upheld the proclaiming of the autonomy of Serbs in the night of Sunday-Monday and condemned "state terrorism" carried out, as set out, by the pronouncedly nationalistic HDZ, which "expresses the will of only one-third of the electorate in Croatia."

The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, too, demands of the competent federal organs to secure a peaceful course of events in Croatia. The party warns that "terror over the Serbian population in Croatia would do away with a possibility of any negotiations" and bring about a civil war.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) committee in the Vojvodina Province sets out that the new Croatian authority "was by way of arrests, threats, pressures, maltreatment of women and children by forcing the people to flee their homes for shelter, carrying out a policy of violence and violating the rights and freedoms of Serbs in Croatia."

The Novi Sad branch of the Party of Yugoslavs sent on Monday an appeal to all the country's citizens calling for a sensible and tolerant behavior.

Also, reports on Monday came from Croatia that the president of the Croatian Supreme Court Milko Gajski and another ten officials and judges of Croatian judiciary asked to be relieved of their posts. The official explanation was that the judges wished to either retire, change their jobs or become attorneys.

Serb Socialist Party on 'State Terror'

AU0110190390 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] The Socialist Party of Serbia condemns most energetically the state terror of the Croatian authority over the innocent and unprotected Serb population in some communes in Croatia. This is endangering human rights, peace, and freedom, and is directly awakening tragic historic memories and heralding a new genocide by Ustashas.

The Socialist Party of Serbia extends full support to the Serbian people in Croatia and their struggle for equality and civil rights, and for the protection of personal, home, and family dignity and integrity.

At the same time the Socialist Party of Serbia extends full support to democratic forces in Croatia and their demands for a quick and just solution to the new situation. The Socialist Party of Serbia demands that the SFRY Presidency and the Federal Executive Council immediately undertake all constitutionally and legally envisaged measures to put a stop to violence against innocent people and to return peace, tranquility, and safety to them.

Democratic relations and civil rights must be guaranteed and ensured to all citizens in Croatia—this is stated among other things in a communique of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

Knin Roads Said Blocked 'Until Further Notice'

LD0110213690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1724 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Gracac, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—Since early this afternoon, the road from Gracac to Knin has been blocked 20 km from Knin. Immediately after a bridge over the Zrmanja River, near Kravlja Draga, the road has been blocked with a huge pile of pine tree trunks. As it is impossible for cars to breach the barricade, the presence of a small group of guards is unnecessary. Equipment needed for erecting the barricade has been removed, and without it the road can be cleared at the earliest by tomorrow morning.

Among several guards in civilian cloths only one has a pistol. The guards are redirecting traffic on both sides of the barricade, in order to prevent the formation of long lines on this narrow road. Apart from this barricade, which completely cuts off the Gracac-Knin road, two additional barricades of stones and tree trunks have been erected but only on one side of the road.

Apart from TANJUG, REUTER, and VECERNJI LIST of Zagreb reporters, several buses are stranded at the barricades, among them a bus full of Hungarian tourists. The guards are not giving information as to when the road will be cleared, but are only repeating that Knin will be cut off from the outside world "until further notice."

Vehicles Being Turned Back

LD0110210190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1952 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Knin, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—All roads to the town of Knin, Republic of Croatia, were blocked this afternoon with rocks and felled trees.

The road to Gracac, north of Knin, is closed in both directions. Serbs, the majority population in this part of Croatia, have formed guards.

The guards are turning back all vehicles once they reached the road blocks, to avoid long lines from forming.

TANJUG's team, REUTERS' photographer and other reporters are still at the road blocks, trying to reach Knin.

Several buses, including one full of Hungarian tourists, have been stranded.

The guards do not know when the road blocks will be removed. They told reporters that Knin is [words indistinct] off "until further."

The Croatian Interior Ministry this evening issued a statement saying that the road blocks and guards in Knin and other towns were not an expression of the will of the people but, instead, of individuals and groups who are making use of the current political situation.

The ministry also reported that "a part of the police forces have been withdrawn from the field" and that the withdrawal will continue "depending on the security situation."

The Croatian Interior Ministry statement said that the municipal authorities in the areas swept by unrest should try to calm down the situation and "establish responsibility," which it said would "diminish the need for the presence of the special police forces."

Armed Guards Manning Barricades

LD0210084190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0813 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] Bosanko Grahovo, 2 Oct (TANJUG)—Last night, guards were deployed on the barricades set up on the roads leading into Knin. Since dawn, armed guards have been searching all the vehicles and passengers and turning them without exception away from Knin, which during the night was completely inaccessible.

Usually from late morning the roads into Knin become passable, but the control of vehicles and passengers is still maintained. Barricades and guards have been deployed around Knin for the last three to four days.

Situation Unlikely To Remain Quiet

AU0110214190 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Dragan Mihovic report]

[Text] The situation in Knin is quiet at present. The streets are empty. There is no new information to indicate any new events. There is no traffic in the direction of Knin except the occasional train that is let through.

On main roads there are barricades and guards. People are anxiously following what the press is reporting. The Croatian Radio and Television news programs, which are (?literally) falsifying the truth, are being received with real disgust.

A night like this one, under these circumstances, can certainly not remain quiet.

Situation in Dvor Na Uni 'Exceptionally Tense'

LD0110170990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1342 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Dvor na Uni, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The situation in the municipality of Dvor na Uni is exceptionally tense and uncertain. Special police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs continue to block all approaches to the buildings of the public security station and the Assembly's building. Vehicles and citizens in the streets are being searched, while an atmosphere of bitterness and protest prevails among the people. The schools in the municipality are closed, while numerous workers in enterprises failed to turn up for work this morning.

Some time after 1100 citizens began to gather in the central square in Dvor na Uni, but after staying there for a short time they dispersed. Numerous people are in the compound of the Samarica enterprise where they are sitting on the grass and awaiting the outcome of the situation.

This morning an extraordinary session of the municipal Assembly Executive Council was held, attended by representatives of work organizations, the economy, the social sector, and working communities, and representatives of the Assembly and the leadership of the Dvor na Uni municipal Assembly, at which the situation in the municipality was discussed.

A statement was issued after the session in which "there was a request that by 1800 today special police units leave the municipality, because there were no reasons whatever for their presence and activity, and the municipal Assembly and Executive Council guarantee that the public security station can ensure public order and peace in the region of the municipality."

We protest in the sharpest terms against the way in which special units have been operating in the region of the municipality of Dvor na Uni. We are particularly embittered about, and protest against, the searching of

schoolchildren at the 1 May primary school in Dvor na Uni upon their arrival and departure from school, with automatic weapons pointed at them and with their hands up, the statement stresses.

The Dvor na Uni Executive Council requests that the government of the Republic of Croatia establish the responsibility of persons who have contributed to and implemented the decision on the confiscation of 60 percent of the arms—and this at night and without the knowledge of the legal organs of the municipality—and that these people be relieved of their duties.

There is also a request to establish the responsibility of Perica Juric, deputy minister of internal affairs, and Stjepan Paler, secretary of the Sisak Secretariat for Internal Affairs, because they failed to carry out properly the duties entrusted to them.

We condemn in the sharpest terms the statement that any arms were purchased using funds earmarked for the development of undeveloped municipalities. We consider this to be yet another in a series of provocations and insults against our sociopolitical community, the statement stresses.

The economy, and social and other activities are being caused inestimable damage by the presence and activity of special police forces, something that we consider to be the goal of the Croatian Government—the complete economic collapse of the economy and of the social sector of the municipality of Dvor na Uni, the statement concludes.

Unless the special police forces are withdrawn at 1800 today a protest meeting is scheduled to begin at 1200 tomorrow.

Special Forces' Presence To Be Protested

AU0210095490 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Zoran Pantelic report from Dvor na Uni]

[Text] Hello. The political situation here in Dvor na Uni continues to be complicated. A protest meeting has been scheduled for today, at which it will be demanded that the Croatian militia special units leave the town. The meeting has been scheduled by the town assembly. At present there are around 150 members of the special units in the town.

The Dvor communal Executive Council yesterday issued a statement making several demands, but the main one was for the withdrawal of the special units by 1800 [1700 GMT] yesterday. Since this has not happened, it is quite certain that the announced meeting will be held.

After several hours of discussion at an emergency session of the communal Assembly, the decision was endorsed late last night to hold the announced meeting. The statement also demands the dismissal of the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of Croatia and the Secretary of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Sisak. (?They) are calling on the citizens who have not yet returned arms to do so as soon as possible.

The presence of special forces here in Dvor na Uni is felt to be pressure on the Serbian people. The neighboring commune of Bosanski Novi very sharply reacted to this and yesterday issued a statement of protest against the action of special forces of Croatia in this Bosnian commune. That is to say, the special forces entered Bosanski Novi unannounced and searched the apartment of (Predrag Curcija) who works in the Dvor Secretariat for Internal Affairs but lives in Bosanski Novi. A statement on this affair is expected from the republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Bosnia- Hercegovina.

Finally, I will repeat once again that the special forces are still in Dvor na Uni; the people are excited and anxious; tension is not diminishing. There is no news yet that the special forces will even withdraw from the town. We have so far learned that the meeting will be addressed by the deputy in the Croatian Assembly from this place, (Savo Dragutic).

That is all from Dvor na Uni. We may expect some more news after 1200 [1100 GMT] today when the meeting is expected to begin.

Serbs Hold Protest Rally in Baniski Grabovac

AU0110194390 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Before informing you about the weather, we have a piece of information which we have just received. It is a report on a rally in Baniski Grabovac at which Borislav Mikelic, president of the Socialist Party of Croatia, addressed the crowd.

We demand the immediate withdrawal of the special militia forces from Banija because their further presence could cause unforeseeable consequences in this region. We also demand the release of all those who have been arrested during the so-called Petrinja unrest, which was directly caused by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia.

We do not demand the redrawing of the republican borders nor any greater rights than those determined by the third declaration at the third session of the ZAVNOH [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia] in Topusko in 1944. We do not want to be second-rate citizens, nor do we want to feel as if we are subtenants in Croatia, which we regard as our home and in which we should and must be equal to Croats and people living in it. This was stated among other things by Borislav Mikelic, president of the Socialist Party of Croatia, a Yugoslav-oriented party, at the rally held in Baniski Grabovac this afternoon in front of several thousand citizens.

Goran Babic, secretary of this party, and Dr. Milan Vojinovic, president of the City Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party of Zagreb, also spoke at the rally. The rally took place without any incidents.

Belgrade Rally Voices Demands of Serbs in Croatia

LD0110215590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2011 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—We have not gathered tonight to support a political party, but to express our sympathy with the sufferings of our brother Serbs in the western parts of the country whose leadership remains silent. Milan Komnenic, a Serbian Renaissance Movement representative, was first to address the gathering in front of the SFRY Assembly with these words.

Between 3,500 and 4,000 had gathered in front of the Assembly by 2100, Serbian Renaissance Movement symphatizers were first to arrive. They were followed by about 1,000 students and a number of inhabitants of the capital.

"The lesson in patriotism," as Komnenic labeled this evening's rally, demanded that the Serbian and Yugoslav leadership energetically react in connection with the latest events in Croatia.

What had been done to Serbs on 10 April 1941 is what Tudjman intends to do to them now, to exterminate those whose only sin is being born a Serb. Has the Catholic leadership again devised a plot? Milan Komnenic asked.

A decision that the meeting should not turn into a party rally was ignored, as testified by the slogans: "Down with the communists"; "Red treason"; and "Red Ustashas."

Stevo Kovacevic, who introduced himself as a Democratic Party member, stressed that the Serbian people have the right to organize themselves if the SFRY Presidency do not impose order in Croatia by 1200 tomorrow.

Shouts of "We want arms" and "We are marching on Croatia" could also be heard.

Marinko Nikolic, a Serbian Renaissance Movement member, who addressed the meeting as a representative of students' halls of residence, proposed to the gathered people "to remain here until the decisive moment comes" and to go on hunger strike, if need be.

Afterward, at the demand of the rally participants, Miroslav Melinar from Knin took the floor. He told them that "in these difficult times, we ought to be united, because this is the only way we can win."

On behalf of the Belgrade branch of the Solidarity Society for Aid to Kosovo, Nedeljka Pavlovic called on all Serbian mothers to organize a gathering in front of the Assembly at 1200 tomorrow and wait for a SFRY Presidency decision.

Anti-Croat Speeches Heard

LD0210025390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2312 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—A rally of 3,500 to 4,000 people was staged in front of the Yugoslav parliament building this evening to protest the (?intervention) of special units of the Republic of Croatia against the Serbian population which opposed the taking away of weapons of reserve police units.

The rally, organized by the Serbian opposition parties, was attended, apart from members and sympathizers of the parties, also by some 1,000 students, demanded that the Serbian and Yugoslav leaderships react to the events in Croatia. Shouts were also heard such as "We Want Arms" and "Let's Go to Croatia".

"The Yugoslav state Presidency, which meets tomorrow because of the events in Croatia, must realize that a split is inevitable—we do not want bloodshed, but neither do we want croats any longer," strongest leader of the opposition party, chief of the Serbian Renewal Movement Vuk Draskovic said. He was welcomed with ovations and shouts "Lead Us to Croatia".

Starting at the World War Two period, when the Ustasha authorities of the Quisling, so-called independent, state of Croatia, carried out a genocide against Jews, Romanies, and Serbs, Draskovic accused Croatian Presidency President Franjo Tudjman of trying to exterminate those whose only sin is that they are Serbs.

It was said at the rally that the Serb people have the right to organize themselves if the Yugoslav state Presidency does not establish order in the Republic of Croatia by noon tomorrow.

Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Chetnik Movement (which was refused permission to be registered as a party), called on all Serbs to enlist as volunteers for the defence of the Serbian people in, as he said, Serbian Dalmatia, a part of Croatia where Serbs are a majority population.

Belgrade Trade Unions Threaten Protest Rally

AU0110190890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Belgrade Trade Unions demands that the SFRY Assembly, the state Presidency, and the Federal Executive Council immediately undertake measures for the protection of the endangered Serbian population in Croatia, and to ensure that their civil rights are respected.

If these demands are not met by 0600 [0500 GMT] tomorrow morning, the Presidium of the City Trade

Unions will organize all Belgrade workers and hold a protest rally. This protest rally, as warned, will last until the situation changes.

Serbs in Kosovo Call For 'General Mobilization'

AU0110221290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Milivoje Mihajlovic report]

[Text] Several protest rallies were held in Kosovo today. Our correspondent Milivoje Mihajlovic reports from the largest ones held in Pristina.

[Mihajlovic] At their meeting in Pristina tonight the representatives of Serbs and Montenegrins from almost all communes of Kosovo demanded that the leadership of Serbia protect its people in Croatia. If the SFRY Presidency, as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces fails to intervene within 24 hours, the Serbs from Kosovo will demand that the President of the State of Serbia announce a general mobilization of all Serbs.

They demand that the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] protect the lives of (?the Serbian) people in Croatia. They want the SFRY Presidency to introduce a state of emergency in Croatia and Slovenia whose leaderships want to destroy Yugoslavia through a civil war.

In a letter sent to the Presidencies of Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as to the general staff of the JNA, they demand that the militant leadership of Croatia, which is carrying out Pavelic's plan to exterminate Serbs, be arrested. If this is not done, the Serbian Presidency is asked to stop financing the JNA and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs which, as is stated, the Serbian people do not only need for parades.

Serbian parties are asked to behave as if there were war conditions and to freeze their political activities until the freedom of Serbian people is secured.

Croat Social Liberal Party Urges Independence

LD0210024590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2111 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The Croat Social Liberal Party [Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka—HSLS] this evening sent a statement to the presidents of the Croat Government and the Croat Assembly stressing that "it wants with full responsibility to take part in the creation of the policy of national salvation."

The HSLS demands the president of the Croat government urgently convene a meeting between all Croat parties "so that, on the basis of relevant information about the newly arisen situation—which is extremely worrying in Croatia—interparty committees for citizens' self-defense, which will be prepared for any eventuality, could be created in all municipalities and local communities".

The party demands the Croat Assembly consider a proposal at the session to convene 4 October that "a declaration on the independence of the Croat Republic" is adopted urgently and that republican laws gain priority over federal. They also propose that the European Community be urged to "offer all its services so that a democratic solution of the crisis in Yugoslavia is found."

Sipovo Inhabitants Sign Up To Go to Croatia

AU0110220890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] About 3,000 inhabitants of the commune of Sipovo demanded at a protest rally that the terror of the Croatian authority over Serbian population in this republic be stopped.

They demanded that the arms that were taken away from the Serbian population in Petrinja and Dvor na Uni be returned, and started signing up as volunteers who would go to help their brothers in Croatia.

'Another 10' Croat Judges Submit Resignations

LD0110153790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1200 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, Oct 1 (TANJUG)—The president of the Supreme Court of Croatia, Milko Gajski, and another 10 officials and judges of district and municipal courts and public prosecutors' offices have requested to be relieved of their duties, something that will be decided by the Assembly at its session at the end of the week. Deputies to the socio-political chamber have just received a proposal by the Assembly Elections and Appointments Commission accompanied by an explanation that many judges want to leave at their own request, either to retire or to take on another post or to become barristers.

The presidents of the municipal courts of Donji Lapac and Supetar have requested to be relieved, as have the judges of the municipal courts of Drnis, Kardeljevo, and Stari Grad and the judge of the Zagreb District Court. The deputy district public prosecutors of Pula and Varazdin and the deputy municipal public prosecutors of Split and Zagreb also request to be relieved.

So far, there has been no proposal for new appointments to the vacant posts in the documents for the next session of this Assembly chamber.

Slovene Socialist Party Urges Secession

LD0110181290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1542 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Ljulbljana, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party in the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia called today the republican parliament and government to "work out an operative plan for Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia."

Also demanded was the republic's soonest possible referendum at which people would vote whether or not they wanted to live in Yugoslavia.

The party wanted all Slovenian representatives to be withdrawn from Belgrade, the seat of federal authorities, and Slovenia to call off hospitality to federal organs and institutions.

The Yugoslav Army was charged of "threatening to intervene" while President of the Yugoslav State Presidency Borisav Jovic was reproached for not returning earlier from the New York U.N. General Assembly session.

Jovic associated his return with tense situation in the country, and this move was interpreted by the Socialists as an intention to "fabricate the general picture of disorder within the state."

Kucan Comments on Arms in Republics, Jovic

AU3009213090 Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 26 Sep 90 p 4

[Unattributed boxed-in report on television interview with Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of Slovenia; place and date not given: "Highlights From Milan Kucan's Television Interview: Always on Trial"]

[Text] I never took the opinions of the "sound forces" as mere remarks, but as serious differences in concepts. You must ask somebody else whether they influence anybody at present, they have never influenced me.

The old Bolshevik views that there must be no differences between the leadership and the people in institutions are still alive. More views of truth present the best truth. I cooperate well with Mr. Bucar [president of the Slovene Assembly], and the Presidency also cooperates well with the Executive Council or rather with three ministers: Rupel, Bavcar, and Jansa.

One's prestige is always on trial, and it is easier to lose than to gain it. My daughter Ana decided by herself to study in America; one gets to Harvard only after a strict selection procedure, and I fear that the name Kucan does not mean anything there. She has a contract with Smelt "to stay in their employment for double the time of her studies." My prestige has not been shaken by this.

The differences with the Army are nothing new, because what is at stake is an essentially different view on the concept of the federation and the role of the Army. Two weeks ago we received hints that weapons were being moved from Slovene barracks. The Federal Secretary for National Defense has stated that this concerns formation and organization moves on the territory of Slovenia, but experience teaches us that such occurrences must nevertheless be watched.

Jovic's "scenario" offered all the options for the future system in Yugoslavia, but the procedure of implementation is quite the contrary. It is not acceptable that those who want to stay in the federation pose conditions to others.

Negotiations will be needed about the system in Yugoslavia. But the facts are that the difference in the level of development between Slovenia and Kosovo is as 1 to 7.5, and between Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina as between Germany and Greece within the EC.

Defense Secretariat Denies Remarks

LD2809185690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1625 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav National Defense Secretariat denied on Friday [28 September] a statement by the president of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, on the alleged "organizational-formational transferring and rearming" of the Yugoslav Army units in the republic.

In an interview to Slovenian Television, Kucan said on September 25 that the federal defense minister, Army General Veljko Kadijevic, had used precisely this formulation to deny to him a report on the alleged evacuation of the Yugoslav National Army's heavy weapons from the Slovenian territory.

An announcement issued today by the information office of the Defense Secretariat denied that General Kadijevic had sent such a reply to Kocan and that he had engaged in anay sort of communication with the Slovenian president regarding the "fabrications on the withdrawal of armaments and military equipment from Slovenia," the announcement says.

The announcement also recalls that the rumors on the alleged transfer of arms from Slovenia were officially denied on Wednesday [26 September] by the command of the Fifth Army Region, to which Slovenia belongs.

Croatia's Policy in Kosovo Likened to Apartheid

AU3009213390 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 90 p 2

[Srecko Jurdana commentary: "Balkan Apartheid"]

[Text] That Belgrade oligarchs cannot sometimes be criticized for inconsistency is best illustrated by the latest series of "measures" aimed at Albanian population in Kosovo. Fighting against their own "imperilment," the Serbs have so far managed to deprive Kosovo Albanians of: the right to media access (television, radio, newspaper); the right to use Albanian language in public; the right to education; the right to be politically represented and to express political views; the right to employment; and the right to walk the streets freely (when Kosovo is

visited by foreign delegations investigating the violation of human rights). What is this Balkan apartheid really aiming to achieve?

One must recall the not so distant statements by Serbian militants in Kosovo, according to which "Serbs will move Albanians to Croatia and Slovenia, and let Croats and Slovenes deal with them," to be able to understand that the current terror over Albanians is in fact a clear fulfillment of the "promise" which dates back to the period of "antibureaucratic revolution." In other words, Serbs are trying to persecute Albanians from Kosovo and make this province "ethnically Serbian," believing that in this way they will resolve the "Kosovo question" forever.

By making life for Albanians in Kosovo impossible and by continuously insulting their national pride, Serbs are at the same time opening them the door to Albania and any other regions on the globe where they might want to emigrate.

Considering the fact that there are two million Albanians living in Kosovo, and about 100,000 in Belgrade itself, this concept of the "final solution to the Kosovo question" is, of course, absurd. However, this does not take anything away from its convincingness. The Belgrade oligarchy turned many of its announced moves, which many people nonchalantly declared in advance as empty threats and "political madness," into real parameters of the new Serbian policy (regardless of the fact that many of those who have not lost the feeling for reality justifiably think that the Serbian policy will not yield much happiness). If a form of political activity could be described as "political madness," this does not mean at all that this madness does not represent a real and possible danger to a sensible system. Saddam Husayn is a good president for those who have forgotten Hitler. Belgrade's policy in Kosovo is escalating toward unreasonable but very real "solutions"; the opening of concentration camps for Albanians in the future should not come as too much of a surprise.

At present, however, it would be reasonable to expect an influx of Kosovo Albanians in Croatia and other regions outside the direct control of the Belgrade oligarchy. As regards this, the impression is that the current Croatian policy toward Kosovo is fairly passive.

This passivity, however, originates from the "communist era," when the Croatian authorities of that time were very glad when Serbia proclaimed Kosovo its "internal phenomenon," naively thinking that Croatia would come out of that political problem "unpunished."

Croatia's "washing its hands" enabled Serbia to do whatever it wanted to do in Kosovo and not to pay a price for its political arrogance in other parts of Yugoslavia. Disregarding the national-Bolshevik terror which it conducts in Kosovo, Serbia has a free hand for "an active policy" in Vojvodina, and even in Croatia, chiefly thanks to Croatia's illusion that by leaving Kosovo to the "mercy" of Serbia, Serbia's pressure on Croatia's territory and "interest spheres" will automatically weaken.

All this means that the correct policy toward events in Kosovo is exclusively a "Yugoslav policy," which is a euphemism for Croatia actively extending support to Albanians, in the sense of creating a counterweight not only to Belgrade stirring up sections of Serbs in Croatia, but also to Belgrade's pretensions to annex Vojvodina. In this sense, the time will probably come soon when Croatia will have to send a signal to Albanians in Kosovo that a way out of their conflict with Serbia is not to obey the Serbian implicit and explicit demands for a mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo, but to persist on democratic principles and equality for all citizens in Kosovo. In a struggle for these principles Croatia must, of course, be ready to offer all possible material and moral support to Albanians.

Smuggled Weapons Intended for Kosovar Albanians

LD3009163190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1535 GMT 30 Sep 90

[Text] Geneva, 30 Sep (TANJUG)—Ali Rehani, a Yugoslav from the province of Kosovo who was on Saturday [29 September] caught attempting to smuggle 20 Kalashnikov rifles across the Swiss-Italian border, was smuggling the arms for a group of Kosovo Albanian separatists, says the first statement by the police in the Swiss canton Tessin.

This confirms earlier "grounded suspicion" of the existence of a "large organized and secret ring for delivering arms to ethnic Albanian separatists in Macedonia and Kosovo," the statement says.

The canton police said that an investigation would be started in Switzerland, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian investigative judge, who has launched the investigation, claims that the arms had been purchased in Luzern, as arms sale is legal in most of Switzerland's cantons.

Rehani, 29, lives and works in Luzern. He attempted to smuggle the arms in his false-bottom passenger car. It has still not been established how many times he had succeeded in this operation. There is a founded suspicion that he had transported similar deliveries several times already and that he is merely one in a secret ring of ethnic Albanian separatists engaged in smuggling arms to Kosovo and Macedonia.

'Poisoning' in Kosovo; Army Officer Sentenced

AU0110155190 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 28 Sep 90 pp 4-5

[Emin Azemi and Blerim Reka report: "An Increasingly Insecure Situation"]

[Excerpts] Pristina, 27 Sep—The Kosovo streets are full of schoolchildren and students these days. At the end of September and the beginning of October, many students

blaze trails toward the unknown, toward new horizons of science, humanity, and civilization. However, for many Kosovo families this period has become a nightmare of insecurity. Pitiful sights of Albanian pupils fainting from poisoning continue. Classes in any primary and secondary schools are cut short half way through because of panic created by the mysterious poisoning. A new case occurred at the 19 November Secondary School in Pristina, when panic arose because of 30 relapses and some new cases of pupils fainting. These scenes upset many Albanian teachers, and made others weep, while Serbian teachers and pupils laughed. A feature of this case was that the poisoning took place in classes held in the dark basement of the school, because the upper floors were reserved for Serbian and Montenegrin classes.

This and other cases of poisoning prompted the Kosovo Alternative to issue a communique which among other things states that the number of 7,000 cases of poisoning in the last school year is now rising in various schools in Kosovo. It is a question of organized poisoning taking place without any prevention by the state. The public both in Yugoslavia and abroad is now aware of this. In spite of protests and appeals addressed to various levels of officialdom, there is no end to this damage being done to young people, and the state is doing nothing. On the contrary, the brutal entries of the police in hospitals and schools prevent help being given to the sick. If the poisoning continues, we will be forced to propose a temporary suspension of classes in all Kosovo schools, despite the importance of continuing the school year normally. The federal state organs' indifference to the mass deterioration of children's health compels us to seek urgent visits to Kosovo by international commissions and organizations in order to assess the situation, intervene, and offer help, states the communique to the public issued the day before yesterday by the Presidium of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance, the Pristina Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, the Kosovo Peasants Party, and the Kosovo Social Democratic Party. [passage omitted]

Eight Years for the Murder of Fadil Tala

It has finally been publicly confirmed that even members of the Yugoslav Army are murderers of soldiers. This has been shown by the Nis Military Court's sentencing of Ljubisa Visnjevac, a former corporal, to eight years imprisonment for killing Fadil Tala in Podujevo on 1 February. This crime by the officer Visnjevac was considered to be murder under Article 47, Paragraph 2, Point 3 of the Penal Code of Serbia. It is however strange that the same article provides for sentences ranging from 10 years imprisonment to shooting for such a crime, and has been applied "flexibly" in this specific case.

This is the first punishment of a Yugoslav People's Army officer for the murder of an Albanian. In this case, the bellows of propaganda seem to have been somehow punctured, and there have been none of the journalistic slanders and idiocies which appeared when it was a case of Albanian "murderers." What else can be said of that section of the Belgrade press which would have compiled entire features if the murderer had really been an Albanian?

A case yesterday evening at Koder e Diellit in Pristina shows how hard on the ear the Serbian militia finds Albanian songs. Some children were playing in front of their homes and singing the songs "O Kosovo, My Mother," and "Be Strong Mother, Do Not Fear." The songs were interrupted by police truncheons. [passage omitted]

'Interparty Duel' in Kosovo Between SPO, SPS

LD2909171390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1630 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Pristina, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—A meeting in Kosovo Polje (Yugoslavia's Republic of Serbia), which was to promote the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) [Srpski Pokret Obnove—SPO] Party today turned into an open interparty duel.

The meeting was also attended by followers of the Serbian Socialist (former communist) Party (SSP) [Socijalisticka Partija Srbije—SPS], whose president is Slobodan Milosevic.

Followers of Serbia's two biggest political parties called each other abusive names and accused one another of treason.

SRM leader Vuk Draskovic and other SRM leaders were unable to take the floor in the tense and explosive atmosphere.

Kosovo Polje is a municipality of the Kosovo Province, situated near its capital Pristina, and is inhabited mainly by Serbs.

It is there that Milosevic's political rise started three years ago.

Serbian Multiparty Elections Scheduled for 9 Dec

LD2809204590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1918 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The first multiparty elections in Serbia will be held on 9 December.

The decision on election for deputies in the National Assembly and on the election for president of the Republic of Serbia was adopted by Zoran Sokolovic, president of the Assembly.

The election campaign begins officially as of today.

Elections for national deputies and for president of the republic will be organized by electoral organs in the republic in keeping with the law on the election of national deputies.

Commissions Will Not Be Multiparty

LD2809224990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2001 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia adopted in Belgrade on Friday [28 September] evening three important laws—on election of representatives for parliament, on election of the president of the republic and on constituencies—which provide the legal framework for the first free elections in the past 50 years in Serbia.

The elections, scheduled for December 9, are to be carried out according to the majority principle, although the opposition parties which at present have no representatives in the parliament, urged a proportional system.

The most fierce debate pertained to the composition of electoral commissions and boards. Although a large number of MPs urged it, the majority has ruled that these bodies should not be multi-party. Serbia is at present the only Yugoslav republic whose elections would be carried out and controlled solely by the party in power. Earlier this week, the opposition parties have threatened to boycott the elections if fair play was not secured to the full in carrying out the elections and counting the ballots.

Democratic Party Threatens Boycott

LD2909184590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1745 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Sept (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS), [Srpska Demokratska Stranka—SDS] one of the strongest opposition parties in this Yugoslav Republic, today reiterated it would boycott the elections scheduled for December 9 unless the authorities showed readiness for dialogue.

The DPS announced the boycott at its regular session, which was attended by the leaders or representatives of nearly all Serbian opposition parties and movements.

The Democrats accuse the authorities of preventing the opposition from participating equally in the election campaign, and demand equal treatment in the media which are mostly [word indistinct] controlled by the Socialists (former communists).

They also demand changes in the election law and the introduction of a parity principle instead of the existing majority principle in elections.

The session of the party was attended also by U.S. congresswoman Helen Delich Bentley, who said in her address it was hard to defend Serbia before the U.S. Congress, because Serbia is still a bastion of communism.

United Opposition Wants Demands Met

LD0110201090 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1634 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The united opposition of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia today invited Serbian citizens to boycott the first multi-party elections scheduled for December 9 if the authorities reject the opposition parties' demands.

The opposition demanded a three-month election campaign, media access, multi-party election committees and bodies and working facilities and budget means for all opposition parties during the election campaign.

The Serbian parliament met some of the demands but refuse to grant a three-month election campaign period, and allowed opposition representatives only to observe the elections without including them in election committees.

Opposition parties accused the Socialist Party of Serbia (former Communists) at today's press conference in Belgrade of "introducing brutal violence in Serbia's political life."

Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic accused the socialists of organizing a "brutal attack on his supporters" two days ago in Kosovo Polje (Province of Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia).

"The press gave a biased report on this incident," said Draskovic. He offered the press a video recording of the incident.

Draskovic organized the promotion of his party two days ago in Kosovo Polje, but a number of supporters of the Socialist Party which is headed by Serbian Presidency President Slobodan Milosevic turned up at the rally.

Serbian Assembly Deputy Zarko Jokanovic also spoke to the press today and said that he and another six delegates voted against the new Serbian constitution, adding that he has been under state security surveillance since then.

Serb Renewal Party Accuses Socialists Over Rally

LD3009204190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 30 Sep 90

[Text] Valjevo, Yugoslavia, 30 Sep (TANJUG)—Leaders of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) [Srpski Pokret Obnove—SPO], the most powerful opposition party in the Yugoslav republic of Serbia, today accused the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) [Socijalisticka Partija Srbije—SPS] of being responsible for the failure of yesterday's promotion rally of the SRM in Kosovo Polje, in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo.

The accusation was voiced at the SRM's rally in Valjevo, Serbia, today.

The SPS had organized a rally at the same time and place (in the vicinity of the provincial capital of Pristina) as

the SRM. Supporters of the two parties clashed, bandying insults and accusations of betrayal of Serbia.

SRM vice-president, writer Milan Komnenic, accused the SPS of having tried to lynch SRM leaders at Kosovo Polje. He further accused SPS president and leader of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic of having 'left as hostages' the Serbs in Kovoso, who have been suffering for decades the terrorism of ethnic Albanian separatists.

At today's rally, attended by some 2,000 supporters of the SRM, the party's local committee demanded the resignation of President Milosevic and republican Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic. A statement released by the party committee claims that, "instead of being the president of all Serbs, (Milosevic) has become a factor of division of the Serbian people".

Macedonian Chamber Discusses Serbian Border

LD2809172190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1326 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Skopje, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The Assembly of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Macedonia at today's session obliged the Republican Executive Council to make contact with the Executive Council of the SR of Serbia on defining the territorial border between the two republics. At a separate session, the sociopolitical chamber accepted a republican government report saying there is due reason to review the territorial border between the SR of Serbia and the SR of Macedonia because of the inconsistency of the procedure in 1946 that continues today.

It was determined that there is evidence that the territorial border between the two republics has not been appropriately fixed, and as a result the work begun more than four decades ago should be completed.

Macedonian Assembly Chamber Adopts Amnesty Law

LD2809171390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1421 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Skopje, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The sociopolitical chamber of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia at today's session adopted a republican law on the amnesty of sentenced persons that reduces by one-quarter the sentences of all sentenced persons.

In the original draft law on the amnesty, it was envisaged that sentences be reduced by one-quarter for those who were being sentenced for the first time and by 15 percent of the envisaged period for those who are serving a prison sentence for the second time. However, in the debate, arguments were accepted that for humane reasons it is better for a unified criterion for reduced sentences to be adopted, which is at the same time in keeping with laws on amnesty that have already been adopted in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and partly also with a similar law in Slovenia.

Macedonia Rejects Albanian Registration Request

LD0110131390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1235 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Tetovo, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—Apostol Sibinoski, the chief of police of the town of Tetovo, Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Monday [1 October] announced that a registration request by the Albanian cultural community of Tetovo, had been rejected.

The official explanation says that the community's program, statute and aims are not in keeping with the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Macedonia.

Tetovo, Western Macedonia, has a majority ethnic Albanian population.

Bosnian Party Threatens Election Boycott

LD2809105990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0946 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—At last night's meeting of Bosnia-Hercegovinian republican leaders and 38 party representatives, the Workers' Democratic Party - Federalist Party (WDP-FP) [acronym as received] said it would launch a boycott of the forthcoming elections in the republic if the electoral law is not changed.

At the meeting, we pointed out the need for democratization of the electoral law and for corrections to enable equality and peaceful life to the nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina, WDP-FP Executive Committee President Dragan Djokanovic said.

We suggested that Bosnia-Hercegovina be one electoral unit, that the number of signatures be reduced to a reasonable proportion, that the procedure of handing in signatures be simplified and thus enable more parties to take part in the elections.

At last night's meeting, the WDP-FP decided to inform the public and other opposition parties that, if the electoral law is not changed immediately, it would boycott the forthcoming elections in the republic, Djokanovic said.

Montenegro Condemns 'Nationalistic Madness'

LD2809205690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1735 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] Titograd, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—The Presidency of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro on Friday supported efforts that the future co-existence of the Yugoslav peoples be decided by agreement.

The stands of the Presidency, explained today to the republican parliament deputies by republican President Dr Branko Kostic, describe Yugoslavia as a federal and democratic community, the only option.

Evaluating that "nationalistic madness and hysteria are acquiring dramatic dimensions" throughout the country, the Montenegrin Presidency called all the citizens of the

republic, regardless of political, religious or national affiliation, to "bury the hatchet" of the past and "not to turn the wheel of history backwards."

The first postwar multi-party elections are to be held in Montenegro and three other Yugoslav republics, as well as on the federal level, by the end of the year.

Such elections were already held last spring in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

Markovic on Republics' Independence Moves, Motives

AU3009211190 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 29-30 Sep 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Ante Markovic by Maren Koester-Hetzendorf in Belgrade; date not given: "Do You Want To Stay or Not?"]

[Text] Belgrade—"We do not force anybody to live under the existing circumstances. We even go so far as to ask the people very frankly whether they want to stay in Yugoslavia or not." It is with unprecedented clearness that Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic discusses the independence aspirations in the individual republics of Yugoslavia.

Markovic now fully backs the Presidium on this issue, whose chairman, the Serb Boris Jovic, announced a referendum on the future form of government of the Balkan state recently. At first, Markovic rejected this because—he argued—it does not square with the government program which is oriented toward Yugoslavia.

Now the prime minister calls upon the republics "that want to go to take measures to go." However, Markovic also makes it clear that "those who stay must respect the Constitution. We will insist on that."

He believes that only a parliament that has been elected in free all-Yugoslav elections can offer solutions for Yugoslavia's future. On this point Markovic obviously represents a different position from that of the Presidium. The Presidium last week announced direct negotiations of the six republics on the future form of government.

However, it is not clear when Markovic wants the republics to decide on whether they will stay in Yugoslavia—now or after the new parliament has drafted a solution.

Markovic's position on the expulsion ordered by Serbian authorities recently, of a delegation of the "International Helsinki Federation," a human rights organization, is remarkable. He said that in this case, legal action would be taken. The Serbian authorities were asked to revoke the measure. However, it is the task of legal organs to investigate the incident, said Markovic.

The delegation visited the Serbian province of Kosovo early in September to study the human rights situation there. The delegates were arrested by Serbian police, and their passports were stamped "persona non grata."

Regarding another visit to Kosovo by members of the Helsinki Federation on Monday [1 October], Markovic said that the federal government has authorized this visit, and measures have been taken to "prevent similar incidents." He said, however, that he is unable to guarantee the local authorities' future conduct.

Nor is Markovic willing to promise that Christine von Kohl, the head of the delegation expelled, can again visit Kosovo on Monday. "That is a decision of the legal organs."

Legal Organs Against Serbian Police?

Yugoslav Government circles have been anxious to make it clear that this is not out of regard for Serbia. They say that legal measures are the only way to show the Serbian police the limits of their official authority.

Given the constantly increasing tendencies of independence, is the Yugoslav federal Government not sitting "on an empty box"; Markovic does not accept that. When we took office "we knew from our past experience and from other countries' experience that the crisis can only be overcome by a basic reform of the system." He said that people had anticipated that national, religious, political, and anticommunist feelings would be released. However, Markovic is optimistic that the resultant problems can be resolved over a long term. "After all, we have seen time and again that even wars end with negotiations."

The prime minister stresses that the decision to begin with economic reforms was correct. Markovic lists the successes: Decreasing inflation from 65 percent in December 1989 to zero; liberalizing 90 percent of the imports ("a maximum in a European comparison"); introducing a convertible currency by tying the dinar to the Deutsche mark; currency reserves totaling $10 billion, which means an increase of $3 billion as against late in 1989.

Markovic: "That cannot be compared with Germany, France, or Great Britain; but other European countries at a medium development level do not have such high currency reserves."

The chief of government admits, however, that there are "tendencies" in some republics to oppose the federal government's program. Yet he demonstrates optimism: "The best way of dealing with opposition to reforms is reform itself."

Markovic says that the production decrease which according to him amounts to 10 percent, is by no means dramatic. He says that for reforming such an inefficient economy, it is a relatively low price. In addition, he is optimistic that the newly developing private economy

will absorb the negative side-effects of the reform—the production decrease, unemployment, and social tensions.

The prime minister argues that "self-managing socialism has merely simulated the market economy." A genuine market economy will now be introduced by consistently privatizing the social property.

However, Markovic keeps to another pillar of Yugoslav policy—nonalignment. He says that the disbanding of the old blocs—the Warsaw Pact and possibly NATO as well—does not mean "that all contradictions will disappear."

Who would have predicted the Gulf crisis several months ago?—the priem minister asks. However, the way conflicts are dealt with has changed, he says. Markovic is convinced that new alliances will be concluded by the "big powers." There is no reason to give up nonalignment, he says.

Markovic does not say much about the other pillar of the Yugoslav system—the Army. "Everything in our society must change, including the Army. Nothing can remain intact."

Europeanization of the Balkans as a Goal

How intact is Yugoslavia's policy toward its neighbors in the Balkans? "A delicate issue," says Markovic, and adds diplomatically: "The point is not the Balkanization of Europe but the Europeanization of the Balkans." Relations with neighboring countries are complicated because of the minorities. Belgrade's support for the Macedonian minority in Greece has clouded its relations with this neighbor country.

The prime minister comments on the prospects of the "Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia" founded by Markovic after concluding the official part of the meeting which was organized by the Federal Secretariat of Information, because the party is labeled a government organ anyway, he says. As a party chief, Markovic says that he meets with considerable opposition among the Serbian nationalists. His party has been established in all republics by the end of the month, "except in Serbia," he says.

In Belgrade, the controversies led to initial trouble: Rowdies of the radical rightist Chetnik movement intruded into a party meeting recently and hurt a speaker of the Markovic party. Markovic says that "not a single policeman appeared on the scene." He says it is a "Yugoslav paradox": "The government seems to be in opposition in some republics."

How does the new party chief come to grips with his political past? Markovic says: "I was in the Communist Party, however, there was always a radical wing which was not in power."

Markovic is convinced that his party will be successful in Yugoslavia, despite all the obstacles: "I never promised anything, unless I was able to keep it."

Alliance of Reformist Forces Outlines Goals

LD0110200190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1538 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—The Alliance of Reformist Forces for the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina now has 420,000 registered members, and 30 or so other founding assemblies are set to be held in the coming period, as party representatives told a regular news conference today.

The Alliance of Reformist Forces gets its funds from donors and from its marketing activities, and soon plans to introduce a membership fee, as it was set out today.

The leader of the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia is Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

The Presidency of the Alliance of Reformist Forces for Bosnia-Hercegovina today called on the progressive public to oppose all attempts at having Yugoslavia's victims of fascism fall into oblivion. The reformist forces consider a disgraceful act the burning of the Yugoslav national flag at the Split stadium and demand that the competent authorities energetically prevent such acts of vandalism.

Jovic Addresses UN on Gulf Crisis, Reforms

LD2809210490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1831 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] United Nations, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia applauds all processes which lead to the opening of a political solution to the latest crisis in the Gulf and is ready to take part in them, Yugoslav Federal Presidency President Dr Borisav Jovic said today.

In his speech to the 45th session of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly, Jovic repeated that Yugoslavia, individually and as chairman of the Non-aligned Movement, resolutely condemns the annexation of Kuwait, which it considers null and void, supports the legitimate Kuwaiti Government and demands an urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from the territory of this country.

The Yugoslav president urged that all actions of the international community, including the presence of armed forces in the Gulf, are being conducted with great discipline and responsibility. "I am certain that it is in the interest of the entire international community to prevent an armed conflict whose consequences cannot be forseen, and that the situation which preceded the invasion be restored," he said.

Jovic also urged that the Middle East problem be resolved, with the full realization of the rights of the Palestinian people to self determination, including the

right to their own state, and Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories. The best way for realizing this goal, he said, would be to call an international conference on the Middle East, under U.N. auspices, of which the Non-aligned Movement is also in favor.

Speaking about the situation in Yugoslavia, Jovic expressed the strong determination of his country to continue the economic and social reforms aimed at introducing a market economy and political [word indistinct].

"We are convinced that we are on the right path and that we shall continue to find support and understanding from the widest circle of countries for the reforms which are [word indistinct] said the Yugoslav president who took part in the debate at the 45th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Meets With Romanian, Nicaraguan Leaders

LD2809225290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2039 GMT 28 Sep 90

[Text] New York, 28 Sep (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic met on Friday [28 September] in New York with Romanian President Ion Iliescu and Nicaraguan President Violeta Barrios Chamorro.

Jovic is in New York attending the general debate at the U.N. General Assembly and the first children's summit.

In his talk with the Romanian president, Jovic discussed the situation caused by the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait and the consequences to two countries were suffering at the economic level by abiding firmly to the U.N. Security Council decision on the introduction of economic sanctions against Iraq. Jovic and Iliescu also devoted full attention to the development of Balkan cooperation.

Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro said in her talk with President Jovic she shared Yugoslavia's stand on the activity of the Movement of Nonalignment, and stressed that in the new and changed international circumstances the Movement was taking on a new direction and obligations.

She also informed Jovic about Nicaragua's endeavors to restore internal stability and recover the economy. Also, she noted that she expected the relations between Yugoslavia and Nicaragua to continue unfolding in the earlier-set friendly direction.

Earlier in the day at a formal ceremony, Jovic was presented with the plaque of a peace organization headed by Indian Guru Shrin Chinmoy, a follower of the Mahatma Gandhi peace movement.

Holds 'Meaningful' Talks With Bush

LD0210035590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2234 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] New York, 1 Oct, (TANJUG)—United States President George Bush today received the president of the SFRY Presidency, Borisav Jovic, in the presidential suite of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. The friendly and cordial talks lasted for more than half an hour.

In the course of the talks, which President Jovic assessed as "very meaningful," President Bush clearly underscored that the U.S. is interested in seeing Yugoslavia united, and its prosperity stemming from economic and political reforms. The U.S. President has expressed satisfaction because Yugoslavia shares with the U.S. and other members of the world community, views on the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

President Bush wanted to find out in detail about the situation in Yugoslavia, about which President Jovic correctly informed him.

According to Jovic, the talks were very beneficial for the future relations between the two countries. On this occasion, he extended an official invitation to President Bush to visit Yugoslavia, which was received with approval. The date and details of the visit will be arranged in due course.

Bush Expresses 'Keen Interest'

LD0210085890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2310 GMT 1 Sep 90

[Text] New York, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—U.S. President George Bush had talks today with the president of the SFRY Presidency, Dr. Borisav Jovic, in the presidential suite of New York's Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Their cordial and friendly talks lasted for over half an hour.

Soon after his meeting with President Bush, SFRY Presidency President Jovic spoke briefly with journalists. He expressed his satisfaction with the "very friendly, very sincere, and very meaningful meeting during which President Bush clearly stated the United States interest in a united Yugoslavia and its prosperity on the basis of economic and democratic reforms." Bush also expressed his "great pleasure with the fact that Yugoslavia shares with the United States and all other member-states of the world community identical views on the crisis in the Persian Gulf."

Bush showed a keen interest in the situation in Yugoslavia and was informed about it by President Jovic. In the view of the SFRY Presidency president the talks were also useful for the relations between our two countries. President Bush was invited to visit Yugoslavia with the hope that the intensity of the talks and the dialogue between our two countries will be resumed in the same direction as was the case on this occasion in New York. The invitation was accepted in principle, but no agreement was reached on the details and the date of the visit.

Asked by a U.S. journalist if he thought the situation in the Gulf is moving toward a military solution instead of a diplomatic one and if this was discussed in the meeting with Bush, President Jovic said Bush's speech in the United Nations "is in the spirit of searching for best

possible solutions." President Jovic described a military solution as "the last and the worst possible option."

Asked to explain what kind of dialogue is envisaged between the United States and Yugoslavia in the course of preparations for President Bush's possible visit to Yugoslavia, SFRY Presidency President Jovic stressed that "it was agreed to intensify the dialogue between our two countries at the ministerial and all other levels, including the presidential level."

Bush also showed interest in the present stage in the process of economic and political changes in Yugoslavia. He was also informed about current difficulties which our country has been experiencing in both areas. On this occasion, Jovic said, the U.S. President expressed support for Yugoslavia's efforts to implement economic and political reforms. On the U.S. side the talks were attended by Secretary of State James Baker; Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser; and Hutchinson, head of the European Department in the U.S. State Department. On the Yugoslav side Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, and Dzevad Mujezinovic, the SFRY ambassador in Washington, took part in the talks.

Following his talks with President Bush, the SFRY presidency president, Dr. Borisav Jovic, who arrived in New York last Thursday [27 September] to address the 45th regular session of the UN General Assembly and the first "children's summit," and where he had meetings and extensive talks with a number of heads of state, left New York for Yugoslavia aboard a JAT [Yugoslavia's national airline] airplane.

Ends New York Visit, Departs

LD0210035990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2337 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] New York, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic left New York for Belgrade this evening, at the close of a four-day visit to the United Nations headquarters.

During the visit, Jovic attended the session of the United Nations General Assembly and the first world summit on children.

In New York, the Yugoslav president had meetings with a number of foreign heads of state, with whom he held useful and exhaustive talks. This evening, at New York's Waldorf Astoria hotel, Jovic spent half an hour in talks with U.S. President George Bush.

Loncar, Shevardnadze Discuss Relations, Gulf

LD2909212290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] New York, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, and Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, held talks today in New York on international cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, world problems, and the new role of the United Nations in the present crisis in the Gulf. The two ministers are leading delegations of their countries at the 45th regular session of the UN General Assembly in New York. During their 90-minute talk, Loncar and Shevardnadze analyzed the internal development of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and here the Soviet minister showed exceptional interest in the reforms which are underway in our country, above all in the economic sphere. The foreign ministers of the two countries assessed that bilateral cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR is at a high level, but that there are difficulties over the payments owed to Yugoslavia. The Soviet side pointed out that in the USSR, there is a desire to solve this question, too.

In talks on developing a European system of security and cooperation within the framework of the CSCE, the ministers expressed identical stands on the need for the process to grow into an institution, accompanied by instituting the creation of appropriate mechanisms such as an all-European parliament, a CSCE Secretariat, and a Council of Ministers of this body. The positive develoment in Europe, it was said, cannot be viewed seperately from world development. In this connection the Soviet minister pointed in particular to the importance of the nonaligned countries, and paid tribute to Yugoslavia for its dynamic leadership.

Consideration was also given to affirming and strengthening the UN's role in resolving the burning problems of the modern world.

"An aggressor cannot be rewarded, nor may it obtain privileges, because this would bring into question the whole of the present system of collective security in the framework of existing international institutions," the Soviet foreign minister said in categorical terms in relation to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Loncar and Shevardnadze agreed that support for the measures of the United Nations expressed in the resolutions of the Security Council is vital, and they pointed out the need to find a political solution. They also agreed that it is necessary to apply all means, including those arising out of Article 42 of the UN Charter, so that Iraq is forced to withdraw from Kuwait and to allow the return of the legal government to this country.

Shevardnadze appealed to the Nonaligned Movement, and to Yugoslavia as president of this movement, to engage themselves in talks with Iraq. He paid tribute to Yugoslavia for its rapid reaction up to this point and the channeling of its efforts into a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Gulf, in keeping with the UN Security Council resolutions.

Addresses New York CSCE Session

LD0210054790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0150 GMT 2 Oct 90

[Text] New York, 2 Oct (TANJUG)—A new and different Europe is taking shape on the political map of the

world, but it cannot be built without building a whole new world. The risks taken by the world are those taken by Europe, too, and an example of this is the Iraqi aggression on and annexation of Kuwait, Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar said in his speech in New York on Monday evening [1 October], in a ministerial meeting of the countries-participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

This act is not only in contravention of international law, it is also a direct threat to global peace and security, Loncar added.

In Europe, increasingly frequent manifestations of extreme forms of nationalism are giving rise to concern, Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Loncar went on to say. Europe's risks lie also in a discrepancy in the development of individual parts of the continent and a threat that bloc divisions, which have been surmounted, might be replaced by other and no less dangerous divisions.

It is natural that the CSCE, as an all-European democratic forum which has so far been an important factor of stability, should form the basis for the new edifice, the future common European home, Loncar stressed, and added that the forthcoming CSCE summit in Paris might be a historic turning point towards a new era of understanding and cooperation.

The document to be adopted in Paris should anticipate and channel development in the direction which shall best reflect the interests of all European countries and nations, Loncar said, and added that Yugoslavia is ready to take equal part in the future all-European talks on disarmament and security.

The positive impulses which have transformed the political map of Europe in less than a year's time are also being felt in the Balkans, where the process of constituting states in a democratic manner, something unprecedented in the more recent or distant past, still opens some old wounds, the Yugoslav foreign secretary said.

In the context of the protection and promotion of the rights of ethnic minorities, the Paris document may go further than the provisions adopted in Copenhagen, Loncar said, and urged a more explicit recognition of the collective rights of minorities.

Yugoslavia upholds the idea of institutionalization of the CSCE, as expressed in the joint document of the neutral and non-aligned countries adopted at their ministerial conference in Malta earlier this year, Loncar stressed. In this context, we urge a linkage of some European institutions, such as the Council of Europe, with the CSCE system, a gradual transformation of the European Community into an all-European project and body, as well as the creation of a European assembly in which should be represented the parliaments of all the CSCE participating states.

Serbian Chetnik Corps Prepared To Fight in Gulf

LD0110135690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1259 GMT 1 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Oct (TANJUG)—At about 1100 today several tens of members of the "Serbian Chetnik Movement" [Srpski Cetnicki Pokret—SCP] gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade to "express support" for U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf.

According to SCP Vice Chairman Aleksandar Stepanovic, a "Chetnik corps" of 100 people is ready to come under the UN flag and fight in the Gulf "in UN uniforms with Serbian and Chetnik markings."

The SCP is ready to "fight anywhere in the world against the two common enemies of the Serbian and American people—communism and Islamic fundamentalism," Stepanovic said.

After one hour the "Chetniks" who had gathered dispersed peacefully.

Serbia Signs Economic Protocol With Russia

LD2909142690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1333 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 29 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and the Soviet Republic of Russia signed a protocol on economic cooperation at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce on Saturday [29 September].

The protocol involves the realization of 26 projects, worth around 300 million dollars. The ten-key projects include the construction of sugar plants, brickyards and other factories. Also included are deliveries of equipment, rendering of various services, forming of joint enterprises etc.

The protocol, to be followed by individual contracts, was signed by representatives of the Consortium for Serbia's Economic Cooperation with Russia and the Russian Ministry of Agriculture.